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The collective ideologies of the 20th and 21st century have illustrated the 
horrifying scale of human atrocities that can be committed in the name of ideological 
groups and causes. While philosophers and historians have developed rich accounts 
of the societal factors shaping the forces behind participation in collective ideologies, 
there has been remarkably little rigorous scientific investigation into the cognitive and 
neural factors that can increase an individual’s susceptibility to ideological dogmatism 
and extremism. The aim of the current doctoral research was therefore to examine 
what psychological traits make some individuals more vulnerable to ideological 
thinking than others. 
Theory-driven and data-driven approaches were employed to map out the 
cognitive underpinnings of ideological thinking. A series of large online studies 
encompassing over 1,500 participants revealed that ideological rigidity may be rooted 
in cognitive rigidity, such that the rigidity with which individuals process and 
evaluate neutral stimuli predicts the rigidity and extremity of their ideological beliefs. 
This relationship was corroborated across multiple ideological domains, including 
nationalism, religion, political partisanship, dogmatism, and extremist attitudes, 
uncovering a tight link between low-level perceptual processes and high-level 
ideological attitudes. 
Furthermore, a data-driven approach using Bayesian analyses was adopted to 
study the cognitive and personality signatures of political conservatism, nationalism, 
religiosity, and dogmatism. This exposed that psychological dispositions can predict 
ideological attitudes substantially better than traditional demographic variables, 
challenging the dominant perspective in the social sciences that socioeconomic 




This research program therefore suggests that ideological attitudes are amenable 
to careful cognitive and computational analysis. The findings signify that individual 
differences in our cognitive dispositions may underpin the intensity of our ideological 
adherence – and so a rigorous scientific study of the ideological mind may illuminate 














“So long as you write what you wish to write, that is all that matters; and whether it 
matters for ages or only for hours, nobody can say.” 





“To listen to a symphony, one doesn’t situate oneself among the brass but in a place 
where the sounds of the diverse instruments blend in the way the composer wanted 
them to. After that one could enjoy dissecting the score, note by note, and in doing 
so study the manner of its orchestration. In the same way, in front of a divided 
picture, it will be advisable first to stand far enough away to perceive the impression 
of the whole, then stop and come closer to study the play of coloured elements.”  
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1.1 A Cognitive Lens on Ideologies 
Since the birth of modern civilization, humans have been creating stories that 
capture their theories about how the world works and how they should act within this 
complex world. These narratives both describe and prescribe human action, and exist 
in a kaleidoscope of forms – from religious doctrines to political manifestos, and from 
racial supremacy to authoritarian nationalism. These accounts are broadly termed 
“ideologies”, and envelope humans’ personal and social lives to a considerable 
degree. The Pew Research Centre estimates that 84.4% of people affiliate with a 
religious institution1, and the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance approximates that over 1.3 billion people voted in their local parliamentary 
elections across the world between 2016 and 20192. Exposure to and participation in 
collective ideologies is therefore remarkably prevalent and consequential to people’s 
daily lives.  
The psychological and societal ramifications of widespread engagement in 
ideologies are highly multifaceted. On one hand, ideologies confer a sense of meaning 
and social connectedness to a community of fellow believers (Hogg, 2005, 2014). On 
the other hand, ideologies have also given rise to history’s gravest atrocities; people 
are often willing to kill and die in the name of an ideological cause, and to take extreme 
measures to defend a cherished ideal or community (Swann et al., 2009, 2014; 
Whitehouse & Lanman, 2014; Whitehouse, 2018). The pervasive nature of these 
behaviours has motivated substantial theorising on their origin: scholars of 
philosophy, history, and politics have long sought to identify the forces shaping the 
emergence and adoption of ideologies. Early theories developed in the social sciences 
will therefore serve as a critical foundation upon which the present research will build. 
                                                          
 
1 Data can be found at: 
http://globalreligiousfutures.org/explorer#/?subtopic=15&chartType=pie&year=2020&data_type=percentage
&religious_affiliation=all&destination=to&countries=Worldwide&age_group=all&gender=all&pdfMode=false 
2 Data can be found at: https://www.idea.int/data-tools/question-view/441 
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Specifically, there are two striking – and often understated – observations that 
guided the present research. Firstly, social scientists have frequently noted that not all 
individuals are equally likely to internalize ideologies and adhere to them in an 
extreme fashion. In their pioneering book, The Authoritarian Personality, Adorno and 
colleagues (1950) asked “why is it that certain individuals accept [fascist] ideas while 
others do not?” (p. 3). Soon afterwards, in 1955, psychologist Richard Crutchfield 
posed a similar question about conformity: “what traits of character distinguish 
between those [people] exhibiting much conformity behaviour… and those exhibiting 
little conformity?” (Crutchfield, 1955, p. 194). Building on these ideas, the sociologist 
Edward Shils noted that individuals are differentially susceptible to ideological 
doctrines, and that this is not purely a matter of upbringing or socioeconomic context: 
“not all those who live in a broken and disadvantaged condition are drawn equally 
by the magnet of the ideological orientation” (Shils, 1958, p. 463-464). Social 
psychologist Thomas Blass further highlighted the presence of interpersonal variation 
in ideological and authoritarian processes; “that there are individual differences in 
obedience is a fact because in most obedience studies, given the same stimulus 
situation, one finds both obedience and disobedience taking place” (Blass, 1991, p. 
402). Early social psychological theorising therefore hypothesized the existence of 
individual difference factors that may amplify individuals’ susceptibility to 
ideological processes. 
The second critical observation is that diverse, and sometimes opposing, 
ideologies use strikingly similar tools and mechanisms to inculcate their followers and 
galvanize them towards collective action and self-sacrifice (Hoffer, 1951). All 
ideologies, regardless of their doctrine or ambition, possess two essential qualities. 
Firstly, all ideologies embrace some form of rigid dogma or at least a simple premise 
that assumes the existence of one true explanation of – and corresponding solution to 
– existing societal conditions. These accounts frequently possess a compelling logic, if 
the premises are believed (Arendt, 1951). All ideologies therefore enforce a sharp 
distinction between those in possession of the ideology’s truth and those who are not 
and espouse categorical divisions between what constitutes “good” versus “evil” and 
who belongs to the ideological ingroup (“us”) and who does not (“them”). As 
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sociologist Edward Shils suggested in 1958, “the belief of those who practice politics 
ideologically [is] that they alone have the truth about the right ordering of life – of life 
as a whole, and not just of political life” (Shils, 1958, p. 451). Ideologies thus breed 
rigidity and dogmatism about truth, morality, and identity. Secondly, all ideologies 
invent and adopt clear identity markers, such as flags, symbols, anthems, costumes, and 
rituals, which signal membership and devotion. The shared and visible nature of these 
identity markers foster passionate feelings of immersion and connectedness with the 
ideological group. Indeed, people are often prepared to kill and die over a flag or a 
defaced ideological symbol (Whitehouse et al., 2014; Swann et al., 2010a, 2010b). By 
dispensing clear guidelines for what to believe and how to act, as well as offering a 
group to which one can belong, ideologies resolve feelings of uncertainty and 
rootlessness (Hogg, 2014; Jost, 2017; Kruglanski et al., 2014, 2017). 
These common tools of ideological indoctrination – rigid dogma and identity 
markers – can be found consistently across the spectrum of ideological persuasions. 
From fascism and communism to radical eco-activism and religious evangelism, 
ideological groups offer absolute answers to societal troubles, strict rules for 
behaviour, and an ingroup mentality through dedicated practices and symbols. These 
mechanisms are further facilitated and amplified by propaganda (Holbig, 2013), 
systems of punishment for deviance and disbelief (Boyd, Gintis, Bowles, & Richerson, 
2003; Fehr & Gachter, 2002; Schweitzer, 1962), and familial and kinship metaphors 
which are often used to depict fellow comrades as “sisters and brothers-in-arms”, 
religious leaders as “mothers and fathers”, the nation as the “motherland” or 
“fatherland”, and revolutionaries as the “sons and daughters” of ideological causes 
(Whitehouse & Lanman, 2014). These characteristics emerge even when the ideology 
is guided by the sincerest intentions and ideals, and allow ideologies to endow 
followers with a sense of coherence, belonging, meaning, and identity that is tightly 
intertwined with their attachment to the ideological group. 
The current research therefore built on the observations that (1) individuals 
vary in their susceptibility to ideological doctrines and processes, and (2) that there is 
remarkable uniformity in the composition and consequences of diverse ideologies. It 
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sought to examine what individual differences make people susceptible to thinking in 
ideologically rigid ways, regardless of the content of that ideology. Rather than 
focusing on socioeconomic predictors, as has been done in the past (e.g. Brown-
Iannuzzi, Lundberg, & McKee, 2017; Jetten, Haslam, & Barlow, 2013), it emphasized 
psychological predictors. And instead of investigating one specific ideological domain 
(e.g. politics or religion), it examined the correlates of a multitude of ideologies. The 
research program detailed and developed in the following pages thereby emerged 
from one primary question: What psychological traits make some individuals more 
susceptible to joining ideological groups and adhering to ideological doctrines than others? 
What do we mean by “ideology”? While ideology has been defined in the past 
in myriad ways (for a useful review see Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009), such as a 
“system of beliefs” (Converse, 1964) or an “organization of opinion, attitudes, and 
values – a way of thinking about man and society” (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 2), here we 
are concerned with a more specific phenomenon. An ideology, in the sense evaluated 
here, possesses two characteristics. Firstly, it has a doctrinal component, reflected in a 
doctrine composed of a set of descriptive and prescriptive attitudes about social 
relations and norms. In other words, an ideology constitutes prescriptions for how 
people ought to think, behave, and interact. Secondly, an ideology entails a relational 
component, in which there is strong ingroup favouritism towards other adherents of 
the ideology coupled with distrust towards outgroups3.  These structural components 
can become psychological: Ideological thinking can therefore be defined as a style of 
thinking that is rigid in its adherence to a doctrine and resistance to belief-updating 
(i.e. doctrinal), and oriented towards an ingroup and antagonistic to outgroups (i.e. 
selectively relational)4. There is both interpersonal and intrapersonal variation in the 
                                                          
 
3 These two components map on roughly (but not exactly) to a distinction made in political science between issue-
based (operational) political ideology and identity-based (symbolic) ideology (Ellis & Stimson, 2012; Mason, 2018).  
Issue-based (operational) ideology can be thought of as the component of political ideologies concerned with policy 
attitudes (Free & Cantril, 1967). Identity-based (symbolic) ideology reflects the social connection to groups that 
hold particular ideological labels, such as “liberal” and “conservative” (Levitin & Miller, 1979). 
4 Importantly, throughout the dissertation, the term “ideological” refers both to the property of being associated 
with an ideological doctrine (in the traditional sense) and to the property of having the doctrinal and 
relational/parochial characteristics of ideologies as defined here. 
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intensity and manifestation of individuals’ ideological thinking, signifying that we can 
study the emergence of ideological worldviews across and within individuals. 
Rich lines of inquiry in social psychology have been established to try to unpack 
the complex processes by which individuals transition from exposure to an ideological 
doctrine to devout participation and adherence. Nonetheless, the study of ideology is 
marked by substantial balkanization. There is now a psychology of politics (Jost et al., 
2003a), of religion (Norenzayan, 2013), of nationalism (Anderson, 1983; Billig, 1995), 
of prejudice (Brandt, 2017; Duckitt & Sibley, 2009), of dehumanization (Haslam, 2006), 
of obedience (Haslam & Reicher, 2007; Reicher & Haslam, 2011), of collective action 
(van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008), of conspiracy theories (Douglas, Sutton, & 
Cichocka, 2017; van Prooijen & Van Vugt, 2018), of radicalization (Kruglanski et al., 
2014) – but there isn’t an overarching psychology of ideology.  
The reasons for this fractionation are historical, methodological, and 
conceptual, and perhaps all can be traced to a theoretical interest in the content of 
ideological beliefs rather than the structure of ideological thinking. In other words, 
researchers have focused on asking why individuals believe specific ideological 
claims (such as about the presence of omniscient gods or capitalistic worldviews), 
rather than why ideological attitudes – regardless of their content – are so compelling 
to the human mind and pervasive across civilizations. An emphasis on the content of 
ideological beliefs justifies the existing academic landscape, in which each ideological 
domain merits its own discipline of study. In contrast, a theoretical and empirical 
focus on the processes of ideological immersion invites a holistic, interdisciplinary 
outlook that addresses the commonalities across diverse ideologies. 
To ground the present research in previous findings and theoretical 
frameworks, the following subsections will (1) offer a brief review of the psychology 
of ideology (Section 1.2), (2) evaluate the conceptual and methodological challenges 
and gaps in the literature (Section 1.3), (3) outline the theory-driven component of this 
doctoral research, specifically the cognitive rigidity hypothesis of ideology (relevant to 
Chapters 2-5; Section 1.4), and (4) delineate the data-driven methods employed to 
study the cognitive underpinnings of diverse ideological attitudes (relevant to 
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Chapter 6; Section 1.5). This will set the stage for the research program sparked by the 
quest to answer these historical, and yet highly modern and topical, questions.  
1.2 The History of the Study of Ideology 
1.2.1 Philosophical and Psychological Beginnings (19th and 20th 
Century) 
The study of ideology has a rich history that spans philosophy, history, political 
science, sociology, anthropology, and psychology, and has been continuously 
informed by political and societal events (Durrheim, 1997). Perhaps one of the earliest 
modern philosophers to write about the dangers of ideologies was the German 
existentialist philosopher, Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche distinguished between “the 
man of convictions” and “the man of scientific thinking” (1878/2008, p. 40), whereby 
he defined a conviction as “the belief that in some point in knowledge one possesses 
absolute truth” (1878/2008, p. 40). He proposed that a conviction therefore holds three 
problematic assumptions: (1) “that absolute truths exist”, (2) “that the perfect methods 
for arriving at them have been found”, and (3) “that every man who has convictions 
makes use of these perfect methods” (Nietzsche, 1878/2008, p. 40). By delineating the 
relationship between convictions and dogmatic thinking, as well as how these are 
antithetical to evidence-based scientific thinking, Nietzsche argued that “convictions 
are more dangerous enemies of truth than lies” (Nietzsche, 1878/2008, p. 1). He noted 
that “it is not the struggle of opinions that has made history so violent, but rather the 
struggle of belief in opinions, that is, the struggle of convictions” (Nietszche, 
1878/2008, p. 41). The existentialist philosopher thus set in motion a rich line of 
philosophical inquiry into the ways in which dogmas, mass movements, and 
ideologies can lead to the erosion of reason and individual freedom. This was further 
advanced and articulated by the founder of psychoanalysis Sigmund Freud (1921) in 
Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, by the feminist existentialist philosopher 
Simone de Beauvoir in The Ethics of Ambiguity (1948), by the political philosopher 
Hannah Arendt (1951) in The Origins of Totalitarianism, and by the thinker Eric Hoffer 
in The True Believer (1951), amongst others. 
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With respect to 20th century psychology5, the early writings on the psychology 
of collective ideologies can be traced – as with almost any subdiscipline of psychology 
– to William James. The prolific psychologist set out a vision for the birth of the 
psychology of religion in The Varieties of Religious Experience (James, 1902), in which he 
posited that it is possible to study religion in a rigorous analytical fashion. To illustrate 
this, James invoked the Enlightenment thinker Baruch Spinoza’s words, “I will 
analyse the actions and appetites of men as if it were a question of lines, of planes, and 
of solids” (Spinoza, 1677/2017). Spinoza here suggests that human behaviours, 
thoughts, and desires are amenable to quantitative analysis and a scientific approach. 
James went even further to advocate that despite the variability of religious doctrines6, 
their commonalities may be the most fascinating objects of study: “When we survey 
the whole field of religion, we find a great variety in the thoughts that have prevailed 
there; but… the theories which Religion generates, being thus variable, are secondary; 
and if you wish to grasp her essence, you must look to the feelings and the conduct as 
being the more constant elements” (James, 1902, p. 650). William James thereby 
recommended a focus on the implicit and unconscious common elements evident 
across religious (and other) ideologies, preceding Sigmund Freud’s thinking on the 
relationships between belief and the unconscious by at least 20 years. 
 Half a century later, with a similar vision to William James, the thinker Eric 
Hoffer (1951) wrote expansively about the importance of considering the structural 
and psychological essence of ideologies, rather than focusing on their content. Writing 
about the processes shaping the rise of mass movements, Hoffer noted in The True 
Believer that “when people are ripe for a mass movement, they are usually ripe for any 
effective movement, and not solely for one with a particular doctrine or program” 
(Hoffer, 1951, p. 16). Hoffer tapped into a critical idea: individual-level risk factors for 
ideological thinking may be domain-general and not specific to a particular doctrine. 
That is, the psychological factors that make an individual susceptible to religious 
                                                          
 
5 As opposed to philosophy, wherever a distinction can be meaningfully made. 
6 Although William James explicitly refers to religion, he does include a variety of ideologies as exemplars, which 
may today be thought of as philosophical or spiritual positions, such as Stoicisim and Buddhism.  
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doctrines are remarkably similar to those that make them vulnerable to communist 
ideologies or far-right ideologies or radical social justice ideologies. 
 Despite the prominence of the idea that the way in which an ideology compels 
the mind is at least as psychologically (and philosophically) interesting as its 
idiosyncratic doctrine – an argument evident in the writings of Nietszche, James, and 
Hoffer – it faded in the second half of the 20th century. Historically, this may have been 
due to the powerful influence of the Holocaust on social psychology, which provoked 
renowned American psychologists to focus on the origins of fascism and right-wing 
authoritarianism. The emphasis of Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and 
Sanford’s (1950) The Authoritarian Personality on the psychology of the political right 
had a lasting impact on the development of political psychology, which continued to 
concentrate on explaining political conservatism, authoritarianism, and anti-minority 
prejudice, while largely overlooking left-wing authoritarianism and other ideological 
realms such as nationalism, patriotism, and extreme social and environmental justice 
activism. 
 Social psychology between the 1950s and 1970s made significant advances in 
our understanding of intergroup dynamics, and especially the psychological forces 
shaping conformity (Asch, 1956, Bond, 2005), obedience (Milgram, 1963; Reicher & 
Haslam, 2011; Reicher, Haslam, & Smith, 2012), social categorization (for reviews: 
Cikara, Bruneau, & Saxe, 2011; Cikara & Van Bavel, 2014; Diehl, 1990; Otten, 2016), 
collective action (Van Zomeren et al., 2008), and cognitive dissonance (Festinger & 
Carlsmith, 1959; Festinger, 1962). Nonetheless, it was characterized by a lack of 
integration across these foci of study and an absence of a clear framework that 
considered how all these processes jointly contribute to immersion, adherence, and 
radicalization to ideologies. The drive to uncover the psychological similarities of 
discrepant ideological domains that was present in the early 20th century was mostly 
lost by the late 20th century7. However, in its place, social psychologists continued to 
                                                          
 
7 Perhaps with the exception of terror management theory, which does posit that all ideologies and cultural 
worldviews serve similar defensive functions against existential threat (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986). 
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be inspired by the Freudian idea that our behaviours and beliefs are guided by the 
pursuit of satisfying various needs, motivations, and desires. Consequently, a large 
proportion of 21st social psychology aimed to apply these Freudian principles to the 
question of why people believe in specific ideological doctrines. 
 
1.2.2 Freudian Artefacts: Motivational Accounts of Ideological 
Processes 
Prevailing theories of the psychology of various ideologies and associated 
processes, such as conservatism (Jost et al., 2003a), religious fundamentalism (Hill & 
Williamson, 2005), authoritarianism (Adorno et al., 1950), system-justification (Jost & 
Banaji, 1994), and violent radicalization (Kruglanski et al., 2014), have been explicitly 
motivational accounts. Motivations are frequently defined in this literature in terms of 
psychological processes that energize behaviour in the pursuit of attaining goals 
(mental representations of desired states). These include motives to satisfy basic 
biological and psychogenic needs such as nutrition, safety, and esteem (Maslow, 
1943), as well as higher-order motives to achieve competence (Ryan & Deci, 2000), 
belonging (Fiske, 2010), control and coherence (Higgins, 2011). Theories of ideological 
behaviour in terms of its motivational origins can be traced to the Freudian influences 
on 20th century psychology, and in particular to Adorno and colleagues’ (1950) 
pioneering book, The Authoritarian Personality. In accordance with Freudian and 
psychoanalytic thought, they defined personality as “essentially an organization of 
needs… (drives, wishes, emotional impulses)” (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 5). This 
provoked Adorno and colleagues (1950) to discuss susceptibility to ideologies in terms 
of needs and motivations: “ideologies have for different individuals, different degrees 
of appeal, a matter that depends upon the individual’s needs and the degree to which 
these needs are being satisfied or frustrated” (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 2).  
The language of needs and motivations has persisted as the primary lens 
through which ideological processes are discussed in the academic literature. This has 
had a powerful effect on how the psychological roots of ideologies have been 
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conceptualized, operationalized, and measured. Motivational theories have been 
particularly prominent in three relevant domains of social psychology: (1) social 
identity processes, (2) radicalization, and (3) political conservatism. With respect to 
social identity theories, multiple frameworks have been developed that posit that the 
need to reduce subjective uncertainty or threat motivates individuals to join social 
groups and defend their worldviews. This idea has been elaborated in Uncertainty 
Identity Theory (Hogg, 2007), the Uncertainty Management Model (Van den Bos, 
2009), and Terror Management Theory (Pyszczynski et al., 1999), and supported by 
research illustrating that uncertainty can amplify social categorization and intergroup 
hostility (e.g. Grant & Hogg, 2012; Hogg et al., 2007; Reid & Hogg, 2005; Sherman, 
Hogg, & Maitner, 2009). Building on this literature, in the context of violent extremism, 
Kruglanski and colleagues (e.g. Kruglanski et al., 2009, 2013, 2014, 2017; Webber & 
Kruglanski, 2018) have suggested that radicalization is largely motivated by 
individuals’ quest for personal significance, and that through the experience of social 
connectedness and adherence to violence-justifying ideologies, violent extremism can 
become a means to attain feelings of meaning and self-worth. Indeed, a fruitful line of 
research around Kruglanski’s Significance Quest Theory has demonstrated the 
existence of a relationship between violent political behaviour and motivations to 
reduce feelings of meaninglessness, humiliation, and relative deprivation (e.g. 
Kruglanski et al., 2014; Adam-Troian et al., 2019). Within political psychology, Jost 
and colleagues (2003, 2017) have delineated three primary motivations that may be 
subjectively fulfilled by adopting conservative worldviews: (1) epistemic motives to 
attain coherence and certainty, (2) existential motives to experience safety and 
meaning, and (3) relational motives to feel socially connected with others.  
Although Jost and colleagues’ (2003, 2009, 2017) taxonomy was synthesized to 
account for right-wing political conservatism, it substantially overlaps with theories 
focusing on social identity processes and extremism. These similarities make the 
three-motive taxonomy a valuable classification of the psychological motivations that 
generally elevate the allure of salient ideological narratives. Indeed, epistemic 
motivations to build coherent models of the world and reduce uncertainty or 
ambiguity have been shown to play a role in nationalism (Hogg, Meehan, & 
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Farquharson, 2010; Hohman & Hogg, 2011), religious fundamentalism (Brandt & 
Reyna, 2010), conservatism (Jost, 2017), and radicalism (Hogg & Adelman, 2013). 
Similarly, the existential needs to attain subjective meaning and to solidify one’s 
purpose in the world are manifest amongst those on the political extremes (Maher, 
Igou & Van Tilburg, 2018; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2016), and mortality salience 
manipulations can induce a conservative shift in political attitudes and greater 
support for militant or violent solutions (e.g. Hirschberger & Ein-Dor, 2006; Landau 
et al., 2004; Routledge, Roylance, & Abeyta, 2017). Lastly, relational motives to affiliate 
with others and establish interpersonal relationships have been implicated in 
ideological attachment to a variety of worldviews (Anicich, Fast, Halevy, & Galinsky, 
2015; Baumeister & Leary, 1995; De Dreu, Balliet, & Halevy, 2014; Gebauer & Maio, 
2012; Hennes, Nam, Stern, & Jost, 2012; Jost, 2017; Weise et al., 2008). Consequently, it 
is valuable to consider these three motivations as key predictors of individuals’ 
susceptibility to joining ideological groups and movements regardless of the content 
of their ideological beliefs. 
 
1.3 Gaps and Methodological Challenges in the Literature 
1.3.1 Beyond Motivations: Cognitive Perspectives 
A fundamental insight that has emerged amongst cognitive scientists over the 
past 50 years is that individuals vary in the way in which their brains process 
information from the environment. When presented with identical stimuli, 
individuals will process and physiologically react to these stimuli in different ways, 
based on their cognitive and neural architecture (Posner & Rothbart, 2018; Sallis, 
Smith, & Munafo, 2018; Trofimova, 2016; Trofimova & Robbins, 2016; Trofimova, 
Robbins, Sulis, & Uher, 2018; Uher, 2018). Thus, there are cognitive dispositions – 
enduring biologically-based dispositional tendencies in processing, evaluating, and 
responding to stimuli – that guide individuals’ behaviour and decision making. These 
cognitive dispositions are stable over time, typically not under explicit conscious 
control, and are manifest with regards to neutral non-emotional stimuli, as well as 
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emotionally-valenced stimuli (Trofimova et al., 2018). The robust cognitive scientific 
understanding that human behaviour is not solely determined by needs and 
motivations suggests that purely motivational accounts of the emergence and 
maintenance of ideological worldviews may be insufficient. 
Incorporating modern conceptualizations of cognition into the study of 
ideological processes has been recognized as an important task for both scientific and 
non-scientific (political) reasons. Scientifically, an interest in the relationship between 
cognitive style and ideological attitudes can be traced to the early 20th century (for 
reviews see: Durrheim, 1997 and Van Hiel et al., 2016), and the growing knowledge 
that individual differences are not purely constrained to “needs” but can also be 
manifest in information processing tendencies has opened up an important avenue 
for study. Moreover, with the recent emergence of political neuroscience (Jost, Nam, 
Amodio, & Van Bavel, 2014), it is imperative to elucidate the mediating cognitive 
mechanisms that sit between ideological behaviour and neural activity. From a more 
politically-motivated perspective, Durrheim (1997) noted that numerous political 
critiques sought to use scientific evidence to legitimize the rationality of their ideology 
and denounce the supposedly inherent irrationality of others. Durrheim (1997) wrote 
that “if a direct relationship can be established between an irrational cognitive style 
and specific ideological beliefs, then these beliefs can be reproached on scientific 
grounds – as inaccurate, unsystematic, or inefficient. It may be argued that the 
ideology is an expression of a generalized psychological irrationality” (p. 630; also 
cited in Van Hiel et al., 2016). Political psychology as a field is still grappling with its 
political and societal implications and ambitions (Jost, 2017), but it is the hope that a 
cognitive and computational perspective to these questions will focus on developing 
mechanistic accounts of ideological cognition rather than politically-motivated 
denunciations of particular doctrines. Section 1.5 will discuss how novel 
methodological and analytic techniques from cognitive science can help alleviate 




1.3.2 Measuring Cognitive Dispositions and Style – Past 
Methodological Weaknesses 
Despite the manifest importance of developing an understanding of the 
intersections between cognitive and ideological processes, there has been remarkably 
little integration between cognitive psychology and social psychology on these 
questions. Notably, the motivational frameworks advocated by social and political 
psychology are not only conceptual: they possess associated epistemological 
assumptions and methodological practices that centre on quantifying psychological 
traits using self-report assessments. This differs from the cognitive literature’s 
development of performance-based, objective, implicit tasks designed to assess 
cognitive traits such as inhibition, metacognition, working memory capacity, 
cognitive flexibility, and others. Consequently, the methods that have been used to 
assess “cognitive style” in social psychology have often failed to correspond to those 
developed by the neuropsychological literature. 
In particular, political psychologists have often operationalized “cognitive 
style” in terms of self-report motivational measures, such as need for cognitive closure 
(Webster & Kruglanski, 1997) and need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). Both 
need for cognitive closure and need for cognition have been extensively studied in 
relation to right-wing attitudes (NCC: Chirumbolo, 2002; Cornelis & Van Hiel, 2006; 
Crowson, Thoma, & Hestevold, 2005; Jost et al., 2003a; Kemmelmeier, 1997; 
Kossowska & Van Hiel, 2003; Van Hiel, Pandelaere, & Duriez, 2004; NC: Sargent, 2004; 
Hennes, Nam, Stern & Jost, 2012; Crowson, 2009; Feldman & Johnston, 2014; 
Ksiazkiewicz, Ludeke, & Krueger, 2016). This has led many social and political 
psychologists to claim that their studies evaluate the “cognitive” basis of political 
beliefs, despite the significant limitations of these measures (discussed at greater 
length in Chapter 4).  
The discrepancy between the social and cognitive psychological 
operationalization of cognition has significant implications for the nature of findings 
in this realm. In fact, in a meta-analysis by Van Hiel and colleagues (2016) spanning 
103 samples and over 12,000 participants, the authors found that relationships 
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between measures of cognitive style and right-wing attitudes were larger when the 
study used a self-report measure rather than a behavioural measure of cognitive style. 
This suggests that effect sizes may be inflated as a result of divergent 
operationalizations and an insufficient attention to the cognitive literature. Moreover, 
given that ideological orientations are also self-reported, overreliance on self-report 
measures of “cognition” can induce issues of common method variance. Therefore, 
theoretic and empirical advancement of the field requires a careful examination of the 
role of methodological and terminological considerations in established findings in 
this discipline. 
 
1.3.3 Disentangling Cognition, Motivation, and Personality 
Importantly, there are essential and notable distinctions between cognitive 
dispositions and motivations. Firstly, while motivations are malleable across contexts 
within the same individual, cognitive dispositions reflect relatively stable individual 
differences. Moreover, while individuals can have conscious access to their needs and 
motivations, and so can self-report their motivational states, cognitive dispositions are 
implicit and frequently can only be shown via behavioural tasks that are designed to 
tap into these specific cognitive processes. Methodologically, there is therefore a sharp 
distinction between how we should measure cognitive dispositions and motivations: 
while the former is assessed via established neuropsychological tasks, the latter is 
measured through self-report questionnaires or experimental paradigms that elicit 
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One may ask, where does “personality” reside amongst these definitions? Here 
we define personality in terms of an individual’s profile of enduring behavioural 
patterns of interaction with the environment in intrapersonal and interpersonal 
contexts (Goldberg, 1993; John & Gosling, 2000; McCrae & John, 1992). Personality can 
be manifest in common behaviours and preferences that the individual is consciously 
aware of. Personality overlaps with cognitive dispositions in that it taps into stable 
individual differences. However, an individual’s personality is critically different to 
their cognitive dispositions in that the former is consciously-accessible while the latter 
is not, and personality operates at a higher-order level of interpersonal behaviours 
while cognitive dispositions are evident in lower-level information processing of 
stimuli (and affect downstream behaviour as a consequence). Naturally, personality 
and cognitive dispositions are related: our conscious behaviours and preferences are 
shaped by how we process information from the environment. Nonetheless, it is a 
matter of empirical inquiry to determine how biologically-based cognitive 
dispositions shape the manifestation of personality. An assumption that the two 
constructs are equal will only be to the detriment of psychological research by 
provoking unnecessary conflation of terms, constructs, and theories. 
Furthermore, personality differs from motivation. While this definitional 
distinction may run counter to Freudian-inspired psychology, it is imperative to 
clarify the discrepancies and overlaps. As defined earlier, while motivations constitute 
sets of psychological processes that energize behaviour in pursuit of particular goals, 
and so motivations can be made salient or silent, personality reflects enduring 
characteristics that are largely stable over time scales. Whereas an individual’s 
motivations can differ in intensity, arousal, persistence, and influence over behaviour 
throughout the lifespan, personality traits are conceptualized as largely remaining 
uniform in how they shape and underpin action and decision-making (e.g. Caspi, 
Roberts, & Shiner, 2005; Costa & McCrae, 1997; Harris, Brett, Johnson, & Deary, 2016; 
Johnson, McGue, & Krueger, 2005; McCrae & Costa, 1994). Despite these differences, 
personality and motivation are tightly interlinked. Some personality traits may elevate 
the chronic experience of certain motivations, or one’s susceptibility to temporary 
activation of motivational states. Moreover, since personality reflects enduring 
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tendencies of behaviour and preferences, and motivations are strongly intertwined 
with preferences, it is reasonable for there to be significant overlap in how these 
constructs are operationalized.  
Indeed, methodologically, there has often been confusion regarding what 
constitutes a cognitive disposition, a personality trait, or a motivational state. Identical 
scales have been used for all three categories. For example, the scale “need for 
cognitive closure” (NCC) has been simultaneously labelled a measure of “cognitive 
style”, “epistemic motivation”, and a “cognitive-motivational content independent 
construct” (Chirumbolo, 2002; Cornelis et al., 2008). In their early research on the need 
for cognitive closure scale, Webster and Kruglanski (1997) suggest that NCC may 
emerge from an interaction of cognitive capacity and motivation. Regrettably, 
contemporary research on instruments such as need for cognition, need for cognitive 
closure, need for order and structure, need for certainty and security, are often used 
interchangeably as “personality”, “motivations”, and “cognitive dispositions”. It is 
hoped that clarifying the differences between these three constructs will facilitate 
more appropriate design and implementation of assessment tools in future research. 
1.3.4 Measuring Ideology – Assessment Challenges  
Perhaps most bizarrely, and problematically, dispositions and motivations 
have often been confounded with ideology itself. Various scales that ostensibly 
measure ideological orientation, such as right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and 
social dominance orientation (SDO), are sometimes conceptualized as enduring 
personality variables, sometimes as motivations, sometimes as sets of specific beliefs, 
and sometimes as general ideological-intergroup orientations. Even the psychologists 
who first popularized these constructs wrote about authoritarianism and SDO in 
ambiguous terms: Altemeyer (1988) considered right-wing authoritarianism as a 
“personality variable” (p. 3), and Sidanius and Pratto (2001) thought of SDO 
simultaneously as a motive - a “ubiquitous motive driving most group-relevant social 
attitudes” (p. 57; also cited in Reynolds et al., 2007) – and as  an ideological worldview:  
a “general attitudinal orientation toward intergroup relations, reflecting whether one 
generally prefers such relations to be equal, versus hierarchical” (Pratto et al., 1994, p. 
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742). Other examples of definitional ambiguity are frequent. For example, Reynolds 
and colleagues (2007) described ethnocentrism, authoritarianism, social dominance 
orientation, and personal need for structure as personality variables (though under 
the current definitions, the first three would be ideological orientations and the last a 
motivation). In an effort to clarify this issue, Duckitt and colleagues (2001, 2002, Sibley 
& Duckitt, 2008) noted that “although the view that RWA, and possibly also SDO, 
constitute personality dimensions that determine generalized prejudice is still quite 
widely held, it has been increasingly criticized. The items [of these scales] … do not 
refer to generalized behavioural dispositions, as the items of personality scales 
typically do, but to social attitudes and beliefs that express basic values of a broadly 
ideological nature” (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008, p. 3). This distinction between 
dispositional and ideological measures has been fruitfully upheld by some researchers 
(e.g. Van Hiel et al., 2016; Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; Perry & Sibley, 2012; Gerber et al., 
2010; Hodson & Dhont, 2015) but neglected by others (e.g. Reynolds et al., 2007; Pratto, 
Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), and so developing clear terminological and 
methodological standards for the field to avoid such confounds is necessary for the 
advancement of empirical and theoretical research on ideologies. 
 Another challenge in the measurement of ideology is that the most widely used 
tool is a test of political conservatism. Specifically, it is typically assessed via a 7- or 9-
point Likert scale on which participants indicate whether they feel “strongly 
conservative” or “strongly liberal”. Nonetheless, the standard single-item Likert scale 
assessment tool does not distinguish between social, economic, and cultural 
conservatism, and individuals’ evaluation of specific social issues, which have been 
shown to have different psychological correlates (Malka & Soto, 2015; Malka, Lelkes, 
& Soto, 2017; see also: Azevedo, Jost, Rothmund, & Sterling, 2019). Additionally, this 
approach assumes that the “strongly conservative” and the “strongly liberal” are 
equivalent in the magnitude and variance of their extremity, dogmatism, and 
partisanship to a political party. This is a claim that has not been directly and 
rigorously tested. Consequently, the typical measurement tool that seeks to tap into 
political ideology may not capture the full spectrum and forms of right-wing and left-
wing ideological beliefs and does not adequately address ideological adherence 
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processes such as dogmatism, group affiliation, willingness to engage in collective 
action and self-sacrifice, and ideological extremism. The reliance on problematic 
assessment tools will inadvertently bias the conclusions of past research. Throughout 
the dissertation, past findings whose interpretations may have been skewed by these 
methodological weaknesses will be highlighted. 
1.4 Theoretical Approaches 
1.4.1 The Cognitive Rigidity Hypothesis 
 Psychologists have sought to identify the psychological underpinnings of 
authoritarianism, ethnocentrism, and xenophobia since the beginning of the 20th 
century. One prominent hypothesis developed in the 1940s proposed that ideological 
rigidity is rooted in mental rigidity. Specifically, it was suggested that “one of the 
characteristics of ethnocentric thinking is a rigidity and inflexibility of the thinking 
process” (Rokeach, 1948, p. 259) and “general rigidity and intolerance…serve as 
primary sources of the specific phenomena in the prejudice area” (Hartley, 1946). This 
hypothesis emerges from the notion that extreme group identities and ideologies are 
often characterized by a tendency to categorize the world and people in an inflexible 
and essentialist manner (Brewer, 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Consequently, 
individuals with a more categorical, inflexible thinking style may tend to adhere to 
ideologies in a stricter or more extreme fashion. Adorno and colleagues’ (1950) pivotal 
book, The Authoritarian Personality, further developed these ideas by providing 
empirical support to the hypothesis that prejudice is tightly linked to rigidity and 
intolerance of ambiguity. Indeed, Else Frenkel-Brunswik (one of the authors of The 
Authoritarian Personality) already noted in 1948 that children who scored highly on 
prejudice measures exhibited greater rigidity on arithmetic and perceptual tasks than 
children who scored low on prejudice (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1948, 1949; Frenkel-
Brunswik & Havel, 1953). The hypothesis that ideological rigidity originates from 
psychological rigidity thus sparked a rich line of research in political psychology, 
under the assumption – well-articulated by Gordon Allport in The Nature of Prejudice 
– that “the style of thinking that is characteristic of prejudice is a reflection, by and 
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large, of the prejudiced person’s way of thinking about anything” (Allport, 1954, p. 
400; emphasis in original; also cited in Roets & Van Hiel, 2011). 
 While the original inflexibility hypothesis was primarily concerned with 
ethnocentrism and intolerance, modern political psychology has focused on the 
relationship between psychological rigidity and politically right-wing attitudes (Jost 
et al., 2003a; Van Hiel et al., 2010, 2016), rather than with ideological or intolerant 
attitudes more generally. Nonetheless, ideological commitment can be evident in 
one’s nationalistic attachment (Mummendey et al., 2001; Zmigrod, Rentfrow, & 
Robbins, 2018), religious doctrine (Besta, Gómez, & Vázquez, 2014; Fredman, Bastian, 
& Swann, 2017), political attitudes (Jost, 2017), or even deep loyalty to a sports team 
(Newson et al., 2018; Xiao & Van Bavel, 2012). Consequently, in the present studies, it 
was hypothesized that cognitive rigidity would be a characteristic of ideological 
thinking across multiple domains, including nationalism, religion, political extremism 
(on both left-wing and right-wing political parties), and general dogmatic thinking. 
This hypothesis thus departs from past work focusing specifically on right-wing 
attitudes by positing that cognitive rigidity is also implicated in extreme left-wing 
attitudes as well as other ideological domains, such as religion, nationalism, and 
dogmatism, which have not been previously subject to theorising with respect to the 
cognitive rigidity hypothesis. 
1.4.2 Defining and Measuring Cognitive Rigidity 
In the neuropsychological literature, cognitive flexibility is defined as the 
ability to adapt to novel or changing environments and a capacity to switch between 
modes of thinking (Cools & Robbins, 2004). Specifically, it can be defined as “the 
ability to flexibly switch perspectives, focus of attention, or response mappings” 
(Diamond, 2006, p. 70). Cognitive inflexibility is therefore represented by 
perseveration, “the tendency of an individual not to change” (Schultz & Searleman, 




There is significant individual variation in cognitive flexibility within the 
general population (Braver, Cole, & Yarkoni, 2010; Miyake & Friedman, 2012), which 
has been linked to dopaminergic functioning (Barnett, Jones, Robbins, & Müller, 2007). 
Furthermore, from a clinical perspective, some populations manifest a deficit in 
cognitive flexibility by persisting with previously-established rules or behavioural 
patterns even when this is maladaptive, as evident in patients of obsessive-compulsive 
disorder (Chamberlain et al., 2006), addiction (Verdejo-Garcia, Pérez-García, & 
Bechara, 2006), and frontal lobe damage (Anderson, Damasio, Jones, & Tranel, 1991). 
As reviewed by Ionescu (2012), there are several behavioural tasks that are 
classically used to operationalize cognitive flexibility in adults, including the 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Grant & Berg, 1948), task switching and optional shift 
paradigms (Miyake & Friedman, 2012; Monsell, 2003), the Alternative Uses Task 
(AUT; Guilford, 1967), insight problems, and induction tasks (Shafto, Coley, & Vitkin, 
2007). In these tasks, performance is measured via participants’ accuracy rates, 
reaction times, or the number and variety of provided responses to open-ended 
problems. Given the extensive use and validation of behavioural tasks for assessing 
cognitive flexibility in neuropsychology and cognitive science, the present studies will 
rely on three established and independent behavioural measures of cognitive 
flexibility in order to investigate the relationship between inflexibility and ideology. 
Specifically, the studies here will operationalize cognitive flexibility using three 
validated cognitive tasks that tap into implicit cognitive tendencies to categorize 
information and rules in a flexible versus more rigid fashion: the Wisconsin Card 
Sorting Test (WCST), the Remote Associates Test (RAT), and the Alternative Uses Test 
(AUT). Either all three tasks or a selection of these will be employed in each study 
(except for Chapter 6). The classic WCST (Grant & Berg, 1948) measures how easily 
individuals adapt to changes in newly-learnt rules and reward contingencies and the 
extent to which individuals can switch between categories when it is disadvantageous 
to persist with a previously-rewarded category. High scores indicate a flexible 
cognitive processing style. The RAT (Mednick, 1968) measures individuals’ ability to 
generate semantic connections between remote concepts. For instance, participants 
36 
 
are shown three remotely-connected words (e.g. worm, shelf, end) and asked to find the 
compound word that links them (e.g. book). The RAT therefore indicates the extent to 
which participants’ semantic networks tend to categorize concepts more loosely – 
which would aid detection of remote conceptual connections – or rigidly, which 
would render such retrieval challenging (Zmigrod & Zmigrod, 2016). The AUT 
(Guilford, 1967) requires that participants provide as many conventional and 
unconventional uses to common objects, such as a brick or a hairpin, and thereby 
assesses four cognitive dimensions, including flexibility. Flexibility is quantified as the 
number of distinct conceptual categories into which a participant’s set of responses 
can be divided. It has been used as a measure of cognitive flexibility in multiple 
behavioural and neuroimaging studies (e.g. Netz, Tomer, Axelrad, Argov, & Inbar, 
2007; Roberts et al., 2017). 
Notably, Eslinger and Grattan (1993) suggested there are at least two facets to 
cognitive flexibility: reactive flexibility, which refers to the readiness to shift 
behavioural responses in reaction to external cues and changing situational demands, 
and spontaneous or generative flexibility, which refers to the ability to generate diverse 
and novel ideas, typically in response to a single question. Eslinger and Grattan (1993) 
noted that a classic measure of reactive flexibility is the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test 
(WCST; Grant & Berg, 1948; Heaton, 1981) as it assesses the ease with which 
individuals can alternate between rule categories when environmental contingencies 
change. Spontaneous cognitive flexibility is measured with generative divergent 
thinking tasks (Eslinger & Grattan, 1993; Tomer et al., 2002), typically with the 
flexibility measure of the Alternative Uses Task (Guilford, 1967, 1971; Ionescu, 2012; 
Roberts et al., 2017). Reactive and spontaneous flexibility have been behaviourally and 
neurally dissociated in previous empirical work (e.g. Cools et al., 2000; Parkin & 
Lawrence, 1994; Tomer et al., 2002, 2007). The Remote Associates Test may be 
conceptualized as merging elements of reactive and spontaneous cognitive flexibility, 
as it tests the way in which participants flexibly search internal conceptual networks 
in response to convergent external cues, and their ability to reactively restructure their 
thinking when they identify semantic connections between some but not all of the cue 
words (Isen, 1990). The RAT is therefore a valuable complementary index of cognitive 
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flexibility to the WCST and AUT. Another distinction between these tasks is the 
modality: while the WCST is a visual task, in which participants are asked to evaluate 
and make choices amongst visual stimuli, the RAT and AUT are both verbal tasks that 
require participants to generate appropriate written responses. Consequently, the use 
of these diverse tasks will allow us to assess convergence between different facets of 
cognitive flexibility. 
 
1.4.3 Current Studies 
Rigid ideological thinking was hypothesized here to be related to domain-
general cognitive rigidity. This was tested in the context of nationalistic ideology and 
identity (Chapter 2), religiosity (Chapter 3), political partisanship (Chapter 4), and 
content-free dogmatic tendencies (Chapter 5). By using validated cognitive tasks that 
tap into implicit cognitive tendencies to categorize information and rules in a flexible 
versus more rigid fashion, we were able to harness modern technological advances to 
address an age-old question. The use of objective, behavioural measures of cognitive 
flexibility was particularly important given that a majority of studies rely on self-
reported measures of inflexibility (as evident in the meta-analyses of Jost et al., 2003a; 
Van Hiel et al., 2010; Jost, 2017). Moreover, as discussed above, Van Hiel and 
colleagues (2016) recently found that operationalizing cognitive style using self-report 
measures rather than behavioural assessments can inflate effect sizes. Consequently, 
the current studies sought to explore the role of behaviourally-assessed cognitive 




1.5 Data-Driven Approaches 
The pioneering philosopher of science Karl Popper wrote in The Logic of 
Scientific Discovery that “theories are nets cast to catch what we call ‘the world’: to 
rationalize, to explain, and to master it. We endeavour to make the mesh ever finer 
and finer” (Popper, 1935, p. 37). Popper subsequently built an entire “theory of 
theories” (Popper, 1935, p. 37), focusing on how scientists can and should refine their 
understanding of phenomena by falsifying hypotheses with carefully designed 
experimental tests. However, on the question of how theories emerge in the first place, 
Popper claimed that this is an issue for the psychologist: “The question of how it 
happens that a new idea occurs to a man – whether it is a musical theme, a dramatic 
conflict, or a scientific theory – may be of great interest to empirical psychology; but it 
is irrelevant to the logical analysis of scientific knowledge” (Popper, 1935, p. 7). 
Nonetheless, following Popper, both philosophers and psychologists have been 
concerned with the ways in which hypotheses and theories are generated by scientists, 
and how researchers’ historical, ideological, and paradigmatic context can 
fundamentally shape science (e.g. Kuhn, 1962). 
In light of the ongoing reproducibility crisis in psychology (John, Lowenstein, 
& Prelec, 2012; Makel, Plucker, & Hegarty, 2012; Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012; Van 
Bavel, Mende-Siedlecki, Brady, & Reinero, 2016), psychologists have indeed been re-
evaluating the origins of their theories and practices. One facet of the field’s self-
examination has involved assessing the extent to which psychological research is 
influenced by researchers’ characteristics, ideologies, and agendas (Duarte et al., 2015; 
Haidt & Jussim, 2016; Inbar & Lammers, 2012; Jussim, Crawford, Anglin, Stevens, & 
Duarte, 2016; Reinero, Wills, Brady, Mende-Siedlecki, Crawford, & Van Bavel, 2019; 
Skitka, 2012; Von Hippel & Buss, 2017). In order to ensure that theories in social and 
political psychology are not unduly influenced by researchers’ preconceptions and 
political agendas, there is now increasing interest in complementing theory-driven 
approaches with data-driven approaches wherever appropriate and feasible. Data-
driven approaches are those that make use of large, unique datasets and utilize novel 
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analysis techniques designed to deal with large datasets in order to extract underlying 
patterns, with no a priori hypothesis8. 
Chapter 6 delineates the application of this data-driven approach to the task of 
investigating the psychological correlates of ideological thinking. It involved 
producing a large dataset in collaboration with Russell Poldrack and colleagues at 
Stanford University, which administered an unprecedented number of cognitive tasks 
and personality questionnaires to over 500 participants in 2016. The aim of the original 
project was to elucidate the structure of self-regulation, and so a large battery of tasks 
and questionnaires that span most of the classic psychological phenomena broadly 
associated with self-control was created. In 2018, as part of the present doctoral 
research, these participants were contacted again and invited to complete several 
ideological attitudes questionnaires. Harnessing this unique dataset allowed us to 
comprehensively examine the cognitive and personality substrates of ideological 
thinking across a multitude of ideological domains, and the temporal and conceptual 
separation of the collection of the psychological and ideological data enabled us to 
overcome typical methodological challenges in this field. It was also an opportunity 
to implement sophisticated data analytic techniques that have been designed to probe 
large datasets in the natural sciences, but have rarely been used in the context of the 
psychological sciences. 
1.6 Overview and Scope 
History has witnessed countless acts of violence committed in the name of 
ideologies, and so scholars across the social and natural sciences have long sought to 
resolve why some people become ideologically dogmatic and extreme while others in 
their community do not. Chapters 2-5 will focus on testing the cognitive rigidity 
hypothesis in the realms of nationalism (Chapter 2; reflects Zmigrod, Rentfrow, & 
Robbins, 2018 in PNAS), religiosity (Chapter 3; reflects Zmigrod et al., 2018 in 
                                                          
 
8 Accordingly, a philosophy of science with regards to data-driven approaches is now flourishing and aiming to 
negotiate and integrate this novel form of data collection and analysis into Popperian, Kuhnian, and Lakatosian 
frameworks (e.g. Krohs, 2012; Kell & Oliver, 2004; Leonelli, 2015; Lowrie, 2017; Mazzocchi, 2015) 
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Psychological Research), political partisanship (Chapter 4; reflects Zmigrod, Rentfrow, 
& Robbins, 2019b in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General), and intellectual 
humility (Chapter 5; reflects Zmigrod et al., 2019 in Personality & Individual Differences). 
Chapter 6 then expands beyond flexibility and instead relies on a data-driven 
approach in a unique sample to address two primary question: (1) Do psychological 
traits predict ideological orientations beyond classic demographic variables? And (2) 
what cognitive and personality characteristics are most predictive of ideological 
thinking in the domains of politics, nationalism, religiosity, and dogmatism? Chapter 
7 synthesizes this set of studies into overarching conclusions, identifies their 
limitations, and offers directions for further research in order to refine, expand, and 
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2 Rigidity of Thought and Inflexible Borders: A 
Cognitive Analysis of British Nationalism 
2.1 Introduction 
Throughout modern history, nationalism has played a prominent role in 
citizens’ voting behaviour and political engagement. Indeed, recent slogans such as 
“Make America Great Again” and “Take Back Control” have been used by political 
campaigns to attract voters. The potency of nationalistic identity was particularly 
evident in the United Kingdom’s June 2016 EU Referendum, in which voting patterns 
crossed political party lines and family traditions, surprising pollsters and political 
analysts. There has been a long and rich tradition of research on nationalism, 
patriotism, and voting behaviour in social psychology and political science (Adorno 
et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1996; Huddy & Khatib, 2007; Kam & Ramos, 2008; Kosterman 
& Feschbach, 1989; Schatz & Staub, 1997; Schatz et al., 1999; Sidanius & Lau, 1989; 
Staub, 1989; Transue, 2007), as well as a large body of empirical work in political 
psychology (for reviews see: Jost, 2017; Jost, van der Linden, Panagopoulos, & Hardin, 
2018) showing psychological differences between individuals of varying political 
orientations (Jost et al., 2003a; Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Hibbing, Smith, & 
Alford, 2014). 
Despite the significant contributions of this work, there is still a need for further 
empirical work on the cognitive processes that underlie individuals’ adoption of 
nationalistic attitudes. Although nationalism is typically correlated with right-wing 
(as opposed to left-wing) orientation, nationalistic attachment is, in principle, distinct 
from political ideology. While many diverse issues are often clustered into party 
politics or conservative versus liberal orientations, including views on economic 
policies, religion, inequality, environmental protection, and civil rights, nationalism 
tends to focus primarily on perceptions of national superiority and idealization of the 
nation and its dominance or history (Kosterman & Feschbach, 1989; Schatz & Staub, 
1997; Staub, 1989). Thus, it is important to explore how the findings from political 
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psychology – which have identified differences between conservatives and liberals in 
their personalities (Caprara & Zimbardo, 2004; Carney, Jost, Gosling, & Potter, 2008), 
need for order and structure (Jost et al., 2003a; Caparos et al., 2015; Chirumbolo, 2002), 
cognitive control and inhibition (Amodio et al., 2007), and physiological reactivity 
(Hibbing et al., 2014; Oxley et al., 2008; Tritt et al., 2016) – translate into the study of 
nationalistic ideology.  
Since the publication of the Authoritarian Personality in the 1950s (Adorno et al., 
1950), psychologists have hypothesized that right-wing and xenophobic attitudes are 
related to a cognitive style characterized by psychological rigidity (Jost, 2017). 
However, when cognitive processes have been studied in relation to political 
ideologies, there has often been disagreement over the definition and measurement of 
‘cognitive style’ (Van Hiel et al., 2016; Onraet et al., 2015). Many studies rely on self-
report questionnaires (e.g. Sargent, 2004; Conway et al., 2015) rather than objective 
tests measuring cognitive function. Indeed, a recent study revealed significant 
differences in the magnitude of the relationship between cognitive style and political 
ideology according to whether the measure of ‘cognitive style’ was based on 
behaviour or self-report (with self-report scales yielding stronger relationships with 
right-wing attitudes; Van Hiel et al., 2016). The present study therefore examines the 
relationship between the strength of individuals’ nationalistic identities, their 
nationalistic attitudes, and their cognitive performance, using validated tests from 
cognitive neuropsychology, as well as self-reported psychological traits, to address 
the question: do individual differences in cognitive characteristics predict nationalistic 
attitudes and identity? 
The EU Referendum in the UK probed citizens’ commitment to separating from 
the EU, and their support for the recreation of economic, legal, and physical 
boundaries in order to reduce multiculturalism and reinstate “control” that had been 
“taken away” from the “British people” (Goodwin et al., 2015, 2017). The outcome of 
the referendum depended on the breadth versus narrowness of citizens’ definitions of 
“British people” and “British society”. And in the months following the result, 
numerous arguments were made about the characteristics and motives of Leave and 
45 
 
Remain supporters, with some speculating that Leave supporters were motivated by a 
sense of British nationalism and ideology. To date, there is very little direct empirical 
evidence available about the impact that nationalism or nationalistic identity might 
have had in the EU Referendum. However, we can draw from psychological theory 
and research to develop hypotheses about which psychological factors may have 
influenced voters’ decisions. 
Social-psychological theories have long contended that categorization of 
individuals into groups is a key process in social identity formation (Tajfel, 1982; 
Turner et al., 1987). Indeed, at the heart of nationalistic ideologies are strict categories 
and rules for what is or is not part of the nation or national culture. We hypothesized 
that nationalistic thinking may be an instance of a general tendency to rigidly 
categorize information and to process information in an inflexible manner, such that 
cognitive inflexibility would be predictive of support for Brexit in the context of the 
UK’s 2016 EU Referendum. While upholding tight, impermeable mental boundaries 
between concepts can be beneficial for mechanistic thinking, it can also lead to 
challenges in adapting to change or uncertainty. 
To objectively assess implicit cognitive flexibility, two cognitive tasks were 
used: (1) the classic Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST; Grant & Berg, 1948; Heaton, 
1981), which measures individuals’ adaptability to changes in newly-learnt rules and 
reward contingencies, and therefore how easily they can switch between categories 
when it is maladaptive to persist with a previously-rewarded category. This measures 
reactive flexibility and can indicate a persisting versus adapting cognitive processing 
style, and has been used extensively to study clinical populations such as patients with 
frontal-lobe damage (Anderson et al., 1991), OCD (Lucey et al., 1997), and 
schizophrenia (Sullivan et al., 1993). Furthermore, (2) the Remote Associates Test 
(RAT; Mednick, 1968), which measures individuals’ capacity to flexibly retrieve 
semantic associations between remote conceptual representations, was also 
administered to provide a complementary index of a ‘flexibility’ construct. 
Participants are presented with three words (e.g. cracker, fly, fighter) and must generate 
the compound word that links these three words (e.g. fire). It is therefore a verbal 
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measure of generative flexibility. Performance indicates participants’ associative 
flexibility and the extent to which their semantic networks tend to categorize concepts 
more loosely (which would facilitate detection of connections between remote 
concepts) or rigidly (which would make such retrieval difficult). These tasks and 
measures lack any ideological or emotional content, employing generally emotionally-
neutral stimuli. 
In order to compare the psychology of nationalistic and political ideologies, 
and to address the methodological debate regarding self-report and behavioural 
measures of cognition (Van Hiel et al., 2016), self-reported psychological flexibility 
was also assessed. This was measured through participants’ intolerance for 
uncertainty and dependence on routines and traditions in their daily lives, which act 
as proxies for subjective behavioural flexibility in contexts of ambiguity and volatility. 
We hypothesized that individuals who report subjective inflexibility would tend to 
prefer the traditionalism and certainty offered by strong nationalistic ideologies. 
Given the current political climate in Europe and the USA, there is an urgent 
need to investigate the cognitive roots of nationalistic attitudes. Cognitive and 
subjective flexibility were examined in relation to four ideological orientations: 
nationalism, right-wing conservatism, system justification, and authoritarianism. 
These psychological and ideological dimensions were studied in relation to 
individuals’ voting behaviour in the EU referendum, as well as their Brexit-related 
attitudes towards the EU and immigration, and measures of nationalistic identity. 
Hence, the aim of this study was to explore the cognitive and psychological factors 
that underlie individuals’ adoption of nationalistic ideologies, beyond demographic 
variables and family traditions, and to investigate the pathways between inflexible 




2.2 Materials and Methods 
2.2.1 Participants 
A total of 391 participants was recruited through Prolific Academic, an 
established platform for online research (Peer et al., 2017, for more information about 
Prolific Academic see: https://www.prolific.ac/), and were financially compensated 
for their participation. Participants provided their informed consent prior to 
participation by indicating their agreement to share information about their 
ideological views, demographic variables, and to perform several psychological tasks. 
All survey items were optional or allowed the participant to indicate that they “prefer 
not to respond” to the particular question. Participants were able to leave feedback at 
the end of the experiment. The experimental and consent procedures were approved 
by the University of Cambridge’s Department of Psychology Ethics Committee. After 
removing participants who were not UK residents or had dual citizenship (n=59), the 
final overall sample was 332 (47.1% female, age: M=37.96, SD=13.69). Within the UK, 
participants identified with England (84.3% of sample), Scotland (9.0%), Wales (5.4%), 
and Northern Ireland (1.2%). With respect to voting behaviour in the 2016 EU 
Referendum, 62.5% of the sample voted Remain and 37.5% voted to Leave the EU. 
2.2.2 Measures and Procedure 
Participants were redirected from Prolific Academic to an online survey hosted 
by Qualtrics Survey Software for completion of all the self-reported items and the 
RAT, and later redirected again to Inquisit 5 by Millisecond Software in order to 
temporarily download software that allows for accurate measure of performance and 
reaction times in the WCST. Participants were asked about their UK residency status, 
voting behaviour in the June 2016 EU Referendum, political party affiliations, and 
other demographic variables such as age, gender, and educational attainment.  
Educational attainment was categorized along five groups: (1) participants 
with no formal educational qualifications (1% of sample), (2) participants who 
completed GCSEs or equivalent qualifications (9.5% of sample), (3) participants who 
completed two or more A-Levels or an apprenticeship (19.0% of sample), (4) 
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participants who completed a bachelor’s degree or equivalent (63.3% of sample), and 
(5) participants who completed a doctoral degree or equivalent (7.2% of sample). It is 
noteworthy that the present sample has a higher proportion of Remain voters than 
Leave voters, and participants in general had high levels of educational attainment, 
so it would be valuable to replicate these findings in a more demographically-
representative sample. 
Cognitive Flexibility  
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) 
The WCST (Grant & Berg, 1948) was administered with Inquisit 5 by 
Millisecond Software in standard fashion (Heaton, 1981). Participants are presented 
with four key cards and a deck of response cards that vary on three dimensions 
(colour, shape, and number of geometric figures) and are asked to match a fifth card 
from the sequentially-presented response cards to one of the four key cards. There are 
various potential rules that can underpin the classification, for instance matching the 
cards by shape, number, or colour. Participants are required to identify and apply the 
correct card classification rule in accordance with the feedback they receive after each 
trial. Participants are informed at the start of the task that the card classification rule 
can change without warning. Correspondingly, after participants correctly respond to 
ten consecutive trials the classification rule changes, requiring a flexible set shift. The 
task terminates after participants complete six categories (twice for each of the three 
classification rules) or after 128 trials. Participants’ performance is indexed through 
the accuracy rate and the number of categories they completed during the task. 
Compound Remote Associates Test (RAT) 
The compound RAT (Mednick, 1968) consisted of 20 compound remote 
associate problems, in which participants are presented with three cue words (e.g. fly, 
cracker, fighter), and are asked to generate the compound word solution that links these 
three words (e.g. fire). Participants were given 20 seconds to provide an answer to each 
problem. Problems of varying difficulty levels were selected from a bank of validated 
remote associate items (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003). The RAT has been used as a 
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measure of cognitive flexibility in previous literature (Isen, 1990; Alexander et al., 
2007; Ishizuka, Hillier, & Beversdorf, 2007; Nijstad et al., 2010), and measures the 
degree to which participants are able to restructure their thinking after identifying a 
semantic association between some, but not all, of the cue words. For instance, when 
presented with tooth, potato, and heart, participants often tend to first generate ache as 
a compound word solution (tooth-ache, heart-ache); however, successful participants 
overcome this initial association and are able to flexibly re-evaluate the cues so as to 
arrive at the correct solution that also connects to the third cue word, i.e. sweet (sweet-
tooth, sweet-potato, sweet-heart). RAT performance can therefore generate insight about 
the way in which established associative networks and conceptual categories are 
internally arranged, accessed, and flexibly explored. 
Subjective Flexibility 
Intolerance for Uncertainty 
Intolerance for Uncertainty was assessed with Carleton, Norton, and 
Asmundson’s (2007) 12-item scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .90), which included items 
such as “Unforeseen events upset me greatly”, “When I am uncertain I can’t function 
very well”, “The smallest doubt can stop me from acting”, and “I must get away from 
all uncertain situations”. Items were rated on a Likert scale from 1 (Not at all 
characteristic of me) to 5 (Entirely characteristic of me). 
Dependence on Routines 
Participants’ dependence on routines in their daily lives was measured with a 
7-item Likert scale ranging from 1 (Not at all characteristic of me) to 5 (Entirely 
characteristic of me) (Cronbach’s alpha = .78). Items included: (a) “I hate it when my 
routines are disrupted”, (b) “I tend to change my plans last minute” (reverse-coded), 
(c) “I avoid situations where unexpected things might happen”, (d) “Traditions are 
important to me”, (e) “Rituals are important even if they are not enjoyable”, (f) “I like 
to have a regular, unchanging schedule”, (g) “Vacations often cause me stress”, and 
(h) “I always go on vacation to the same destination”. All items were evaluated on a 
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7-item Likert scale ranging from 1 (Not at all characteristic of me) to 5 (Entirely 
characteristic of me) 
Ideological Orientation Variables 
Authoritarianism 
Authoritarian beliefs were measured with a four-item set of child-rearing 
questions developed by Hetherington & Weiler (2009), which asks “Which one do you 
think is more important for a child to have?” and then requires participants to choose 
one in the following pairs: “independent or respectful”, “curious or well-mannered”, 
“obedient or self-reliant”, and “considerate or well-behaved”. Each item is coded 0 for 
the non-authoritarian answer (independent, curious, self-reliant, and well-behaved) 
and 1 for the authoritarian answer, and a summed total is used as a measure of 
authoritarian beliefs. 
Nationalism 
Nationalism was measured using items adapted to the UK from an established 
nationalism scale (Sidanius, Feschbach, Levin, & Pratto, 1997; Federico, Golec, & Dial, 
2005; Ho et al., 2012), consisting of 6 items, each rated by participants on a Likert scale 
ranging between 1 (Strong disagree) to 7 (Strongly agree) (Cronbach’s alpha =.79). Items 
included: (a) “To maintain our country’s economic superiority, aggressive economic 
policies are sometimes necessary”, (b) “Generally, the more influence the UK has on 
other nations, the better off they are”, (c) “We should do anything necessary to 
increase the power of country, even if it means war”, (d) “The UK should not dominate 
other countries” (reverse-coded), (e) “There are many other cultures in the world that 
are superior to ours” (reverse-coded) and (f) “For the most part, the UK is no more 
superior than any other industrialized country in the world” (reverse-coded). The 





Political ideology was assessed by asking participants to indicate their political 
party affiliation in the UK, and participants responded to the question “Which of the 
following political parties best represents your views?”. In order to quantify these 
party affiliations along a left-right political conservatism spectrum, we consulted a 
research report by YouGov, a specialist in polling demographically-representative 
samples, published on September 29th 2017. Each participant’s level of conservatism 
was therefore matched to the estimation of their political party’s right-wing 
conservatism. Political ideology was assessed by asking participants to indicate their 
political party affiliation in the UK, and participants responded to the question 
“Which of the following political parties best represents your views?” and were able 
to choose between: “Conservative Party” (N=63), “Labour Party” (N=70), “Liberal 
Democrats” (N=62), “Scottish National Party” (N=12), “UK Independence Party” 
(N=21), “Green Party” (N=41), “Plaid Cymru” (N=4), “Democratic Unionist Party” 
(N=2) and “Don’t know/Other/Prefer not to say” (N=57). In order to quantify these 
party affiliations along a left-right political conservatism spectrum, we consulted a 
research report by YouGov, a specialist in polling demographically-representative 
samples, published on September 29th 2017, which reported data collected from 46,643 
participants across the UK in June 2017. In this report YouGov provides data 
regarding participants’ self-identification on the left-right political spectrum in 
relation to their past voting behaviour in the 2015 Election. For each political party, 
we calculated a ratio of the percentage of participants who self-identified as “very or 
fairly right wing” (for the Conservative Party and UKIP) or “very or fairly left wing” 
(for all other political parties) divided by the percentage of participants who identified 
as “centre or slightly left/right of centre”. This provided a proxy measure of the level 
of right wing conservatism of each political party. These calculations provided the 
following conservatism scores for each political party: UKIP (+2.27), Conservative 
Party (+1.55), Liberal Democrats (-0.64), Plaid Cymru (-1.00), Scottish National Party 
(-1.75), Labour Party (-2.5), and Green Party (-5.5). There was no data for the 
Democratic Unionist Party (however, since only 2 participants in our sample affiliated 
with the DUP, this did not hinder the analysis). Each participant’s level of 
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conservatism was therefore matched to the estimation of their political party’s right-
wing conservatism. 
System Justification 
The system justification scale comprised of 8 items from Kay & Jost’s (2003) 
measure, adapted to British society: (a) “In general, British society is just and fair”, (b) 
“In general, the British political system operates as it should”, (c) “British society 
needs to be radically restructured” (reverse-coded), (d) “The UK is the best country in 
the world to live in”, (e) “In the UK, most policies serve the greater good”, (f) “In the 
UK, everyone has a fair shot at wealth and happiness”, (g) “British society is getting 
worse every year” (reverse-coded), (h) “British society is set up so that people usually 
get what they deserve”. All items were randomly ordered. Cronbach’s alpha was .88. 
Nationalistic Identity 
Attitudes towards Brexit-related issues 
Based on the format of Everett’s (2013) Social and Economic Conservatism 
Scale, participants were asked about their feelings of positivity versus negativity 
towards a number of issues linked to Brexit on a Likert scale between 0 and 100. The 
issues included: (a) Brexit, (b) European Union, (c) Immigration, (d) Access to the EU 
Single Market, and (e) Free Movement of Labour. In addition, participants were asked 
to rate their agreement with the following two statements: “The UK government has 
a right to remain in the EU if the risks are too high”, and “If you are a citizen of the 
world, you are a citizen of nowhere” (the latter of which was borrowed from Prime 
Minister Theresa May’s speech to the Conservative Party in October 2016). 
Identity Fusion 
To measure participants feeling of “oneness” with the UK and the EU, 
participants were presented with validated measure of identity fusion, the Dynamic 
Identity Fusion Index (DIFI; Jimenez et al., 2016), consisting of a continuous pictorial 
representation that allows participants to move a small circle representing “the self” 
by clicking and dragging it toward or away from a large circle representing “the 
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group”. The distance between the centres of the two circles has been shown to indicate 
the extent to which individuals feel their personal identity is fused with a collective 
identity (Jimenez et al., 2016). It has temporal stability, as well as convergent and 
discriminant validity, and can predict the endorsement of pro-group behaviours 
(Jimenez et al., 2016). In this study, participants were presented with the DIFI twice; 
once where the group was the “United Kingdom” and another when the group was 
“Europe”. A difference score was then computed on the distance scores of UK and 
Europe fusion in order to identify the extent to which participants’ group fusion was 
specifically nationalistic. 
Structural Equation Models 
All models were estimated in the Lavaan software package (Version 5.23; 
Rosseel, 2012) in R (R Development Core Team, 2016) using full information 
maximum likelihood (ML) with robust standard errors in order to account for 
multivariate nonnormality and missingness. Overall model fit was assessed with the 
chi-square test, RMSEA and its confidence interval (acceptable: 0.05-0.08), the 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI; acceptable: 0.95-0.97), and SRMR (acceptable: 0.05-0.10), 
and the Yuan-Bentler scaling factor was reported for each model (Schermelleh-Engel 
et al., 2003; Cangur & Ercan, 2015). Models were compared using a chi-square test 
when the models were nested, and using the AIC in all other cases (in accordance with 





The sample consisted of 332 UK citizens recruited through Prolific Academic 
(47.1% female, age: M=37.96, SD=13.69) who voted in the EU Referendum in June 
2016. Correlations among Brexit-related attitudes (support for Brexit and opposition 
to immigration, the EU, and free movement of labour) were mostly moderate to large, 
as expected, with rs ranging from |.28| and |.80|, all ps<.001 (Table 2.1), confirming 
that these attitudes are related, but that they also tap different views. Furthermore, 
support for Brexit was quite strongly correlated with all four ideological variables 
(authoritarianism, nationalism, conservatism, and system justification); here the r 
ranged from .33 to .65, all ps<.001, suggesting that pro-Brexit attitudes were related to 
heightened authoritarianism, nationalism, conservatism, and system justification 
(Table 2.1). Notably, the intercorrelations amongst the ideological orientation 
measures were moderate to large in magnitude (r ranged from |.19| to |.53|, all 
ps<.01), indicating that whilst these variables are related, there is more than one 
separable ideological construct involved. 
The correlation between the two objective cognitive flexibility measures (WCST 
and RAT accuracy; r=.19, p=.007) was modest, and between the two subjective 
flexibility measures (r=.62, p<.001) was high. The cognitive and subjective flexibility 
measures were modestly or not significantly related. Intolerance for uncertainty was 
negatively related to the WCST accuracy rate (r=-.15, p=.029), but not to RAT accuracy 
rate (r=.02, p>.250), and there was no correlation between dependence on routines and 
the cognitive tests. Taken together, these results suggest that the cognitive and 
subjective flexibility measures are independent facets of flexible cognition. 
In terms of the demographic variables, there were no differences between men 
and women in any of the psychological flexibility variables, ps>.05. There was also no 
correlation between age and performance in the WCST or RAT, or in terms of self-
reported intolerance for uncertainty and dependence on routines. There were 
significant correlations between educational attainment and RAT performance (r=.14, 
p=.013), intolerance for uncertainty (r=-.12, p=.036), and dependence on routines (r=-
.13, p=.021), but not with WCST performance (r=-.13, p=.056). Remain and Leave voters 
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did not differ in terms of gender, but participants who voted Remain were younger 
than Leave voters (Remain: M=36.52, SD=13.131; Leave: M=40.37, SD=13.943; 
F(1,284)=5.560, p=.019) and had higher educational attainment (Remain: M=2.85, 
SD=.647; Leave: M=2.41, SD=.887; F(1,295)=24.041, p<.001). Given these associations, 
educational attainment and age were included as covariates in all subsequent 
analyses, unless otherwise specified. 
To evaluate the strength of the relationship between Brexit voting behaviour 
and Brexit-related attitudes, we tested for differences in the attitude measures 
between Remain and Leave voters. Univariate ANCOVA, with age and educational 
attainment as covariates, found that, compared to Remain voters, Leave voters felt 
significantly more positive about Brexit (F(1,277)=838.211, p<.001, ƞ𝑝
2=.752; Remain 
voters: M=9.83, SD=14.448; Leave voters: M=78.35, SD=22.994) and significantly more 
negative about immigration (F(1,266)=207.857, p<.001, ƞ𝑝
2=.439; Remain voters: 
M=67.88, SD=19.717; Leave voters: M=26.19, SD=23.262), the European Union 
(F(1,275)=493.084, p<.001, ƞ𝑝
2=.642; Remain voters: M=75.76, SD=18.991; Leave voters: 
M=20.83, SD=18.615), and free movement of labour (F(1,268)=221.289, p<.001, ƞ𝑝
2=.452; 
Remain voters: M=75.88, SD=20.452; Leave voters: M=33.08, SD=24.084). These results 
and the magnitude of the effect sizes indexed by the ƞ𝑝
2  reveal a strong relationship 
between how participants voted and their attitudes towards Brexit-related issues. In 
particular, attitudes to Brexit are sufficiently closely related to be acceptable as a 
surrogate for voting behaviour. 
2.3.1 Correlations Between Brexit Attitudes and Psychological 
Flexibility 
 The links between psychological flexibility and support for Brexit, are reflected 
in the cross-correlations between these two classes of measure. The results revealed 
significant negative correlations between cognitive flexibility on the WCST and RAT 
and positive feelings towards Brexit (Table 2.1; Figure 2.1) and negative feelings 
towards immigration, the EU, and free movement of labour (Table 2.1). This pattern 
of associations converged with those observed for the subjective flexibility findings, 
which showed significant positive correlations between subjective inflexibility 
56 
 
(reported reliance on daily routines and uncertainty intolerance) and pro-Brexit, anti-
immigration, anti-EU, and anti-free movement of labour attitudes (Table 2.1, Figure 
2.1). In accordance with Gignac & Szodorai’s (2016) categorizations, the effect sizes of 




Figure 2.1. WCST accuracy rate and dependence on routines according to Brexit-





Table 2.1. Correlations between all measures of psychological flexibility, ideological orientation, and nationalistic identity and attitudes. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 WCST % Accuracy -- .185** -0.099 -.148* -.192* -.161* -.172* -0.111 -.150* -.265*** .211** .259*** .210** .223*** .259*** -.165* 
2 RAT % Accuracy  -- 0.016 0.043 -0.024 -0.068 -.165** -.161* -0.095 -.119* 0.065 .113* .167** 0.033 .143* -.217*** 
3 Dependence on 
Routines 
  -- .620*** .414*** .184** .238*** 0.098 .284*** .210** -.276*** -.208** -.264*** -.173** -.220*** .220*** 
4 Uncertainty 
Intolerance 
   -- .310*** 0.043 .140* -0.011 .137* .132* -.232*** -.136* -.142* -.141* -.162* .161** 
5 Authoritarianism     -- .257*** .445*** .191** .418*** .454*** -.492*** -.478*** -.456*** -.454*** -.323*** .349*** 
6 Nationalism      -- .508*** .526*** .557*** .550*** -.423*** -.536*** -.501*** -.391*** -.332*** .428*** 
7 Conservatism       -- .369*** .422*** .497*** -.492*** -.460*** -.454*** -.328*** -.378** .325*** 
8 System Justification        -- .376*** .333*** -.158* -.288*** -.305*** -.176** -0.141 .253*** 
9 Nationalistic Identity 
Fusion 
        -- .648*** -.555*** -.643*** -.586*** -.476*** -.434*** .431*** 
10 Pro-Brexit Attitude          -- -.649*** -.840*** -.706*** -.615*** -.700*** .523*** 
11 Anti-Immigration 
Attitude 
          -- .697*** .684*** .586*** .541*** -.409*** 
12 Anti-European 
Union Attitude 
           -- .734*** .707*** .642*** -.514*** 
13 Pro-Free Movement 
of Labour 
            -- .699*** .542*** -.461*** 
14 Pro-Access to EU 
Single Market 
             -- .454*** -.401*** 
15 Pro-Government 
Right to Remain 
              -- -.279*** 
16 “Citizen of World is 
Citizen of Nowhere” 
Agreement 
               -- 
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Interestingly, across all of the psychological measures, subjective and objective 
cognitive flexibility were positively correlated with agreement that the UK 
government ought to be flexible with its implementation of Brexit in light of potential 
costs (Table 2.1; Figure 2.1), indicating that psychological flexibility in non-ideological 
domains may be a trait underpinning flexibility in policy evaluation. Furthermore, 
subjective and objective cognitive flexibility were significantly negatively correlated 
with agreement with the idea that “a citizen of the world is a citizen of nowhere”, a 
quote by UK Prime Minister Theresa May (Table 2.1, Figure 2.2). This quote may be 
interpreted as reflecting a highly specific and narrow definition of citizenship, as well 
as some negativity towards globalization; the negative correlation might therefore 
indicate that psychological flexibility could be linked to how broadly versus narrowly 
identity boundaries are drawn. 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Cognitive flexibility (WCST and RAT performance) and dependence on 
routines in relation to beliefs about citizenship. Error bars reflect 1± standard error, 
dashed lines reflect significant linear correlations. 
 
To complement these results, we also examined the correlations between these 
psychological flexibility measures and the ideological orientation variables. Overall, 
individuals with high scores on these ideological factors exhibited reduced subjective 
and objective cognitive flexibility. As evident in Table 2.1, objective cognitive 
flexibility measured by the WCST was negatively correlated with authoritarianism, 
nationalism, conservatism, and nationalistic identity fusion. Notably, RAT 
performance was not correlated with authoritarianism, nationalism, or nationalistic 
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identity fusion, but was negatively correlated with conservatism and system 
justification. This suggests that different ideological orientations may relate to 
different facets of cognitive flexibility. Consistent with the pattern of results observed 
for the objective cognitive flexibility measures, individuals with higher self-reported 
flexibility in the context of uncertainty and ambiguity in their daily lives reported 
lower authoritarianism and conservatism. Furthermore, individuals with higher 
subjective flexibility were less strongly fused to the UK relative to Europe (Table 2.1). 
Both measures of subjective flexibility were uncorrelated with system justification, 
and dependence on routines was positively correlated with nationalism while 
uncertainty intolerance was not. 
2.3.2 Structural Equation Models 
To develop a more comprehensive understanding of how psychological 
flexibility contributes to an ideological orientation that promoted support for the UK’s 
exit from the EU, we specified a type of structural equation model called path models 
to investigate whether the ideological variables (authoritarianism, nationalism, 
conservatism, and system justification) mediate the relationships between the 
psychological flexibility variables and support for Brexit. To test this prediction, we 
fit a three-level model whereby Level 1 consisted of the four psychological flexibility 
measures (two objective cognitive flexibility measures – WCST and RAT – and two 
subjective flexibility measures – Intolerance for Uncertainty and Dependence on 
Routines). Level 2 consisted of the four ideological orientation measures – 
authoritarianism, nationalism, conservatism, and system justification. In our 
specification, psychological variables in Level 1 directly affected the ideological 
variables in Level 2, which in turn affected the pro-Brexit attitudes in Level 3 (see 
Figure 2.3). In all models we allow for residual covariances within, but not between 
levels. Age, gender, and educational attainment were also included as covariates of 
interest of Brexit attitudes, and we allowed for residual covariance between the 
demographic variables.  
First, we tested a model in which Brexit attitudes were directly determined by 
both psychological and ideological variables. This model showed adequate fit to the 
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data (𝜒2=53.146, df=24, p=.001, N=332, RMSEA=.060 [.038, .082], SRMR=.059, 
CFI=.948, Yuan-Bentler scaling correction factor=.996). Next, we compared this 
model, in which direct effects of the psychological flexibility to Brexit attitude 
pathways were estimated freely, to a more parsimonious model in which 
psychological variables affected ideological variables, which in turn affected Brexit 
attitudes. This model captures the assumption that all the influence that psychological 
flexibility has on Brexit attitudes is mediated via the ideological variables (Figure 2.3). 
This model had good fit to the data (𝜒2=58.475, df=28, p=.001, N=332, RMSEA=.057 
[.037, .078], SRMR=.060, CFI=.950, Yuan-Bentler scaling correction factor=1.006). 
Notably, a likelihood ratio test suggested no significant decrease in model fit 
(Δ𝜒2=5.5276, Δdf=4, p=.2373), suggesting the more parsimonious model with no direct 
pathways between the psychological variables and Brexit attitudes (i.e. assuming a 





Figure 2.3. Structural equation model predicting support for Brexit. All parameters 
shown are fully standardized. Significant parameter estimates are shown in green and 
red bolded lines. Residual covariances between psychological variables and between 
ideological variables are allowed, but not shown for simplicity. Significance level was 
p<.05. Sig. Neg. = significant negative pathway, Sig. Pos. = significant positive 
pathway, N.S.=not significant, L1 = Level 1 (Psychological Flexibility variables), L2 = 
Level 2 (Ideological Orientation variables), L3 = Attitude outcome variable, 
WCST=Wisconsin Card Sorting Test accuracy, RAT=Remote Associates Test accuracy. 
Figure design inspired by Kievit and colleagues (2014, 2016). 
 
As shown in Figure 2.3, this model explains 47.6% of the variance in pro-Brexit 
attitudes (R2=43.6% without the demographic covariates). The model suggests that 
reduced cognitive and subjective flexibility contribute towards a more authoritarian, 
conservative, nationalistic ideological orientation, which in turn is predictive of 
support for the UK’s exit from the EU. Out of the ideological orientation variables in 
Level 2, the strongest predictors (as indexed by standardized pathways) of Brexit 
support were nationalism, authoritarianism, and conservatism. Each of these 
variables made significant, and complementary, contributions to the prediction of 
Brexit support, and each ideological variable in turn was predicted by a unique 
combination of the cognitive and subjective flexibility variables. A stronger 
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dependence on daily routines was a significant predictor of all the ideological 
variables in Level 2, indicating that reduced subjective flexibility may contribute to an 
ideological orientation that is more authoritarian, nationalistic, conservative, and 
system-justifying. Notably, while poor WCST performance significantly predicted 
authoritarianism and nationalism, poor RAT performance significantly predicted 
conservatism. This indicates that these cognitive flexibility measures have selective 
and specific effects on different ideological variables, and so certain types of cognitive 
inflexibility may contribute to particular forms of ideological thinking. 
In this model, system justification was not a significant predictor of Brexit 
support. To examine this further, we fit a model in which the pathways between pro-
Brexit attitude and authoritarianism, nationalism, and conservatism are constrained 
to 0, while the pathway between pro-Brexit attitude and system justification was 
estimated freely. This suggested that system justification is predictive of support for 
Brexit (unstandardized estimate=1.022, SE=.186, standardized estimate=.340, p<.001), 
but its variance is accounted for by the other ideological variables, such that it is 
associated with Brexit support but does not predict above and beyond 
authoritarianism, nationalism, and conservatism. 
To validate and extend this model further, we fit the original parsimonious 
model (Figure 2.3) but with different Brexit-related attitudes, including opposition to 
immigration, the EU, and free movement of labour (Figures 2.5-2.6). Across all these 
attitude measures, a model in which the effects of the psychological variables on the 
attitude outcome variable were mediated through the ideological measures had good 
model fit to the data and was more parsimonious and had equivalent model fit to a 
model which allowed direct pathways between the psychological variables and the 
attitude to be freely estimated (see Figures 2.5-2.6). These models revealed the same 
pathway patterns between the psychological, ideological, and attitude outcome 
variables as in the original model predicting Brexit support (Figure 2.3), with only 
slight variations in the parameter estimates. Overall, all three models found that 
cognitive and subjective inflexibility were predictive of a more authoritarian and 
nationalistic ideological orientation, which in turn significantly predicted Brexit-
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related attitudes (R2 varied between 40.4% and 45.5% with the demographic 
covariates, and between 39.0% and 43.2% without the demographic covariates). The 
only differences between the models were the predictive power of the demographic 
variables (e.g. age was not a significant predictor of opposition to the EU and freedom 
of labour movement), the predictive power of conservatism (conservatism was 
predictive of Brexit support and opposition to immigration, but not of opposition to 
the EU and freedom of labour movement), and the significance levels of the pathway 
between WCST performance and nationalism (which varied between p=.043 and 
p=.055, suggesting at best a borderline effect).  
 
Figure 2.4. Structural equation model predicting nationalistic identity fusion All 
parameters shown are fully standardized. Significant parameter estimates are shown 
in green and red bolded lines. Residual covariances between psychological variables 
and between ideological variables are allowed, but not shown for simplicity. 
Significance level was p<.05. Sig. Neg. = significant negative pathway, Sig. Pos. = 
significant positive pathway, N.S.=not significant, L1 = Level 1 (Psychological 
Flexibility variables), L2 = Level 2 (Ideological Orientation variables), L3 = Attitude 
outcome variable, WCST=Wisconsin Card Sorting Test accuracy, RAT=Remote 




Furthermore, to establish that the fit of these models was not merely due to a 
general feature of the variable covariance matrix, we conducted control analyses to 
assess the hierarchical structure of these models. An additional model was fitted in 
which Level 1 and Level 2 were reversed, and so pro-Brexit attitude was regressed on 
the psychological variables, which in turn were regressed on the ideological variables. 
This control model therefore consisted of the same information as the original model 
(depicted in Figure 2.3), and has equivalent complexity, but assumes a different 
structural relationship between the variables. As in the original model, residual 
covariances were allowed within levels but not between levels, and there were no 
direct pathways between the ideological variables and the Brexit attitude measure. 
The original model fit the data significantly better than this inverted model 
(∆AIC=129.175). Notably, the original model structure was also a consistently better 
fit than the inverted model when the outcome variables were opposition to 
immigration (∆AIC=97.341), the EU (∆AIC=117.468), and free movement of labour 
(∆AIC=92.729). 
So far, the fitted structural equation models demonstrated the contribution of 
psychological flexibility to ideological orientations that support Brexit and oppose 
immigration, the EU, and free movement of labour. In addition to these policy-
oriented attitudes, it is valuable to test whether this model would predict participants’ 
sense of nationalistic identity and how personally “fused” they feel with the concept 
of the UK. We therefore followed the same analytic procedure and fitted the original 
model structure to participants’ nationalistic identity fusion scores. First, we fit a 
three-level model in which the direct paths between the psychological variables and 
nationalistic identity fusion were freely estimated, and residual covariances were 
allowed within levels but not between levels. This model demonstrated good fit to the 
data (𝜒2= 52.882, df=24, p=.001, RMSEA=.060 [.038, .082], SRMR=.058, CFI=.950, Yuan-
Bentler scaling correction factor=.998). Next, we constrained the direct paths between 
the psychological variables and the nationalistic identity fusion to 0, such that the 
model structure assumed the effect of the psychological variables on identity fusion 
was fully mediated through the ideological variables. This model also possessed good 
model fit (𝜒2=54.816, df=28, p=.002, RMSEA = .054 [.032, .075], SRMR = .059, CFI = 
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.953, Yuan-Bentler scaling correction factor =1.014) and accounted for 42.6% in the 
variance in nationalistic identity fusion (Figure 2.4). Comparison of these two models 
showed no significant difference in model fit (Δ𝜒2=2.5181, Δdf=4, p=.6414), and so the 
latter, more parsimonious model, which assumed no direct pathway between the 
psychological variables and identity fusion, was preferred. Moreover, when this 
parsimonious model was compared to a control inverted model in which Level 1 (the 
psychological variables) and Level 2 (the ideological variables) were reversed, the 
original parsimonious model possessed a more favourable model fit and structure 
than its inverted counterpart (∆AIC=108.228). 
As evident in Figure 2.4, the pattern of results for the model predicting 
nationalistic identity fusion was similar to the models predicting policy-oriented 
Brexit attitudes, as poor performance on the objective cognitive flexibility measures 
and a stronger dependence on daily routines predicted a more ideological thinking 
style which in turn contributed to participants’ sense of identity fusion and “oneness” 
with the UK relative to Europe. Consequently, policy preferences as well as sense of 






Figure 2.5. Structural equation model predicting opposition to immigration (top) 
and EU (bottom). All parameters shown are fully standardized. Significant parameter 
estimates are shown in green and red bolded lines. Residual covariances between 
psychological variables and between ideological variables are allowed, but not shown 
for simplicity. Significance level was p<.05. Sig. Neg. = significant negative pathway, 
Sig. Pos. = significant positive pathway, N.S.=not significant, L1 = Level 1 
(Psychological Flexibility variables), L2 = Level 2 (Ideological Orientation variables), 
L3 = Attitude outcome variable, WCST=Wisconsin Card Sorting Test accuracy, 




Figure 2.6. Structural equation model predicting opposition to free movement of 
labour. All parameters shown are fully standardized. Significant parameter estimates 
are shown in green and red bolded lines. Residual covariances between psychological 
variables and between ideological variables are allowed, but not shown for simplicity. 
Significance level was p<.05. Sig. Neg. = significant negative pathway, Sig. Pos. = 
significant positive pathway, N.S.=not significant, L1 = Level 1 (Psychological 
Flexibility variables), L2 = Level 2 (Ideological Orientation variables), L3 = Attitude 
outcome variable, WCST=Wisconsin Card Sorting Test accuracy, RAT=Remote 





The present study found that adoption of strongly nationalistic attitudes in the 
context of the EU Referendum was related to reduced psychological flexibility across 
multiple objective and subjective measures (Figures 2.1 & 2.2, Table 2.1). Support for 
Brexit was associated with ideological orientations that were significantly more 
authoritarian, nationalistic, conservative, and system-justifying. Moreover, structural 
equation modelling revealed that reduced subjective and objective cognitive flexibility 
contribute towards more authoritarian, nationalistic, and conservative ideological 
orientations, which in turn predict support for Brexit and opposition to immigration, 
the EU, and free movement of labour. The models accounted for a significant 
proportion of variance in pro-Brexit attitudes (44.3% on average across the measured 
attitudes; Figures 2.3, 2.5, and 2.6). Building on the re-emergence of nationalistic 
sentiments in Europe and the USA in 2016 and 2017, this investigation was able to 
offer a novel outlook on the psychology behind nationalistic identity in the context of 
Brexit. From a methodological perspective, assessing cognitive flexibility using 
objective performance-based neuropsychological measures, and complementing 
these with self-report measures, allowed us to explore the psychological processes 
underpinning ideological cognition and voting behaviour. Interestingly, this path 
analysis model structure also accounted for participants’ sense of identity fusion with 
the UK (Figure 2.4), as assessed via a pictorial measure. Consequently, cognitive and 
subjective inflexibility contribute towards ideological thinking styles that shape both 
policy-oriented nationalistic attitudes and sense of personal nationalistic identity. 
Notably, the two objective cognitive flexibility tasks were ideologically- and 
emotionally-neutral, and so did not tap information processing specific to nationalistic 
ideologies or any form of social cognition. Although nationalism and voting have long 
been coupled with emotional processing (Jost, Hennes, & Lavine, 2013; Feldman, 
Huddy, & Cassese, 2012), and many studies in political psychology have investigated 
individuals’ responses to negative and threatening stimuli (Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 
2009; Smith et al., 2011; Carraro, Castelli, & Macchiella, 2011), it may not only be ‘hot’ 
cognition – i.e. emotion-dependent information processing (Lodge & Taber, 2005; 
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Roiser & Sahakian, 2013) – that is relevant to the adoption of ideologies. In this study, 
we showed that ‘cold’ cognition – i.e. information processing that is emotionally-
neutral – can also be implicated in individual differences in adherence to ideologies. 
This provides empirical support to the idea that the rigidity of our belief systems is 
not purely a matter of emotion and attitude-confirming biases, but can also be related 
to cognitive information processing styles that are not explicitly linked to our moral 
foundations, beliefs, and values.  
Indeed, this builds upon earlier work demonstrating links between 
neurocognitive functioning and political ideologies. For example, Amodio and 
colleagues (2007) illustrated that neurocognitive sensitivity to response conflict is 
correlated with a more liberal political orientation, and Shook and Fazio (2009) 
provided evidence that learning strategies in the exploration of novel non-ideological 
stimuli were related to political ideology. Hence, there is value in expanding the use 
of cognitive methods for studying the psychological roots of ideology. 
The present findings also reveal notable specificities in the pathways between 
psychological flexibility and Brexit attitudes. As evident in Figure 2.4, the effect of 
WCST performance on pro-Brexit attitudes is mediated via its effect on nationalism 
and authoritarianism, while the effect of RAT performance is mediated through 
heightened conservatism. This signifies that the pathways between objective cognitive 
flexibility, ideological orientations, and nationalistic policy attitudes vary according 
to the facet of cognitive flexibility under investigation. Consequently, certain facets of 
psychological inflexibility are associated with specific types of conservative-leaning 
ideologies. This yields two valuable insights: firstly, cognitive flexibility is a 
multidimensional construct that both social and cognitive psychology researchers will 
need to further unpack. Secondly, there are subtle differences in the cognitive 
correlates of different types of ideological thinking, and so future research will need 
to address the mechanisms underlying these differential relationships and explore 
what these psychological correlates can tell us about the differences between 
authoritarianism, nationalism, conservatism, and system justification, amongst other 
ideological orientations. Furthermore, while dependence on routines and traditions in 
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daily life was predictive of all four ideological orientations, intolerance for uncertainty 
was not a significant predictor of any of these. This suggests that a preference for 
habits and repetitive routines may foster a preference for ideologies that emphasize 
traditionalism and predictability. However, it is conceivable that immersing oneself 
in strongly ideological environments may also encourage psychological inflexibility 
and promote a preference for routines and traditions. Nevertheless, more research is 
necessary to understand the nature of cognitive flexibility and the various ways in 
which it manifests in relation to ideological thinking. 
This research program builds on and complements previous work in four 
overarching theoretical frameworks: (1) the nature of nationalistic attachment, (2) 
political conservatism as motivated social cognition, (3) System Justification Theory, 
and (4) Identity Fusion Theory. Previous studies of nationalistic attachment have 
typically distinguished multiple dimensions of nationalism (Sidanius, Feshbach, 
Levin, & Pratto, 1997), such as a distinction between nationalism and patriotism 
(Kosterman & Feschbach, 1989, De Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003; Wagner et al., 2010), 
between blind and constructive patriotism (Schatz et al., 1997, 1999), and between 
collective narcissism and positive group regard (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & 
Bilewicz, 2013). Future research should therefore fractionate nationalism further and 
investigate whether patriotism conceptualized as love of one’s country, rather than 
nationalistic views on separateness and superiority, have different cognitive 
correlates. 
Furthermore, these findings are relevant for the literature on the relationship 
between right-wing conservatism and cognitive style (Jost et al., 2003a; Jost, 2017; Van 
Hiel et al., 2016; Van Hiel, Onraet, & De Pauw, 2010), as the results indicate negative 
relationships between right-wing conservatism and objective cognitive flexibility in 
the WCST and RAT (Table 2.1, Figure 2.3). Interestingly, in the structural equation 
models (Figures 2.3 & 2.4), conservatism was predicted by RAT (and not WCST) 
performance and greater dependence on routines, and so it is important to address 
the specificities in the relationship between right-wing conservatism and objectively-
assessed cognitive flexibility.  
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Recent interpretations of System Justification Theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994) have 
posited that national attachment may be a means of attaining the system justifying 
goal to defend existing social systems against criticism (Van der Toorn et al., 2014). 
Indeed, the present study found significant correlations between system justification 
and nationalistic attitudes and attachment (Table 2.1). However, system justification 
did not account for nationalistic attitudes above and beyond the other ideological 
orientation variables in the model (authoritarianism, conservatism, and nationalism), 
and was in fact a significant negative predictor of anti-immigration attitudes (Figure 
2.5). Additionally, System Justification Theory proposes that justifying the prevailing 
systems is psychologically appealing because it facilitates the attainment of certainty 
and coherence, and reduces feelings of threat and inconsistency (Hennes et al., 2012; 
Jost, Ledgerwood, & Hardin, 2008). Here, system justification was negatively 
correlated with RAT performance (Table 2.1, Figure 2.4), signifying that these 
epistemic motivations may operate more deeply than the social-psychological level, 
and may related to cognitive predispositions towards inflexible thinking that could 
make some individuals more susceptible to these epistemic and existential 
motivations. 
Finally, these findings are also relevant for Identity Fusion Theory (Swann et 
al., 2010). Extending previous work showing that strong identity fusion is related to 
extreme pro-group actions (Swann et al., 2009) and sacrificial behaviours across 
different cultures (Swann et al., 2014; Whitehouse et al., 2014; Fredman, Bastian, & 
Swann, 2017), here we find that identity fusion also captures individual variation in 
normative intragroup and intergroup attitudes and is related to psychological 
flexibility. Most interestingly, the results indicate that heightened fusion with the 
nationalistic ingroup is related to poorer WCST performance (Table 2.1), suggesting 
that more cognitively flexible individuals have a reduced tendency to selectively fuse 
with their national ingroup. Moreover, Whitehouse and Lanman (2014) proposed that 
rituals are key components of identity fusion, and correspondingly we found that 
individuals who reported depending on rituals and routines in their daily lives, and 
who believed that rituals are important even when unpleasant, were more fused to 
their nation (Table 2.1). Note that the rituals and routines that participants reported 
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about were personal rather than collective, suggesting that dispositional propensities 
towards ritual engagement may play an essential role in shaping susceptibility to 
identity fusion. 
The finding that both behavioural and self-report measures of psychological 
flexibility made significant unique and independent contributions to ideological 
thinking and Brexit-related attitudes supports other empirical work on prejudice (e.g. 
De keersmaecker et al., 2017a) and methodological considerations about how best to 
measure these constructs (Jost, 2017; Van Hiel et al., 2016; Onraet et al., 2015). 
Furthermore, this study was not meant to be an exhaustive investigation of all the 
facets of psychological flexibility or cognitive style (for further discussions into the 
cognitive flexibility construct see: Schaie, Dutta, & Willis, 1991; Kozhevnikov, 2007; 
Cools & Robbins, 2007; Kehagia, Murray, & Robbins, 2010), and so there is room for 
further elucidation of the relationships between various ideological orientations and 
flexibility. 
By investigating the cognitive roots of ideological thinking and nationalistic 
attitudes and behaviour, this study has sought to connect the realm of cognition with 
that of ideology. Ideologically-neutral cognitive flexibility was found to be an 
important correlate of ideological identity and behaviour, suggesting that flexibility 
of thought may have far-reaching consequences for social and political attitudes. The 
way the brain constructs internal boundaries between conceptual representations and 
adapts to changes in environmental contingencies has been shown here to be linked 
to their desire for external boundaries to be imposed on national entities and for 
greater homogeneity in their cultural environment. This illustrates that information 
processing styles in relation to perceptual and linguistic stimuli may also be drawn 
upon when dealing with political and ideological information. Thus, it is not only 
emotional processing or “psychological needs” that underlie individuals’ adoption of 
nationalistic ideologies; “cold” cognitive information processing styles also play a key 
role in ideological behaviour and identity. Nevertheless, these findings do not rule out 
the possible effects of immersing oneself in ideologies on psychological flexibility and 
cognition, and so future research will need to address these complex causal 
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relationships and interactions (Jost, Nam, Amodio, & Van Bavel, 2014). 
Acknowledging the importance of linking individual differences at the level of 
perception and cognition with differences at the level of identity and political 
behaviour will help to further inform our understanding of the cognitive 
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3 Cognitive Flexibility and Religious Disbelief: The 
Roles of Ideological Rituals, Identity, and 
Upbringing 
3.1 Introduction 
The last decade has seen the birth of a new field, the ‘cognitive science of 
religion’ (Boyer, 2008; Whitehouse, 2004), which has illustrated that religious beliefs 
and traditions originate from ordinary psychological functions (Banerjee & Bloom, 
2014; Heywood & Bering, 2014; Norenzayan & Gervais, 2013; Norenzayan, 2016). 
There is a range of human cognitive biases that are thought to make children and 
adults “intuitive theists” (Järnefelt, Canfield, & Kelemen, 2015; Kelemen, 2004; 
Kelemen & Rosset, 2009). These include human tendencies towards 
anthropomorphism (Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007) and teleological thinking 
(Banerjee & Bloom, 2014; Heywood & Bering, 2013), which may give rise to specific 
religious beliefs about supernatural agents and creationism (Norenzayan, 2016). 
Notably, however, research on the links between religious beliefs and cognitive 
processes has been largely motivated by researchers’ interest in the content of religious 
beliefs, that is, in why religions tend to depict supernatural agents or include beliefs 
about agentic, omniscient, and punishing gods (Norenazayan, 2016). Nevertheless, 
there has been little scientific attention to how the strictness of religious ideologies – 
regardless of the content of their doctrine – might also be rooted in and have 
consequences for cognition. 
The building blocks of religious belief systems consist of strict rules and rituals 
that offer adherents a sense of coherence and certainty and a firm knowledge structure 
about the world (Atran, 2002; Kay et al., 2008, 2009; McCullough & Willoughby, 2009; 
Rutjens et al., 2010; Epley et al., 2007; Dechesne et al., 2003; Norenzayan & Hansen, 
2006; Vail et al., 2010). Despite the proliferation in academic research into the 
cognitive, affective, and moral underpinnings of religiosity (Norenzayan, Shariff, & 
Gervais, 2016; Purzycki et al., 2016; Rand et al., 2014; Kapogiannis et al., 2009, 2014; 
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Pennycook et al., 2012), two important questions have not been addressed empirically: 
firstly, given the strictness of many religious ideologies, to what extent does religious 
adherence and practice of repetitive religious rituals shape the persistence versus 
flexibility of one’s cognition? And secondly, to what extent does early religious 
upbringing shape later cognitive persistence and flexibility? 
When facing dynamically changing environments, human goal-directed action 
is thought to be characterized by a conflict between two antagonistic cognitive modes 
(Goschke, 2003; Dreisbach & Goschke, 2004; Hommel, 2015). On one hand, goal-
directed behaviour requires that stable goals are maintained and that these are 
shielded from irrelevant information or competing goals. That is, it is adaptive to have 
an orientation towards cognitive persistence. On the other hand, behaviour must remain 
sensitive to alternative possibilities, to disengage from ineffective goals, and to flexibly 
adapt when environments or internal states change. Goal-directed behaviour 
therefore also benefits from cognitive flexibility. These two cognitive control modes 
serve antagonistic adaptive functions and have complementary advantages and 
disadvantages (Goschke & Bolte, 2014). Excessive shielding of goals against 
distraction or competing responses through cognitive persistence enhances stability, 
but can give rise to inflexible perseverative behaviour. In turn, excessive flexibility 
and behavioural switching may lead to unproductive distractibility. 
Notably, individuals differ in their cognitive control tendencies towards 
persistence or flexibility, and there is evidence that genetic and cultural factors shape 
these cognitive control preferences (for review see: Hommel & Colzato, 2017). Given 
that religious ideologies tend to possess firm and persistent representations of how 
the world is structured, what is good and true, and how individuals ought to behave, 
it is valuable to investigate the links between religion and cognitive flexibility, as well 
as whether growing up with strict rules for behaviour and thought shapes cognitive 
persistence.  
Graham and Haidt (2010) drew the fruitful analogy that overemphasis on the 
role of belief in Gods when investigating the psychology of religions is “like focusing 
on the football: It seems to be where the action is, but if you stare too long at it, you 
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miss the deeper purpose of the game, which is the strengthening of a community” (p. 
140). Indeed, a concentrated focus on the content of religious beliefs can obscure key 
features of religious ideologies. However, in addition to studying the community and 
the social functions of religion, it is also essential to investigate the cognitive functions 
and consequences of religions. That is, if we extend the metaphor, looking at the 
community still misses the complete picture because one also needs to look at how 
playing the game shapes the minds and brains of the players, or attracts players with 
particular psychological characteristics.  
The present study therefore sought to investigate the extent to which 
tendencies towards cognitive modes of flexibility versus persistence are related to 
three facets of religious life: (1) religious affiliation (i.e. identifying as religious or 
nonreligious), (2) religious practice, and (3) religious upbringing, in a sample of 





3.2 Materials and Methods 
3.2.1 Participants 
The sample consisted of 744 participants (55.5% female; age: M=36.56, 
SD=13.45) recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk and social media and were 
financially compensated for their participation. Participants provided their informed 
consent in accordance with the University of Cambridge’s Department of Psychology 
Ethics Committee. The majority of participants are US residents (92.2%), with 5.4% not 
residing in the US, and 2.4% preferring not to indicate. In terms of religiosity, 62.5% 
of the sample reported being religious (N=465), 31.9% reported being non-religious 
(atheist or agnostic, N=237), and 5.6% declined to respond or did not know (N=42). 
Out of those who reported being religious, 45.8% were Protestant Christian, 26.7% 
were Roman Catholic, 5.8% were Jewish, 3.7% were Hindu, 1.5% were Greek or 
Russian Orthodox, 1.5% were Mormon, 1.1% were Muslim, and 13.7% affiliated with 
other religions. In terms of frequency of religious services attendance amongst 
religious participants, 29.7% attended 1-2 times per week, 13.1% attended 1-2 times 
per month, 18.6% attended 1-2 times per year, 18.4% seldom attended, and 20.2% 
never attended. Across all participants, 59.4% had been raised in a home described as 
religious. 
3.2.2 Measures and Procedure 
Religiosity Measures 
Participants were asked the following questions, all of which were answered in 
a multiple-choice format with appropriate potential answers and always the option 
not to respond: (Q1) “What is your present religion, if any?”. Participants were 
presented with the following response options: “Protestant (Baptist, Methodist, Non-
denominational, Lutheran, Prebysterian, Pentacostal, Episcopalian, Reformed, 
Church of Christ, etc.)”, “Roman Catholic”, “Mormon”, “Orthodox (Greek, Russian, 
or some other orthodox church)”, “Muslim”, “Jewish”, “Hindu”, “Jehova’s Witness”, 
“Atheist (do not believe in God)”, “Agnostic (not sure if there is a God)”, “Don’t 
know”, “Would rather not say”, “Other” (with option to fill in text). (Q2) “As a child, 
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were you raised in a religious home?”. Participants could select between: “Yes”, “No”, 
“Don’t know”. (Q3) “Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend 
religious services?”. Participants could select between the following responses: “More 
than once a week”, “Once a week”, “Once or twice a month”, “A few times a year”, 
“Seldom”, “Never”. 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) 
The WCST (Grant & Berg, 1948) was administered with Inquisit 5 by 
Millisecond Software in standard fashion (Heaton, 1981). Participants are presented 
with four key cards and a deck of response cards that vary on three dimensions 
(colour, shape, and number of geometric figures) and are asked to match a fifth card 
from the sequentially-presented response cards to one of the four key cards. 
Participants need to identify the correct classification rule (out of three potential rules: 
matching by colour, shape, or number) according to the feedback they receive after 
each trial. They are informed that the classification rule may change without warning, 
and indeed the rule alternates after participants correctly respond to ten consecutive 
trials, requiring a flexible set shift. The task ends after participants complete six 
categories (twice for each of the three rules) or after 128 trials. To index participants’ 
performance, the WCST accuracy rate was computed. 
Remote Associates Test (RAT) 
The RAT (Mednick, 1968) consisted of 15 compound remote associate 
problems, in which participants are presented with three cue words (e.g. cottage, swiss, 
and cake), and must generate the compound word solution that connects these three 
words (e.g. cheese). Items of varying difficulty levels were selected from established 
remote associate problems (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003). Participants were given 
20 seconds to respond to each item. 
Alternative Uses Task (AUT) 
In the AUT (Guildford, 1967), participants were asked to generate as many 
possible uses for two common household items (brick and newspaper) for 2 minutes. 
Participants’ responses were recorded and scored along four components by two 
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independent raters in accordance with previous guidelines (Cronbach’s alpha= .994; 
Chermahini & Hommel, 2010; Madore et al., 2015; Roberts et al., 2017). Flexibility was 
scored according to the number of distinct categories that participants’ responses for 
a given item could be clustered into (e.g. using a newspaper for making origami and 
making paper dolls are uses that would fall under the same category of arts and crafts, 
while using a brick for swatting a fly would fall under a separate category). The total 
flexibility score comprised of the sum from all trials. Fluency constituted the total 
number of appropriate responses. Elaboration reflected the amount of detail provided 
by the participants (for brick, “build” would receive a score of 0; “build a house” 
would receive a score of 1; and “a weapon to protect family when your house is 
robbed” would be awarded 2 points for specifying detailed use and context). To score 
originality, each response was compared to the responses from the rest of the 
participants, such that responses to a given object that were only provided by 5% of 
the sample received an originality point. The total originality score reflected the sum 
of original scores per participant across all trials. To establish interrater reliability for 
appropriate categories, level of detail for the elaboration scoring, and originality, the 
raters separately scored 25 random participants’ responses, and once high interrater 
reliability was established with this set on all AUT measures (Cronbach’s alpha>0.91 
on all measures), the raters independently scored the rest of the participants. Each 
AUT measure reflects the mean score given by the two independent raters. 
Additional Measures 
Additional measures that were included in this study but are not reported here 
included:  political affiliation and conservatism (Everett, 2013), identity fusion (Swann 
et al., 2009; Jimenez et al., 2016) and support for extreme pro-group actions (Swann et 






Correlational analysis revealed significant positive correlations between the 
three cognitive flexibility measures: r=.135 (p=.010) between WCST and RAT, r=.176 
(p<.001) between AUT Flexibility and RAT, and r=.289 (p<.001) between WCST and 
AUT Flexibility. Given the different demands that each of these tasks makes on 
participants’ working memory, perception, and linguistic skills, this corroborates past 
work suggesting that these three measures are related but separable facets of flexible 
cognition (e.g. Eslinger & Grattan, 1993; Parkin & Lawrence, 1994). 
In terms of the relationship between the cognitive flexibility measures and 
demographic variables, age was positively correlated with RAT performance, r=.138 
(p<.001), but not with WCST, r=-.049 (p=.331), or AUT Flexibility, r=-.051 (p=.186). 
Educational attainment was not correlated with any of the three measures: WCST, 
r=.017 (p=.737); RAT, r=.057 (p=.146), and AUT Flexibility, r=.031 (p=.420). There were 
also no differences according to gender on the three measures: WCST, t(393)=-.013 
(p=.990); RAT, t(639)=1.440 (p=.150), and AUT Flexibility, t(671)=-.325 (p=.745). 
An independent samples t-test demonstrated there was a significant difference 
in the age of religious participants (M=37.83, SD=13.44, N=447) and nonreligious 
participants (M=34.07, SD=12.89, N=235); t(680)=-3.516, p<.001. A Chi-Square Test 
demonstrated an association between gender and religious affiliation, χ2(1)=12.538, 
p<.001, such that females tended to be more religious than males. There were no 
differences in educational attainment of religious and nonreligious participants, 
t(687)=-1.086, p=.278.  
In order to make sure that any detected differences in cognitive flexibility 
according to religiosity are not due to differences in these demographic variables, the 
variables of age, gender, and educational attainment were included as covariates in 
all analyses, unless otherwise stated. Furthermore, since not all participants 
completed the WCST, the ANCOVAs and Bonferroni corrections are reported 
separately for each of the cognitive flexibility measures, so that each analysis reflects 
the full number of participants who completed that cognitive flexibility measure. 
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3.3.1 Religious Affiliation and Flexibility 
Univariate ANCOVAs were computed on measures of cognitive flexibility, 
with age, gender, and educational attainment as covariates, and religious versus 
nonreligious identity as the fixed factor. An ANCOVA on WCST accuracy rate 
revealed a significant main effect of religious identity, F(1,368)=15.425, p<.001, 
ƞ𝑝
2=.040, such that nonreligious participants (N=114) possessed higher scores on the 
WCST overall than religious participants (N=259) (see Figure 3.1). There were no 
significant effects of age, gender, or educational attainment. The effects of religious 
affiliation on WCST remain unaffected when the analysis is conducted without 
inclusion of the covariates: F(1,379)=17.238, p<.001, ƞ𝑝
2=.044. 
This pattern of results was also evident in the ANCOVA on RAT accuracy rate, 
F(1,594)=14.686, p<.001, ƞ𝑝
2=.024: as seen in Figure 3.1, nonreligious participants 
(N=208) provided more correct answers on the RAT than religious participants 
(N=391). There was a main effect of age for RAT performance, F(1,594)=14.141, p<.001, 
ƞ𝑝
2=.023, with older participants scoring more highly on the RAT. There were no 
statistically significant effects of gender or educational attainment. The effects of 
religious affiliation on RAT performance remain unaffected when the analysis is 
conducted without inclusion of the covariates: F(1,607)=9.066, p=.003. 
A MANCOVA on the four AUT measures, with age, gender, and educational 
attainment as covariates, and religious versus nonreligious identity as the fixed factor, 
found a significant main effect of religious identity for the AUT Flexibility score, 
F(1,623)=352.987, p<.001, ƞ𝑝
2=.362, and the AUT Originality score, F(1,623)=69.855, 
p<.001, ƞ𝑝
2=.101, but not for the AUT Elaboration score, F(1,623)=.047, p=.829 or AUT 
Fluency score, F(1,623)=2.405, p=.121 (Figure 3.1). Specifically, nonreligious 
participants (N=416) provided more flexible and original responses on the AUT than 
religious participants (N=212). There was no significant effect of gender (p=.332) or 
age (p=.948) for the AUT Flexibility score, and a small significant effect of educational 
attainment, F(1,623)=4.846, p=.028, ƞ𝑝
2=.008, with higher educational attainment 
relating to more flexible scores. For the AUT Originality score, there was no significant 
effect of age (p=.992) or educational attainment (p=.059), and females provided more 
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original responses than males, F(1,623)=9.222, p=.002. The effects of religious 
affiliation on AUT performance remain unchanged when the analyses are conducted 
without inclusion of the covariates: there is a significant effect for AUT Flexibility, 
F(1,623)=363.404, p<.001, and AUT Originality, F(1,623)=64.706, p<.001, and 




Figure 3.1. Comparison of religious and nonreligious participants on the Wisconsin 
Card Sorting Test (WCST), Remote Associates Test (RAT) and Alternative Uses Test 
(AUT) Flexibility, controlling for age, gender, and educational attainment. ***p<.001, 
error bars denote 1± standard error. 
 
3.3.2 Religious Practice and Flexibility  
Participants were split into three groups according to their response to the 
question of frequency of religious service attendance: (1) nonreligious participants, (2) 
religious participants who regularly attend religious services (between multiple times 
per week to multiple times per year), and (3) religious participants who seldom or 
never attend religious services aside from weddings and funerals. Univariate 
ANCOVA, with age, gender, and educational attainments as covariates, showed 
significant differences between the three groups on the WCST, F(2, 384)=7.548, p=.001, 
ƞ𝑝
2=.038, such that nonreligious participants (M=76.78%, SD=10.56%, N-114) 
performed significantly better than both practicing religious participants (M=70.77%, 
SD=16.68%, N=151) and non-practicing religious participants (M=69.72%, 
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SD=15.12%, N=125), and there were no significant differences between the two groups 
of religious participants (see Figure 3.2), as confirmed with post-hoc Bonferroni 
correction. There was no significant effect of age, gender, or educational attainment 
(p>.250). However, when splitting the practicing religious participants according to 
the frequency of their religious service attendance, significant differences emerged 
between those that attend religious services 1-2 per week and those that attend 
services 1-2 per year: participants who attend religious services weekly (M=67.48%, 
SD=17.87%) performed significantly more poorly than religious individuals who 
attend yearly (M=73.95%, SD=14.03%), t(117)=-2.207, p=.029. 
Furthermore, a univariate ANCOVA on RAT accuracy rate demonstrated a 
main effect of religious practice, F(2,631)=13.935, p<.001, ƞ𝑝
2=.042, with non-practicing 
religious participants (M=72.12%, SD=20.89%, N=208) exhibiting significant greater 
cognitive flexibility on the RAT than practicing religious participants (M=61.87%, 
SD=27.33%, N=239), and with no difference in performance between non-practicing 
religious participants (M=71.23%, SD=21.10%, N=190) and nonreligious participants, 
as confirmed with Bonferroni correction. There was a significant effect of age, 
F(1,631)=10.138, p=.002, ƞ𝑝
2=.016, and no significant effects of gender or educational 
attainment. 
A MANCOVA on the four AUT measures demonstrated significant differences 
between the three groups in the AUT Flexibility score, F(2,662)=99.688, p<.001, 
ƞ𝑝
2=.231, and AUT Originality score, F(2,662)=26.525, p<.001, ƞ𝑝
2=.074, but not in AUT 
Elaboration, F(2,662)=.369, p=.692, or AUT Fluency, F(2,662)=1.037, p=.355. 
Nonreligious participants exhibited higher flexibility in their AUT responses than 
non-practicing religious participants, which in turn provided more flexible responses 
than practicing religious participants (Figure 3.2), after Bonferroni correction and with 
no significant effects of age (p=.519), gender (p=.126), or educational attainment 
(p=.098). Similarly, nonreligious participants (M=8.72, SD=3.94, N=212) offered more 
original responses to the AUT than non-practicing (p<.001; M=6.91, SD=4.26, N=195) 
and practicing (p<.001; M=6.24, SD=3.78, N=261) religious participants, but 
Bonferroni correction revealed there were no significant differences between non-
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practicing and practicing religious participants in AUT Originality (p=.201). There was 
no effect of age (p=.822), and a significant effect of gender, F(1,662)=9.357, p=.002, and 
educational attainment, F(1,662)=4.394, p=.036, such that females and participants 
with higher levels of educational attainment offered more original responses. 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Comparison of nonreligious participants, religious participants who 
seldom or never attend religious services (nonpracticing), and religious participants 
who regularly attend religious services (practicing) on the Wisconsin Card Sorting 
Test (WCST), Remote Associates Test (RAT) and Alternative Uses Test (AUT) 
Flexibility, Bonferroni-corrected, controlling for age, gender, and educational 
attainment. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, error bars denote 1± standard error. 
 
3.3.3 Religious Upbringing and Flexibility 
Participants were split into four groups: nonreligious individuals without a 
religious upbringing (N=109), nonreligious individuals with a religious upbringing 
(N=101), religious individuals without a religious upbringing (N=131), and religious 
individuals with a religious upbringing (N=278). Univariate ANCOVA, with age, 
gender, and educational attainment as covariates, demonstrated significant 
differences between groups for WCST accuracy rate, F(3,362)=5.207, p=.002, ƞ𝑝
2=.041, 
where nonreligious participants performed significantly better than religious 
participants regardless of upbringing after Bonferroni correction. There were no 
significant effects of gender (p=.563), age (p=.503), or educational attainment (p=.376). 
The same pattern of results was evident for the ANCOVA for RAT accuracy rate, 
F(3,584)=5.248, p=.001, ƞ𝑝
2=.026, with nonreligious participants performing better than 
religious participants, as confirmed with Bonferroni correction. There was no effect of 
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educational attainment (p=.242) or gender (p=.085), but there was an effect of age 
(p<.001) whereby older participants performed better on the RAT. Notably, a trend 
emerged in RAT performance where nonreligious participants with a religious 
upbringing (M=74.50%, SD=18.05%) performed better than nonreligious participants 
without a religious upbringing (M=69.70%, SD=23.27%), but an independent samples 
t-test found that this did not achieve statistical significance (t(207)=-1.647, p=.095). 
A MANCOVA on the AUT subscores demonstrated significant differences 
between these four participant groups in AUT Flexibility, F(3,612)=141.846, p<.001, 
ƞ𝑝
2=.410, and AUT Originality, F(3,612)=26.236, p<.001, ƞ𝑝
2=.114, but not in AUT 
Elaboration, F(3,612)=.128, p=.944, or AUT Fluency, F(3,612)=2.422, p=.065. For both 
the AUT Flexibility and AUT Originality scores, nonreligious participants performed 
significantly better than religious participants regardless of upbringing after 
Bonferroni correction. As evident in Figure 3.3, nonreligious participants provided 
significantly more flexible responses than religious participants, with no significant 
effect of age (p=.679) or age (p=.358), and a significant effect of educational attainment, 
F(1,612)=7.774, p=.005, ƞ𝑝
2=.013, such that higher educational attainment was related 
to more flexible responses in the AUT. 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Comparison of religious and nonreligious participants with and without a 
religious upbringing on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST), Remote Associates 
Test (RAT) and Alternative Uses Test (AUT) Flexibility, Bonferroni-corrected, 
controlling for age, gender, and educational attainment. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, 
error bars denote 1± standard error. Religious upbring.= Religious upbringing, No 




The present study examined the relationship between three aspects of religious 
life – religious affiliation, practice, and upbringing – and three psychological measures 
of cognitive flexibility. Overall, the results suggest that religious disbelief and reduced 
religious practice among religious individuals are related to heightened cognitive 
flexibility across three independent behavioural neuropsychological measures. In 
terms of religious affiliation, the findings indicate that individuals who identified as 
nonreligious exhibited cognitive control biases towards cognitive flexibility in the 
WCST, RAT and AUT, while religious individuals displayed tendencies towards 
cognitive persistence (Figure 3.1). With respect to WCST performance, this indicates 
that religious participants exhibited greater cognitive persistence while nonreligious 
participants demonstrated greater cognitive flexibility and did not persist with the 
previously-rewarded strategy when it was no longer adaptive. In terms of RAT 
performance, the findings signify that nonreligious individuals tended to flexibly 
retrieve remote associations between conceptual representations, suggesting they 
possess looser boundaries between representational categories in their underlying 
semantic networks and a tendency to restructure thought when certain semantic 
searches are unproductive or misleading. The same pattern was evident in the AUT, 
in which nonreligious participants provided responses that spanned a more flexible 
range of ideas and conceptual categories for possible object uses. These findings 
suggest that there is a relationship between cognitive flexibility and the religious 
ideologies to which we adhere. 
In terms of frequency of religious service attendance, there were significant 
differences between nonreligious individuals, religious individuals who seldom or 
never attend religious services (non-practicing), and religious individuals who 
regularly attend religious services (practicing) in terms of the AUT Flexibility score 
(Figure 3.2). Nonreligious participants provided significantly more flexible responses 
than non-practicing religious participants, who in turn exhibited greater flexibility on 
the AUT than practicing religious participants. This linear relationship suggests that 
religious affiliation and religious practice may both exert an effect on the spontaneous 
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flexibility measured by the AUT, or that individuals who display tendencies towards 
spontaneous flexibility may be less likely to affiliate as religious and to engage with 
repetitive religious rituals. Analysis of RAT performance revealed that non-practicing 
religious participants exhibited the same levels of cognitive flexibility as nonreligious 
participants, and displayed stronger tendencies towards cognitive flexibility than 
practicing religious participants (Figure 3.2). This suggests that engagement and 
practice of religious rituals and routines may shape the semantic flexibility that 
underpins the RAT, or that individuals with greater flexibility on the RAT are more 
averse to engagement in religious rituals and services. It is striking that AUT and RAT 
flexibility of religious participants who regularly attend religious services differs from 
religious participants who do not. 
The amount of religious attendance was not a differentiating factor amongst 
religious participants in terms of WCST performance when comparing the three 
groups, such that non-practicing religious participants scored the same as practicing 
religious participants, and both groups adopted a more persistent cognitive style than 
nonreligious participants (Figure 3.2). However, when studying the group of religious 
participants who reported attending religious services regularly, a significant 
difference emerged between participants who attend services 1-2 times per week and 
those who attend services 1-2 times per year. Participants with infrequent yearly 
attendance exhibited heightened cognitive flexibility in the WCST, while those who 
attended weekly behaved in a more cognitively persistent way, suggesting that high 
frequency of engagement with religious rituals and traditions is linked to greater 
cognitive persistence amongst practicing religious individuals in the WCST. This 
could imply that repetitive engagement with religious doctrine has a positive effect 
on cognitive persistence, or that individuals who are more cognitively persistent are 
more attracted to the regular practice of rituals that occurs at religious services. 
Furthermore, when analysing participants’ religious upbringing in relation to 
their current religious affiliation, it was manifest that current affiliation was more 
influential than religious upbringing in all of the measured facets of cognitive 
flexibility (Figure 3.3). Nonetheless, RAT performance indicated a trend in which 
91 
 
nonreligious participants who had a religious upbringing – i.e. those that choose to 
‘leave’ religion in favour of atheism – were the most cognitively flexible of the four 
groups, including more so than nonreligious participants with no religious 
upbringing. While this trend did not achieve statistical significance in the current 
sample, it is noteworthy for future research as it could suggest that being sceptical of 
one’s religious doctrine and upbringing requires significant cognitive flexibility – 
more so than is required to remain within one’s familiar ideologies. The finding that 
there are significant differences in cognitive control styles between those who chose 
to ‘adopt’ religion and those who chose to ‘leave’ religion in the WCST, RAT, and AUT 
may signify that ‘adopting’ a religious ideology is a process that makes use of 
heightened cognitive persistence while scepticism towards religion is tied to a 
tendency towards cognitive flexibility. Overall the findings indicate that the act of 
choosing one’s affiliation is more indicative of one’s cognitive control style than one’s 
upbringing. 
 The present findings have multiple theoretical and methodological 
implications for the study of the psychology of religion. Firstly, from a methodological 
standpoint, this investigation suggests that it is possible to study religious life and 
experiences using the methodologies of cognitive psychology, and that assessing how 
cognitive control styles are linked to strictness of ideology is a fruitful path for 
psychologists of religion to take. A rich literature on the psychology of religion has 
demonstrated that nonreligious individuals have a stronger tendency to inhibit 
intuitively compelling incorrect ideas on the Cognitive Reflections Test (Shenhav, 
Rand & Greene, 2012; Pennycook et al., 2012; Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012; see meta-
analysis: Pennycook et al., 2016; see failures to replicate: Sanchez et al., 2017; Yonker 
et al., 2016), which is thought to measure an analytical cognitive style. Nonetheless, 
the Cognitive Reflections Test (Frederick, 2005) only relies on three items consisting 
of mathematically-based problems and so may confound numeracy ability. It would 
therefore be valuable for future work to examine the interaction between an analytic 
and flexible cognitive style in shaping religious beliefs and identities. Interestingly, 
recent cross-cultural evidence suggests that there is large variability in the relation 
between analytic thinking and religiosity across different countries (Gervais et al., 
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2018), and so it will be worthwhile to investigate whether there is cross-cultural 
variation in the relationship between cognitive flexibility and religiosity as well.  
Importantly, research has begun to focus on the perceptual underpinnings of 
religiosity, indicating that the hierarchical visual perception, as measured with 
Navon’s (1977) global-local perception task, of atheists differs from that of neo-
Calvinists (Colzato et al., 2008; 2010a), Italian Roman Catholics (Colzato et al., 2010a), 
Orthodox Jews (Colzato et al., 2010a), and Taiwanese Zen Buddhists (Colzato et al., 
2010b). This suggests that religious adherence can fundamentally shape visual 
attention (Hommel & Colzato, 2010). Interestingly for the present study, there is a 
positive relationship between individual differences in the tendency to visually 
encode the “bigger picture” of hierarchical visual stimuli and RAT performance 
(Zmigrod, Zmigrod, & Hommel, 2015), suggesting that individual and group 
differences in perception may lend themselves to differences in cognitive control style. 
Consequently, engagement in religious practices appears to shape cognitive 
processing at multiple levels, including perception and meta-control policies such as 
flexibility and persistence. This is congruent with the model presented by Hommel 
and Colzato (2017), which proposes that the meta-control strategies of persistence and 
flexibility are shaped by genetic and cultural factors as well as transient situational 
factors.  
Secondly, these results may be relevant for behavioural genetics studies 
looking at the heritability of religiousness (Bouchard et al., 1999, 2004; Beer, Arnold, 
& Loehlin, 1998; Truett et al., 1992). Individual differences in cognitive flexibility, and 
specifically the WCST, RAT, and AUT Flexibility, have been linked to dopaminergic 
systems (Braver, Cole, & Yarkoni, 2010; Barnes et al., 2011; Barnett et al., 2007, 
Chermahini & Hommel, 2010; Mayseless et al., 2013), and so perhaps future 
behavioural genetic and epigenetic investigations on the heritability of religiosity 
should investigate the role of genes implicated in dopamine functioning. In fact, an 
integrative predictive processing framework for understanding religion has been 
recently proposed (van Elk & Aleman, 2017), implicating the dopaminergic system in 
the maintenance of religious and paranormal beliefs (Butler et al., 2010, 2011; 
93 
 
Krummenacher et al., 2010; Schjoedt et al., 2008; Sasaki et al., 2013). Generating a 
neurobiologically-informed research agenda may therefore sharpen our 
understanding of how ideological commitment is biologically – and not just socially – 
transmitted across generations through cognitive control styles. 
This investigation looked at three aspects of religious life, and this was not 
meant to be an exhaustive list of all the facets of religious ideologies and experiences. 
Consequently, future research will need to elaborate on more features of religious 
rituals and practice, and examine a wider range of religions than those present in this 
sample. It will also be valuable to examine the trade-off between cognitive flexibility 
and persistence to a greater extent in order to identify how these cognitive control 
modes interact (for an in-depth review, see Hommel & Colzato, 2017). Furthermore, 
this raises interesting questions – does a ritualistic lifestyle and adopting a firm 
ideological doctrine shape one’s cognitive persistence, or do individuals with 
heightened cognitive persistence tend to engage more with religious life? Or perhaps 
it is an interaction of these factors, and if so, it is valuable to characterise the interaction 
between cognitive predispositions and environmental influences. Longitudinal data 
may be the best way to address these questions. 
In the Varieties of Religious Experience, William James argued that “to the 
psychologist, the religious propensities of man must be at least as interesting as any 
other of the facts pertaining to his mental constitution” (1902, p. 2). Here we find that 
individuals’ religious propensities may in fact be linked to features of their cognitive 
constitution. The results indicate that affiliation and engagement with religion may be 
rooted in and have consequences for cognitive control styles. These findings highlight 
that ideological identity, engagement, and environmental upbringing all interact to 
shape – and be shaped by – the characteristics of one’s cognition. This underlines the 
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4 Ideological Symmetries: Testing the Ideological 
Extremity Hypothesis in American Political 
Partisanship 
4.1 Introduction 
In The True Believer (1951), the thinker Eric Hoffer wrote about crowds and mass 
movements, “All movements, however different in doctrine and aspiration, draw their early 
adherents from the same types of humanity; they all appeal to the same types of mind.” Hoffer 
tapped into an important idea: there may be a certain “type of mind” that is particularly 
drawn to adopting an ideology or doctrine, almost regardless of its content or 
ambition. Indeed, scholars and scientists have long sought to identify the 
psychological underpinnings of rigid ideological adherence, particularly since the 
atrocities committed in the name of political ideologies at the start of the 20th century. 
Many psychologists have theorized that rigid adherence to a political ideology may 
reflect underlying cognitive rigidity (Adorno et al., 1950; Rokeach, 1954). Nonetheless, 
there have been two competing hypotheses regarding the precise relationship 
between cognitive rigidity and political identity. One hypothesis, the ideological 
extremity hypothesis, has suggested that individuals on the political extremes – of both 
liberal and conservative ideologies – are more cognitively rigid than moderates 
(Greenberg & Jonas, 2003). This hypothesis emerges from the notion that extreme 
political partisanship may be linked to inflexible belief systems that capture the world 
in black-and-white terms and offer certainty and simplicity (Fernbach, Rogers, Fox, & 
Sloman, 2013; van Prooijen & Krouwel, 2017). Indirect evidence has illustrated that 
political extremists on both the political left and right are more dogmatically intolerant 
(van Prooijen & Krouwel, 2017), more likely to feel superior about their beliefs (Toner, 
Leary, Asher, & Jongman-Sereno, 2013) and to avoid exposure to each other’s opinions 
(Frimer, Skitka, & Motyl, 2017) relative to political moderates. Consequently, the 
rigidity-of-the-extreme hypothesis suggests that political extremism is underpinned by 
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a cognitive rigidity that facilitates the attitudinal rigidity that often characterizes 
political extremists.  
The second hypothesis, the so-called rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis, has argued 
that conservatives perceive the world in a more inflexible, categorical way than 
liberals (Altemeyer, 1998; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003a). This 
hypothesis has received empirical support through studies demonstrating a 
relationship between political conservatism and psychological preferences for 
traditionalism, familiarity, and certainty, and between political liberalism and 
acceptance of uncertainty and ambiguity (for reviews: Hibbing, Smith, & Alford, 2014; 
Jost, 2017; Van Hiel, Onraet, & De Pauw, 2010).  
Notably, empirical research on this debate has almost exclusively relied on self-
report questionnaires as proxies for cognitive rigidity, as opposed to the use of 
objective cognitive assessments to quantify cognitive inflexibility directly. Self-report 
measures of cognitive style tend to suffer from considerable limitations, such as failure 
in self-assessment of cognitive abilities (Kruger & Dunning, 1999), inclusion of 
political content in non-political measures and non-political content in political 
measures (Malka, Lelkes, & Holzer, 2017), and poor psychometric properties (Kirton, 
1981). Additionally, a recent meta-analysis has shown that correlations between 
cognitive style and political attitudes are inflated when relying on self-report 
questionnaires to quantify cognitive rigidity rather than behavioural assessments 
(Van Hiel, Onraet, Crowson, & Roets, 2016). Furthermore, most measures of 
“cognitive and perceptual rigidity” used thus far in political psychology have not 
corresponded to those used in the cognitive psychology literature. Consequently, 
there is a need to test these hypotheses using established objective and ideologically-




4.1.1 Rigidity-of-the-Extreme: The Psychology of Extreme 
Partisanship 
The two hypotheses – the ideological extremity hypothesis and the rigidity-of-the-
right hypothesis – tap into two orthogonal aspects of political identity. As noted by 
Settle, Dawes, and Fowler (2009), “Partisanship is typically evaluated along two 
dimensions – the strength of reported partisan attachment and the direction of that 
attachment” (p. 601). While a rich literature has emerged on the psychology of partisan 
direction (i.e. left versus right political orientation), there has been little empirical 
investigation of the psychological origins of partisan intensity, that is, the strength of 
a person’s partisan identity and attachment (Van Bavel & Pereira, 2018).  
Nonetheless, new findings have demonstrated several ways in which political 
extremists, on both sides of the political spectrum, differ psychologically from political 
moderates. Relative to moderates, political extremists tend to experience more 
negative emotions about politics and to derogate outgroups (van Prooijen, Krouwel, 
Boiten, & Eendebak, 2015) and view politics in more simplistic terms (Lammers, Koch, 
Conway, & Brandt, 2017). Political extremists’ tendency to believe in simple political 
solutions to complex societal challenges also predicts their greater likelihood of 
believing in conspiracy theories (van Prooijen, Krouwel, & Pollet, 2015). Furthermore, 
research with cognitive anchoring tasks has suggested that political extremists exhibit 
greater belief superiority and are more likely to reject external information than 
moderates (Brandt, Evans, & Crawford, 2015). In the case of the EU refugee crisis, 
political extremists possessed greater judgmental certainty about their knowledge of 
the crisis, independently of their actual knowledge, than political moderates (van 
Prooijen, Krouwel, & Emmer, 2017). This demonstrates that both partisan direction 
and intensity matter for how individuals evaluate ideological arguments and 
intergroup conflict. 
Recently, Jost (2017) pointed out several key questions currently faced by 
political psychology, including: (1) What does political psychology have to say about left-
wing rigidity? and (2) Are ideological differences only evident in subjective, self-report 
measures and not behaviourally? With regards to the question of left-wing rigidity, while 
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recent evidence has shown that left-wing authoritarianism exists and is predictive of 
voting behaviour (Conway, Houck, Gornick, & Repke, 2018; Conway & McFarland, 
2019), there is a lack of research directly examining the relationship between partisan 
intensity and cognitive rigidity independently of partisan direction. When the 
rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis and the ideological extremity hypothesis have been 
pitted against each other, the psychological variables of interest have consisted of 
intolerance of ambiguity, need for cognitive closure, dogmatism, and integrative 
complexity (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003b); none have assessed 
cognitive rigidity directly and objectively. This is related to the second question posed 
by Jost (2017) about the contrast between self-report and behavioural methods – 
perhaps the use of behavioural methodologies has the potential to illuminate 
ideological differences (and similarities) which are absent or obscured in self-report 
questionnaires. 
4.1.2 Rigidity-of-the-Right: Evidence and Measurement Problems 
Two recent meta-analyses have evaluated the state of the evidence in favour of 
the rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis. Jost (2017) identified 16 studies which 
investigated whether conservatives score more highly on tests of “perceptual or 
cognitive rigidity” than liberals. Nine out of 16 studies supported the rigidity-of-the-
right hypothesis, such that the overall unweighted (r=.32) and weighted (r=.38) effect 
sizes were large and significant. Notably, however, out of the nine studies 
demonstrating a significant effect, six studies used self-report rather than behavioural 
measures: five studies used a self-report measure of cognitive rigidity (Gough & 
Sanford, 1952), and one study used a self-report measure of intolerance of trait 
inconsistency (Steiner & Johnson, 1963). Two studies used unvalidated behavioural 
measures which do not clearly tap into cognitive flexibility: Kidd & Kidd’s (1972) 
study asked participants to identify changes between visual objects drawn on cards. 
However, recognizing changes or discrepancies between visual stimuli does not imply 
adaptability to change or flexibility of thought, and the author-designed task was not 
validated or used as a measure of cognitive flexibility in later studies. The second 
study by Neuringer (1964) used the “Rokeach Map Test” as a test of rigidity, in which 
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participants were presented with sequential street maps and asked to find the shortest 
distance between two points on the map. After being presented with seven maps in 
which the shortest route was identical across maps, participants were shown five 
maps in which a new shortcut was possible. If participants chose the shortcut on any 
of the five test maps, they were characterized as "nonrigid". This study’s small number 
of test trials (i.e. five), low threshold for being classified as “nonrigid” (scoring above 
0 out of 5), small sample (N=15), along with the problematic nature of binary 
assessments of continuous cognitive constructs, should raise serious doubts regarding 
the validity of Neuringer’s (1964) findings. Consequently, the significant findings 
from this meta-analysis of “cognitive and perceptual rigidity” were based largely on 
self-report measures and a couple of problematic behavioural tests.  
The second meta-analysis, by Van Hiel and colleagues (2016), identified a larger 
number of studies in which a measure of rigidity was administered (N=46), but 
separated the studies according to whether rigidity was operationalized with a 
behavioural task (N=31) or a self-report scale (N=15). Overall, the findings corroborate 
Jost’s (2017) meta-analysis, as conservatism was significantly related to self-reported 
rigidity (r=.47) and, to a lesser extent, behaviourally-assessed rigidity (r=.11). Even in 
this expanded sample of behavioural studies, there is significant variation in how 
cognitive rigidity was operationalized: for instance, while Rokeach (1954) utilized a 
set of perceptual problem solving tasks (i.e. the Einstellung problems; which have 
received criticisms: Levitt, 1956), Sidanius (1985) used the “Political Prediction Test” 
in which participants are asked to make judgements within the political domain and 
cognitive flexibility is extracted as an index from how these judgments are made. 
Consequently, some behavioural measures of cognitive rigidity possess ideological 
content and so are not inherently politically-neutral. 
These two meta-analyses clearly demonstrate that no behavioural study has 
been conducted for over 20 years on disentangling the rigidity-of-the-right and 
ideological extremity hypotheses (since 1997; see Van Hiel et al., 2016), and the 
publication year for a behavioural study up to 1997 is on average 1959 (range: 1948 to 
1997). Moreover, the debate has been plagued by relatively small sample sizes 
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(mean=65, range=15 to 225; calculated from Van Hiel et al., 2016) and diverse 
methodologies and conceptualizations of both conservatism and rigidity. The present 
study therefore sought to rely on established, ideologically-neutral cognitive tasks 
from the neuropsychological literature and recruit a large sample that would be 




4.2 Materials and Methods 
4.2.1 Participants and Procedure 
We sought to recruit 648 participants via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(www.mturk.com) to achieve greater than 90% power to detect a small effect of 
Cohen’s f=.1 at α=.005 in our primary one-way ANCOVAs of the cognitive variables 
and three groups of political affiliation and conservatism. We anticipated a small effect 
due to previous work done by Sidanius (1985) and reviewed by Jost and colleagues 
(2003), which found an average correlation of .15 between general conservatism and 
conceptually similar cognitive flexibility constructs. We oversampled by 15% and 
recruited 750 participants, 7 of which were excluded due to providing incomplete 
responses, yielding a total sample of 743 participants. Data collection was not 
continued after data analysis. All participants were American citizens. Participants 
were redirected from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk to an online survey hosted by 
Qualtrics Survey Software for completion of all the self-reported items and the RAT, 
and later redirected again to Inquisit 5 by Millisecond Software in order to temporarily 
download software that allows for accurate measure of performance and reaction 
times in the WCST. Participants were asked about demographic variables such as age, 
gender, and educational attainment (ranging from high school graduate, some college 
but no degree, associate degree (2-year), bachelor’s degree (4-year), Master’s degree, 
professional degree (JD, MD), or doctoral degree). The research was conducted with 
the ethical approval of the institution’s Department of Psychology Ethics Committee. 
4.2.2 Measures  
4.2.2.1 Political Identity Measures 
Political Party Affiliation 
To indicate their political party affiliation, participants were asked: “Generally 
speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an 
Independent, or something else?”, with the response options being “Republican”, 





To measure participants’ feeling of attachment to their political party, 
participants were presented with a validated measure of identity fusion, the Dynamic 
Identity Fusion Index (DIFI; Jimenez et al., 2016), which consists of a continuous 
pictorial representation that allows participants to move a small circle representing 
“the self” by clicking and dragging it toward or away from a large circle representing 
“the group/ideology”. The amount of overlap between the two circles has been shown 
to indicate the extent to which individuals feel their personal identity is fused with a 
collective identity (e.g. Jimenez et al., 2016; Jong, Whitehouse, Kavanagh, & Lane, 
2015; Kapitány, Kavanagh, Buhrmester, Newson, & Whitehouse, 2019; Misch, 
Fergusson, & Dunham, 2018). It has temporal stability, as well as convergent and 
discriminant validity (Jimenez et al., 2016). In this study, participants were presented 
with the DIFI twice; once where the group was the “Republican Party” and another 
when the group was “Democratic Party”. Hence, to compute Republican Party 
Identity Fusion, the size of the overlapping area between the “Me” circle and the 
“Republican Party” circle was calculated. The same methodology was applied to the 
calculation of Democratic Party Identity Fusion. 
To calculate political partisanship, we computed each participant’s maximum 
identity fusion to either political party (Democratic/Republican Party), and retrieved 
the value for the party with which the participant was most fused. To capture the left-
right spectrum, if participants’ maximum fusion was with the Democratic Party, their 
fusion score was multiplied by -1, to create a spectrum from -100 to 100. This was 
taken as an index of participants’ political partisanship, weighted by partisan 
direction.  
𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥 =  {




Where 𝐹𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑅 reflects Republican Party Identity Fusion and 𝐹𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐷 reflects 





As a robustness check, we also computed the difference in participants’ fusion to the 
two parties: 
𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 =  𝐹𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑅 − 𝐹𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐷 
 
Furthermore, in order to obtain an unweighted measure of political partisanship, for 
cases when it is necessary to examine participants’ fusion with their favoured party 
regardless of the party’s political direction, we collapsed 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥 into: 
 
𝑃𝑃|𝑚𝑎𝑥| =  {




Consequently, the 𝑃𝑃|𝑚𝑎𝑥| scale reflects political party identity fusion between 0 and 
100, rather than between -100 and 100 as in 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥. 
 
Political Conservatism 
The 12 Item Social and Economic Conservatism Scale (SECS; Everett, 2013) was 
administered, which asks participants about how positively or negatively they feel 
towards 12 social and economic political issues on a scale of 0-100 (with increments of 
10). As detailed by Everett (2013), the social issues consisted of abortion, religion, the 
family unit, traditional marriage, traditional values, patriotism, and military and 
national security. The economic issues included welfare benefits, limited government, 
business, gun ownership, and fiscal responsibility. By summing the participant’s score 
in response to social issues and separately in response to economic issues, we could 
compute a score of issue-specific social conservatism and economic conservatism 
respectively. The reliability of the SECS was high (Cronbach’s alpha for overall scale 





4.2.2.2 Cognitive Flexibility Tests 
Remote Associates Test (RAT) 
The Remote Associates Test (RAT; Mednick, 1962) consisted of 15 compound 
remote associate problems, in which participants are presented with three cue words 
(e.g. cottage, swiss, and cake), and must generate the compound word solution that 
connects these three words (e.g. cheese). Items of varying difficulty levels were selected 
from established remote associate problems (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003). 
Participants were given 20 seconds to respond to each item. RAT performance was 
computed in terms of the proportion of correct words. 
 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) 
The WCST (Grant & Berg, 1948) was administered with Inquisit 5 by 
Millisecond Software in standard fashion (Heaton, 1981). Participants are presented 
with four key cards and a deck of response cards that vary on three dimensions 
(colour, shape, and number of geometric figures) and are asked to match a fifth card 
from the sequentially-presented response cards to one of the four key cards. 
Participants need to identify the correct classification rule (out of three potential rules: 
matching by colour, shape, or number) according to the feedback they receive after 
each trial. They are informed that the classification rule may change without warning, 
and indeed the rule alternates after participants correctly respond to ten consecutive 
trials, requiring a flexible set shift. The task ends after participants complete six 
categories (twice for each of the three rules) or after 128 trials. To index participants’ 
performance, the accuracy rate were computed. 
 
Alternative Uses Test (AUT) 
In the AUT (Guilford, 1967), participants are asked to generate as many 
possible uses for two common household items (brick and newspaper) for 2 min. 
Participants’ responses were recorded and scored along four components by two 
independent raters in accordance with previous guidelines (Cronbach’s α = 0.994; 
Chermahini & Hommel, 2010; Madore, Addis, & Schacter, 2015; Roberts et al., 2017). 
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Flexibility was scored according to the number of distinct categories that participants’ 
responses for a given item could be clustered into (e.g. using a newspaper for making 
origami and making paper dolls are uses that would fall under the same category of 
arts and crafts, while using a brick for swatting a fly would fall under a separate 
category). The total flexibility score comprised the sum from all trials. Fluency 
constituted the total number of appropriate responses. Elaboration reflected the 
amount of detail provided by the participants (for brick, “build” would receive a score 
of 0; “build a house” would receive a score of 1; and “a weapon to protect family when 
your house is robbed” would be awarded 2 points for specifying detailed use and 
context). To score originality, each response was compared to the responses from the 
rest of the participants, such that responses to a given object that were only provided 
by 5% of the sample received an originality point. The total originality score reflected 
the sum of original scores per participant across all trials. In accordance with 
convention, nonsensical uses were excluded prior to coding of responses. To establish 
inter-rater reliability for appropriate categories, level of detail for the elaboration 
scoring, and originality, the raters separately scored 25 random participants’ 
responses, and once high inter-rater reliability was established with this set on all AUT 
measures (Cronbach’s α > 0.91 on all measures); the raters independently scored the 






The sample consisted of 743 participants (Age: M=36.58, SD=13.46; 55.6% 
female), including 323 self-affiliated Democrats, 161 Republicans, and 203 
Independents (56 participants with responded as “Other” and so were excluded for 
the analyses of political affiliation but were included in all other analyses). We first 
validated known associations between political affiliation, political partisanship, and 
conservatism. A MANOVA on participants’ conservatism with respect to their party 
affiliation demonstrated significant differences between Democrats, Independents, 
and Republicans in social conservatism, F(2,575)=100.265, p=4.42×10-39, ƞ𝑝
2=.259, and 
economic conservatism, F(2,575)=148.809, p=8.27×10-53, ƞ𝑝
2=.341. After post-hoc 
Bonferroni correction, across both conservatism measures, Democrats (social 
conservatism: M=342.40, SD=134.66; economic conservatism: M=228.40, SD=66.78) 
were significantly more liberal than Independents (ps<.001; social conservatism: 
M=392.31, SD=150.38; economic conservatism: M=287.99, SD=83.11), and 
Independents were significantly more liberal than Conservatives (ps<.001; social 
conservatism: M=539.87, SD=117.77; economic conservatism: M=360.79, SD=76.29). 
Democrats were no more fused to their favoured party – i.e. were no more 
partisan – than Republicans, t(451)=-.237, p=.813 (see Figure 4.1). Participants who 
identified as Independents were significantly less partisan (to the party with which 
they felt greater identity fusion) than either Democrats or Republicans, 
F(2,617)=38.582, p<.001, ƞ𝑝
2=.111. 
Pearson’s correlations among the cognitive flexibility variables were modest, 
replicating past research: AUT Flexibility was positively related to RAT (r=.20, p<.001) 
and WCST (r=.19, p<.001), and the correlation between RAT and WCST approached 
significance (r=.10, p=.066). There was manifest individual variability in each of the 
cognitive flexibility measures (RAT: M=68.02%, SD=23.85%, range=0 to 100%; WCST: 




In terms of the demographic variables, there were no gender differences in 
performance on any of the cognitive flexibility measures: RAT (t(639)=1.346, p=.176), 
WCST (t(396)=-.172, p=.863), and AUT Flexibility (t(716)=.416, p=.678). There was a 
significant gender difference in absolute political partisanship (𝑃𝑃|𝑚𝑎𝑥|) (t(636)=2.410, 
p=.016), with women (M=56.09, SD=31.99) exhibiting heightened identity fusion to 
their favoured political party relative to men (M=49.94, SD=31.95). With regards to 
conservatism, there was no significant gender difference in social conservatism 
(t(622)=.112, p=.911) but there was a significant difference in economic conservatism 
(t(659)=-3.777, p<.001), with men (M=293.24, SD=91.80) reporting heightened 
economic conservatism relative to women (M=266.13, SD=90.69). Educational 
attainment was not significantly related to any of the variables of interest (ps>.124). 
Furthermore, age was positively related to RAT performance (r=.136, p=.001), but not 
WCST (r=-.042, p=.403) or AUT Flexibility (r=-.021, p=.573). Age was also positively 
related to social conservatism (r=.217, p<.001) and economic conservatism (r=.083, 
p=.034) but not to absolute political partisanship (𝑃𝑃|𝑚𝑎𝑥|, r=-.003, p=.943). However, 
there was no significant age difference between Republicans (M=38.32, SD=12.831), 
Democrats (M=35.69, SD=14.059), and Independents (M=36.23, SD=12.913; 
F(2,676)=2.076, p=.126), nor a significant difference in educational attainment 
(F(2,682)=.884, p=.414; Republicans: M=2.24, SD=1.373; Democrats: M=2.41, SD=1.289; 
Independents: M=2.38, SD=1.261). Consequently, and in accordance with convention, 
the variables of age, educational attainment, and gender were consistently included 







Figure 4.1. Political partisanship according to political affiliation. Democrats and 
Republicans were equally partisan in their identity fusion with their favoured political 
party (𝑃𝑃|𝑚𝑎𝑥|). ***p<.001, n.s. = not significant.  
 
4.3.1 Political Affiliation and Cognitive Flexibility 
A univariate ANCOVA on RAT performance according to self-reported 
political affiliation (Democrats, Republicans, versus Independents) was computed, 
with age, gender, and educational attainment as covariates. This revealed a main effect 
of political affiliation, F(2,595)=5.345, p=.005, ƞ𝑝
2=.018, such that Independents 
performed significantly better on the RAT (M=72.38%, SD=22.26%) than Democrats 
(M=66.67%, SD=24.19%, Independent-Democrat estimated marginal mean 
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difference=.065, p=.016, 95% CI = [.009, .121]) and Republicans (M=65.16%, 
SD=25.38%, Independent-Republican estimated marginal mean difference=.078, 
p=.010, 95% CI = [.014, .142]) after post-hoc Bonferroni correction. There was no 
significant difference between Democrats and Republicans. There were no effects of 
gender or educational attainment, but there was a significant effect of age, 
F(1,595)=10.131, p=.002, ƞ𝑝
2=.017 (Figure 4.2). 
Similarly, a univariate ANCOVA on WCST performance with age, gender, and 
educational attainment as covariates demonstrated a main effect of political affiliation, 
F(2,363)=5.794, p=.003, ƞ𝑝
2=.031, whereby Independents performed significantly better 
on the WCST (M=75.53%, SD=11.83%) than Democrats (M=71.27%, SD=15.67%, 
Independent-Democrat estimated marginal mean difference=.045, p=.047, 95% CI = 
[.000, .089]) and Republicans (M=68.28%, SD=17.06%, Independent-Republican 
estimated marginal mean difference=.072, p=.003, 95% CI = [.019, .125]) after post-hoc 
Bonferroni correction. There was no effect of age, gender, or educational attainment. 
There were no significant differences between Democrats and Republicans (Figure 
4.2). 
Finally, a univariate ANCOVA on the AUT Flexibility score, with age, gender, 
and educational attainment as covariates revealed a main effect of political affiliation, 
F(2,664)=5.872, p=.003, ƞ𝑝
2=.017 (see Figure 4.2), such that Democrats (M=3.903, 
SD=1.533) and Independents (M=3.987, SD=1.481) performed significantly better than 
Republicans (M=3.456, SD=1.637), after post-hoc Bonferroni correction (Republican-
Democrat estimated marginal mean difference = -.443, p=.014, 95% CI = [-.797, -.068]; 
Republican-Independent estimated marginal mean difference = -.535, p=.004, 95% CI 
= [-.932, -.137]). There was no difference in AUT Flexibility between Democrats and 






Figure 4.2. Cognitive flexibility according to political affiliation for the three cognitive 
flexibility tests: Remote Associates Task, Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, and Alternative 
Uses Test Flexibility score. The shaded areas reflect 95% confidence intervals. 
Comparisons indicate significant differences after Bonferroni correction, accounting 
for age, gender, and educational attainment. Data points reflect partial residuals.  
*p<.05, **p<.01. 
 
4.3.2 Partisanship and Cognitive Flexibility 
Bayesian Quadratic Regressions 
Given the inverted-U-shaped relationship evident in Figure 4.2, we tested for 
quadratic associations between cognitive flexibility and political partisanship across 
the political spectrum (𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥). For each cognitive flexibility measure, we conducted 
two regression models: one that assumed a linear relationship and another that 
assumed a quadratic relationship between cognitive flexibility and political 
partisanship. We computed Bayes factors for the linear and quadratic regressions to 
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compare the strength of the evidence for a quadratic (subscript q) over a linear 
(subscript l) model specification (BFql).  
The Bayes factors in this case express the relative likelihood of a quadratic 
model versus a linear model given the data and certain prior expectations. To calculate 
Bayes factors using Bayesian regression, we relied on a default Bayesian approach 
promoted by Wetzels and colleagues (2011), Rouder and Morey (2012) and Liang and 
colleagues (2008), and computationally specified in the R package BayesFactor (Morey, 
Rouder, & Jamil, 2015). As evident in Table 4.1, across all three measures, there was 
evidence in favour of quadratic regressions over linear regressions. This was 
especially pronounced for the RAT and AUT Flexibility. For instance, in the case of 
the RAT results, the data are more than 2000 times more likely to have occurred under 
a quadratic model than a linear model, reflecting decisive evidence (for more details 
on evidence categories see: Wetzels et al., 2011; Jeffreys, 1961) in favour of a quadratic 
relative to a linear model. Moreover, the coefficients of the quadratic regressions, 
provided in Table 4.1, demonstrate a significant quadratic effect of political 
partisanship after adjusting for age, gender, and educational attainment, for all three 
tests of cognitive flexibility. 
Table 4.1. Standardized coefficients of quadratic regressions predicting cognitive 
flexibility. BFql indicates the evidence in favour of a quadratic regression over a linear 
regression model. Interpretation reflects evidence categories for Bayes factors as 
suggested by Jeffreys (1961) and Wetzels and colleagues (2011). *p<.05, ***p<.001 
Cognitive Flexibility Test RAT WCST AUT Flexibility 
Political Partisanship 
(𝑷𝑷𝒎𝒂𝒙) 
   
     Linear Effect .00007 -.047 -.091* 
     Quadratic Effect -.189*** -.112* -.186*** 
    
Age .149*** -.051 -.018 
Gender -.076 -.005 .006 
Educational Attainment .060 .022 .022 











This was corroborated by a robustness check with the alternative measure of 
political partisanship, 𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓. Regressing political partisanship (𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓) on RAT 
revealed a significant quadratic term (β=-.125, t=02.861, p=.004) and greater evidence 
for a quadratic than a linear association, BFql = 10.329. Similarly, there was a quadratic 
effect when regressing political partisanship (𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓) on AUT Flexibility (β =-.114, t=-
2.731, p=.007), with strong evidence for a quadratic regression model BFql = 7.493. 
 
Interrupted Regressions 
To validate the existence of inverted U-shaped relationships, we use an 
interrupted regression model (the two-lines test; Simonsohn, 2018). This method 
simultaneously estimates two regression lines – one for low x-values and one for high 
x-values. This facilitates the testing of a sign change, that is, whether the average effect 
of x on y is of opposite sign for high versus low values of x. The two-lines test also 
identifies a data-driven change point where the two lines split using the “Robin Hood” 
algorithm, which has been demonstrated to obtain higher statistical power for 
detecting U-shaped relationships than other algorithmic alternatives (Simonsohn, 
2018). An inverted-U-shaped relationship exists if the explanatory variable positively 
correlates with the outcome variable at low values, and negatively correlates with the 
outcome variable at high values. 
The results are presented in Figure 4.3. The slope between cognitive flexibility 
and political partisan identity on the left of the political spectrum is positive across all 
three measures of cognitive flexibility, suggesting that greater party partisanship on 
the political left is related to reduced cognitive flexibility. Symmetrically, the slope 
between cognitive flexibility and political partisan identity on the right of the political 
spectrum is negative, indicating that greater political partisanship on the political 
right is also related to reduced cognitive flexibility on the RAT and AUT. In the case 
of the WCST, the results indicated that the relationship between flexibility and 






Figure 4.3. Interrupted regression results according to cognitive flexibility test. 
Political partisanship is operationalized according to 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑎𝑥, such that partisan 
intensity is weighted by partisan direction (below 0 reflects left-leaning partisanship 






4.3.3 The Specificity of Flexibility 
Additionally, since the AUT assesses multiple aspects of cognition, including 
flexibility, fluency, elaboration, and originality, we were able to investigate whether 
cognitive flexibility is specifically implicated in political partisanship relative to other 
facets of cognition. We conducted a multiple linear regression predicting political 
partisanship, as operationalized in 𝑃𝑃|𝑚𝑎𝑥|, with the four AUT measures as predictors. 
This regression was significant, F(4,619)=5.353, p=.0003, and revealed that cognitive 
flexibility was the only significant predictor out of the four measurements (β = -.166, 
t=-3.284, p=.001), and elaboration (β = -.043, p=.319), fluency (β = .054, p=.492), and 
originality (β = -.056, p=.440) were not related to political partisanship.  
Bayes factor analysis corroborated these findings (see Figure 4.4). Computing 
the Bayesian regressions and associated Bayes factors for all possible combinations of 
AUT sub-measure predictors allows us to balance predictive power and parsimony 
(by removing redundant predictors). This analysis revealed that the best model is the 
one that predicts political partisanship only with cognitive flexibility, and no other 
AUT predictors. The Bayes factor for this model was BF10=1100.362, indicating that 
the data are 1100 times more likely under this model than an intercept-only null model 
(H0). Furthermore, the flexibility-only model (subscript x) was over 100 times more 





Figure 4.4. Bayesian model selection results, suggesting that the best model consists 
only of AUT Flexibility and no other AUT sub-measure. Flex = AUT Flexibility; Elab 
= AUT Elaboration; Flue = AUT Fluency; Orig = AUT Originality score. 
 
4.3.4 The Role of Political Conservatism 
The analyses above demonstrate that the relationship between political 
partisanship and cognitive inflexibility is evident on both the political right and left, 
thus giving support for the rigidity-of-the-extreme hypothesis. The rigidity-of-the-
right hypothesis also makes a prediction regarding political conservatism specifically: 
that there would be a linear relationship between conservatism and cognitive 
inflexibility. Correlational and Bayesian analyses offered inconclusive support for this 
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hypothesis. Social conservatism was significantly correlated with AUT Flexibility (r=-
.14, p=.001, BF10=3.09 (in favour of relationship)) but not with WCST (r=-.03, p=.567, 
BF01=2.34 (in favour of null)) or RAT (r=-.08, p=.055, but approached significance, 
BF01=0.91 (in favour of null)). Economic conservatism was not significantly correlated 
with AUT Flexibility (r=-.07, p=.067, but approached significance, BF01=1.15 (in favour 
of null)), WCST (r=.04, p=.451, BF01=2.24 (in favour of null)), or RAT (r=-.03, p=.535, 
BF01=2.57 (in favour of null)). 
To ensure that relationships were not attenuated due to the influence of 
covariates, we conducted a set of multiple hierarchical linear regressions, in which 
social and economic conservatism were simultaneously included as predictors of 
cognitive flexibility, while adjusting for the demographic covariates of age, gender, 
and educational attainment. Social conservatism, economic conservatism, and the 
demographic variables were therefore included in the first step of the hierarchical 
linear regression for each cognitive flexibility measure. In the second step, we tested 
whether the relationship demonstrated above between cognitive inflexibility and 
political partisanship (unweighted by partisan direction, as operationalized with the 
collapsed 𝑃𝑃|𝑚𝑎𝑥| measure) would persist after accounting for any relationships 
between cognitive inflexibility and political conservatism. Consequently, in the 
second step of the hierarchical regressions, we included 𝑃𝑃|𝑚𝑎𝑥| as a predictor of 
cognitive flexibility. 
With respect to predicting flexibility on the RAT, social conservatism was a 
significant negative predictor (β =-.170, t=-2.842, p =.005), while economic 
conservatism was not (β =.085, t=1.452, p =.147) in the first step. In the second step, 
political partisanship was a significant negative predictor of flexibility (β =-.207, t=-
4.665, p <.001) as was social conservatism (β =-.123, t=-2.076, p =.038). Economic 
conservatism was still not a significant predictor in the second step (β =.051, t=.884, p 
=.377). Furthermore, predicting flexibility on the AUT demonstrated that economic 
conservatism was not a significant predictor in the first step (β =-.024, t=-.418, p =.676) 
and social conservatism approached significance (β =-.108, t =-1.892, p =.059). In the 
second step, political partisanship was a significant negative predictor (β =-.162, t =-
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3.762, p<.001) while neither economic conservatism (β =-.048, t =-.852, p =.395) or social 
conservatism (β =-.073, t =-1.273, p =.204) were statistically significant predictors. 
WCST was not linearly predicted by either social conservatism (β =-.086, t =-1.096, p 
=.274) or economic conservatism (β =.090, t =1.178, p =.240) in the first step, and was 
also not predicted by political partisanship in the second step (β =-.057, t =-.996, 
p=.320). This may be due to the asymmetry evident in the interrupted regressions (Fig 
3) whereby there is a significant relationship between WCST flexibility and 
partisanship with regards to the Democratic Party, but not the Republican Party. 
Lastly, we also tested whether quadratic relationships between social 
conservatism and cognitive flexibility would better reflect the data than linear 
relationships. Bayesian analyses suggested that a linear relationship was either better 
than a quadratic relationship or there was insufficient data to conclude (WCST: 






The present investigation sought to address the question: Does mental rigidity 
reflect one’s partisan intensity or political orientation? The results reveal that strong 
partisan intensity predicts reduced cognitive flexibility, regardless of the political 
party’s orientation and doctrine. Quadratic regressions revealed that strong partisan 
intensity, on both the political left and right, was related to reduced flexibility across 
all three tests of cognitive flexibility (Table 4.1). This was corroborated by Bayes factor 
analysis, which demonstrated that the relationship between political partisanship 
across the political spectrum was quadratically – rather than linearly – related to 
cognitive flexibility (Table 4.1). Bayes factor analysis illustrated that the data were over 
2000 times more likely to occur under a quadratic model than a linear regression 
model for the RAT and AUT (Table 4.1). The inverted U-shaped relationship between 
flexibility and partisanship was further validated with interrupted regressions (the 
two-lines test; Simohnson, 2018; Figure 4.3), underscoring that lower cognitive 
flexibility is evident amongst strong political partisans of both liberal and conservative 
ideologies. This was further corroborated by the finding that participants who self-
described as political Independents exhibited heightened cognitive flexibility relative 
to Democrats and Republicans on the WCST and RAT (Figure 4.2). Consequently, 
investigating the roots of partisan intensity uncovers important psychological 
similarities between adherents to opposing political ideologies. 
Analysis of participants’ performance on the AUT, which measures multiple 
aspects of cognition, highlighted that flexibility was specifically implicated as a 
psychological correlate of partisanship. Other cognitive traits, such as fluency, 
elaboration, or originality, were not significantly related to partisan intensity. 
Moreover, when political partisanship was regressed on all possible predictor 
combinations of the four AUT cognitive measures, the model consisting of cognitive 
flexibility as the only predictor was the best model (i.e. with the greatest evidential 
strength). The data were more than 1000 times more likely to occur under a model 
predicted only by cognitive flexibility than a null hypothesis model (Figure 4.4). 
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These results have implications for the two dominant hypotheses about the 
nature of mental flexibility and political ideology. To the best of our knowledge, these 
findings constitute the first direct objective testing of the ideological extremity hypothesis 
using behavioural assessments of cognitive flexibility rather than self-report 
questionnaires. The data here support the essential claim of the ideological extremity 
hypothesis: political extremists were more cognitively rigid than political moderates, 
across multiple tests of cognitive flexibility (Table 4.1, Figures 4.2 and 4.3). These 
results suggest that the rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis may be incomplete, as it does not 
account for the presence of the “rigidity-of-the-left”.  
When partisan intensity and partisan direction (i.e. conservatism) were 
simultaneously entered into a linear multiple regression, the relationship between 
partisan intensity and cognitive inflexibility persisted after controlling for 
conservatism. This adds to an emerging literature illustrating that political extremists 
across the political spectrum tend to possess and exhibit similar levels of dogmatism 
and prejudice (for a review see: Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, Crawford, & Wetherell, 
2014), partisan bias and selective exposure to opposing opinions (Ditto et al., 2018; 
Frimer, Skitka, & Motyl, 2017), moral motives (Frimer, Biesanz, Walker, & MacKinlay, 
2013; Frimer, Tell, & Motyl, 2017), simplicity of political categorization (Lammers et 
al., 2017), and belief in conspiracy theories (Krouwel, Kutiyski, van Prooijen, 
Martinsson, & Markstedt, 2017). Notably, social conservatism, but not economic 
conservatism, was a significant predictor of cognitive inflexibility, indicating that 
there may still be ideological asymmetries that need to be empirically evaluated (Jost, 
2017). Note, however, that the regression coefficient of partisan intensity was 
consistently larger and more statistically significant than that of social conservatism 
in the multiple linear regression predicting cognitive flexibility (see Results section). 
Partisan intensity therefore appears to be more predictive of mental flexibility than 
partisan direction. Economic conservatism was consistently statistically insignificant 
as a predictor of flexibility. This offers nuanced directions for future research on the 
rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis – perhaps it is specific to social, as opposed to 
economic, right-wing conservatism (see also Crowson, 2009; Feldman & Johnson, 
2014; Malka & Soto, 2015). Moreover, this gives rise to the question: given the 
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cognitive similarity between individuals on both political extremes, what factors 
determine their political orientation? Future studies should seek to replicate and 
expand these results, as well as explore ways in which the two hypotheses can be 
combined and empirically negotiated. Jost and colleagues (2003b) proposed a way in 
which the ideological extremity and rigidity-of-the-right hypotheses may be 
combined (see Figure 4.2 in their original paper), whereby there would be a U-shaped 
relationship between mental rigidity and political partisanship, but there would be a 
weaker relationship between partisan intensity and mental rigidity on the political left 
relative to the political right. This merits future examination. 
The present investigation is relevant to other studies in political psychology 
which have sought to use indicators of cognitive processing that do not explicitly rely 
on self-reports. These studies have not directly assessed cognitive flexibility, instead 
focusing on other cognitive domains, such as confidence and meta-cognition (Brandt 
et al., 2015; Rollwage, Dolan, & Fleming, 2018), exploratory behaviour (Shook & Fazio, 
2009), integrative complexity (Tetlock et al., 1994; Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2003), 
information evaluation (Ditto et al., 2018), political categorization tendencies 
(Lammers et al., 2017), and threat sensitivity (Hibbing et al., 2014). Moreover, many of 
these tasks inherently possess political content (e.g. Ditto et al., 2018; Tetlock et al., 
1994; Lammers et al., 2017) and so are not reflections of ideologically-neutral cognitive 
tendencies. Future research will benefit from examining multiple cognitive domains 
in tandem in order to evaluate the relative contributions of these individual 
differences to political ideology and how they may interact (for a review see: van 
Prooijen & Krouwel, 2019). 
The findings also highlight that the common practice of excluding political 
Independents from political psychology studies may obscure critical relationships and 
identity processes. We therefore advocate that political Independents are included as 
a comparison group in the field’s studies wherever possible and applicable. 
Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of obtaining 
representative samples using online participant samples, such as Amazon Mechanical 
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Turk, and so replicating these effects in nationally representative samples in the US 
and other political systems will constitute a valuable validation.  
In sum, the present findings signify that the way individuals process neutral 
stimuli and react to the environment can reveal how they process social and political 
information, and consequently how they form their ideological attitudes and political 
identities. Moreover, the findings highlight that investigating processes such as 
partisan intensity, attachment, and extremism across opposing ideological 
orientations may be as scientifically fruitful (if not more so) as studying the content of 
those ideologies. This is in line with Rokeach’s (1954) argument that adherents of both 
extreme left-wing and right-wing ideologies would exhibit tendencies towards 
rigidity. The cognitively flexible mind may be more likely to formulate socio-political 
opinions in a way that does not fully conform with the particular constellation of 
beliefs advocated by a political party. These findings nicely echo Hoffer’s early 
theoretical writings which suggested that “all movements, however different in doctrine 
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5 Deconstructing Dogmatism: The Interaction of 
Cognitive Flexibility and Intelligence 
5.1 Introduction 
In an era of polarization, fake news, and the wide spread of misinformation, 
there is a strong public need for an understanding of how citizens can inoculate 
themselves against deception and inaccurate information. The capacity to critically 
evaluate information in nonbiased ways requires intellectual humility – the 
understanding of one’s limitations and biases when making evidence-based decisions. 
Intellectual humility allows us to avoid psychological tendencies to overlook evidence 
and confirm prior beliefs. Specifically, intellectual humility has been defined as 
“recognizing that a particular personal belief may be fallible, accompanied by an 
appropriate attentiveness to limitations in the evidentiary basis of that belief and to 
one’s own limitations in obtaining and evaluating relevant information” (Leary et al., 
2017). 
Over the last decade, a substantial literature has emerged in philosophy, 
theology, and psychology, seeking to (a) define intellectual humility (Baehr, 2011; 
Davis et al., 2016; Gregg, Mahadevan, & Sedikides, 2016; Roberts & Wood, 2003; 
Samuelson et al., 2015; Whitcomb et al., 2015; Wright et al., 2016), (b) develop 
measurement tools (Hoyle et al., 2016; Krumrei-Mancuso & Rouse, 2016; Leary et al, 
2017; McElroy et al., 2014; Meagher et al., 2015), and (c) link intellectual humility to 
other personality traits such as openness (McElroy et al., 2014; Porter, & Schumann, 
2017; Leary et al., 2017), prosociality (Krumrei-Mancuso, 2017), dispositional 
attachment orientation (Jarvinen & Paulus, 2016), and religiosity and religious 
tolerance (Hook et al., 2016; Hopkin, Hoyle, & Toner, 2014; Krumrei-Mancuso, 2018; 
Leary et al, 2017; Rodriguez et al., 2017; Van Tongeren et al., 2016; Zhang et al., 2016). 
So far, research on the psychological roots of intellectual humility has been primarily 
the concern of social and developmental psychology.  
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In theorising about the cognitive mechanisms that might underlie intellectual 
humility, Samuelson and Church (2015) proposed that the human tendency to rely on 
heuristics may lead to intellectually arrogant behaviours. Dual-systems accounts of 
human cognition suggest that thinking and reasoning are characterized by two 
distinct systems: System 1 processes, which are fast, automatic, associative, and 
intuitive, and System 2 processes, which are slow, conscious, deliberate, and analytical 
(Evans, 2003, 2008; Evans, & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). The 
corollary of this dual-systems approach is that in order to reason intelligently and 
avoid biased thinking, it is necessary to engage System 2 processes which are 
deliberate and analytical, and to override the automatic biases that are assumed to 
emerge from System 1 processes (Evans, 2003, 2008). Samuelson and Church (2015) 
therefore suggest that in order to facilitate intellectual humility, System 2 processes 
must be engaged and promoted. Interestingly, De keersmaecker and Roets (2017) 
found that cognitive ability shaped the extent to which individuals adjust their beliefs 
after learning that their attitudes were based on false information; people with lower 
levels of cognitive ability adjust their attitudes to a lesser extent than those with higher 
levels of cognitive ability. Intelligence may therefore be an important cognitive 
correlate of intellectual humility. 
Nevertheless, although deliberate, intelligent, analytical thinking may be 
important for intellectual humility, it might not be sufficient or necessary. For 
instance, one can persist in believing one’s previous ideas and resist changing them in 
the face of new evidence even with slow and deliberative thinking. Intellectual 
humility and the capacity to revise one’s ideas and be open to the ideas of others may 
require more than just analytical thinking or cognitive ability. Specifically, in order to 
be aware of one’s cognitive limitations and evaluate evidence appropriately, 
considerable mental flexibility is required. While the intellectually arrogant or servile 
individual disregards new information in favour of past beliefs, the intellectually 
humble individual is able to be flexible in their thinking, overcome biased reasoning, 
find creative connections between past ideas and new information, and flexibly adjust 
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their attitudes based on new evidence. The aim of this study was therefore to evaluate 
the hypothesis that the intellectually humble mind is also a flexible mind. 
The hypothesis that cognitive flexibility and openness to novel ideas may be 
crucial ingredients for intellectual humility has support in the empirical literature. 
Indeed, Leary and colleagues (2017) found that intellectual humility was positively 
correlated with self-reported openness to alternative ideas and values, and negatively 
correlated with dogmatism and intolerance of ambiguity. Stanovich and West (1997) 
found that participants who scored highly on a self-report measure called “Actively 
Open-minded Thinking”, which the researchers suggested is an indicator of cognitive 
flexibility and openness to belief change, were more likely to evaluate arguments 
based on the argument quality rather than relying on prior beliefs, even when 
controlling for cognitive ability. The study therefore suggests that a flexible thinking 
disposition may facilitate intellectual humility independently of cognitive ability. 
Interestingly, cognitive ability, operationalized with SAT scores and a test of verbal 
ability, was a unique and independent predictor of argument evaluation performance, 
signifying intelligence may still play a notable role.  
However, there are methodological problems with relying purely on self-report 
measures of cognitive flexibility. For instance, effect sizes may be inflated in self-
report as compared to behavioural measures of cognition, and at times self-report 
measures yield opposite effects to theoretically-consistent behavioural assessments 
(e.g. Van Hiel et al., 2016; De Keersmaecker et al., 2017b; Saunders et al., 2017). 
Furthermore, new tools have been developed to accurately measure intellectual 
humility and its components directly (Krumrei-Mancuso & Rouse, 2016), and so there 
is a need to empirically investigate the ways in which flexibility of thought can shape 
intellectual humility. 
The present study sought to disentangle the relationships between cognitive 
flexibility, cognitive ability (fluid intelligence), and intellectual humility, using classic 
tasks from experimental psychology. Notably, cognitive flexibility and intelligence 
have been theoretically and empirically dissociated (e.g. Friedman et al., 2006; Schaie 
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et al., 1991; Salthouse et al., 1998), and so it is valuable to examine their relative 
contributions and interactions. This investigation thus addressed three primary 
hypotheses: 
H1: Flexible thinking is positively correlated with intellectual humility 
(building on Stanovich and West’s (1997) work). 
H2: Cognitive ability is positively correlated with intellectual humility (as 
suggested by Samuelson & Church, 2015 and De keersmaecker & Roets, 2017). 
H3: There is an interaction between flexibility and intelligence in shaping 
intellectual humility. If indeed intellectual humility is associated with high 
cognitive flexibility (in H1) and high intelligence (in H2), then two plausible, 
dissociative interaction mechanisms might be at play: 
H3-A: There is an additive or multiplicative interaction, such that the highest 
intellectual humility would reflect high flexibility and high intelligence, 
while the lowest intellectual humility would be associated with low 
flexibility and low intelligence. This hypothesis would predict that 
individuals who score highly on flexibility, but not intelligence (and vice 
versa), would have lower intellectual humility than individuals who score 
highly on both. 
H3-B: There is a compensatory interaction, such that either high flexibility or 
high intelligence are sufficient for high intellectual humility. Consequently, 
high flexibility would facilitate intellectual humility particularly for 
individuals with lower scores on the intelligence test, and vice versa. This 
hypothesis would predict that individuals who score highly on flexibility, 
but not intelligence (and vice versa), would have similar levels of intellectual 
humility as individuals who score highly on both. That is, there is no 
additive advantage for intellectual humility in scoring highly on both 
flexibility and intelligence. This would suggest that there are multiple 
independent psychological pathways to achieving high intellectual 
humility. 
The present study sought to investigate the cognitive correlates of intellectual 
humility and clarify these mechanisms in order to better understand the psychological 




5.2 Materials and Methods 
5.2.1 Participants 
Power analysis was conducted with the ‘pwr’ package (Champely et al., 2015) 
in R (R Core Team, 2018). To estimate the expected effect sizes, we relied on previous 
work conducted by Leary and colleagues (2017) on relevant relationships between 
personality and intellectual humility. Specifically, Leary and colleagues (2017) found 
a correlation between intellectual humility and openness to ideas (r=.40) and the Big 
Five personality factor of openness (r=.33), which are conceptually relevant to 
cognitive flexibility (e.g. DeYoung, Peterson, & Higgins, 2005). Furthermore, they 
found a correlation between intellectual humility and intrinsically-motivated 
epistemic curiosity (r=.35) and need for cognition (r=.34), which are theoretically 
linked to intelligence – indeed, Fleischhauer and colleagues (2010) found significant 
correlations between fluid intelligence and need for cognition. Consequently, for the 
power analyses, we relied on the smallest relevant effect size identified by Leary and 
colleagues (2017), which was the relationship between the Big Five factor of openness 
and flexibility, i.e. r=.33. To obtain a power of approximately 90% at α=.05, the power 
analysis revealed a sample size of N=92 would be required. We oversampled by 20% 
(18 participants), and so recruited a sample of N=110 from Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(50.8% female; age: M=40.75, SD=11.40). Two participants were excluded from the 
analysis since they indicated that their native language was not English, and since the 
cognitive flexibility tasks were verbal in nature, this was grounds for exclusion from 
the analysis. In terms of educational attainment, all participants completed high 
school or an equivalent, and so there were 6 categories of educational attainment: (1) 
high school diploma only, (2) some college but no degree, (3) 2-year Associate’s 
degree, (4) 4-year Bachelor’s degree, (5) Master’s degree, or (6) Professional degree 
(JD, MD). Participants provided their informed consent to participate in the study in 






Intellectual Humility – Comprehensive Intellectual Humility Scale (CIHS) 
The CIHS, a 22-item scale developed by Krumrei-Mancuso and Rouse (2016), 
was used to assess intellectual humility. The CIHS scale measures four distinct factors 
of intellectual humility: (1) independence of intellect and ego (Cronbach’s α = .914; 
e.g. “When someone contradicts my most important beliefs, it feels like a personal 
attack”), (2) openness to revising one’s viewpoint (Cronbach’s α = .872; e.g. “I am open 
to revising my important beliefs in the face of new information”), (3) respect for others’ 
viewpoints (Cronbach’s α = .926; e.g. “I can respect others, even if I disagree with them 
in important ways”), and (4) lack of intellectual overconfidence (Cronbach’s α = .822; 
e.g. “My ideas are usually better than other people’s ideas”). The items are rated on a 
5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Items were 
summed for the full scale (Cronbach’s α = .664) and for each of the subscales (factors). 
Higher scores indicated greater intellectual humility. 
Cognitive Flexibility – Alternate Uses Task (AUT) 
In this computerized version of the AUT (Guildford, 1967), two common 
household items (brick and newspaper) were presented each for 1.5 minutes. 
Participants were asked to generate as many possible uses for these items. A timed 
clock was displayed to participants showing them how much time they had left. 
Flexibility was quantified as the total number of distinct conceptual categories in 
which the participant’s responses belonged, in accordance with convention (e.g. 
Chermahini & Hommel, 2010; Addis et al., 2016; Madore, Addis, & Schacter, 2015). 
The responses were rated and calculated by two independent raters.  
Cognitive Flexibility - Verbal Fluency task (VF) 
In this computerised version of the semantic verbal fluency (Tombaugh, Kozak, 
& Rees, 1999; Troyer, Moscovitch, & Winocur, 1997), participants are asked to generate 
words from a given concept (i.e. ‘things on wheels’ or ‘red things’) for two minutes each. 
Flexibility was computed as the total number of distinct conceptual categories. The 
responses were rated and calculated by two independent raters. 
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Intelligence - Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices Task (Raven’s SPM) 
An abbreviated version of the Raven’s SPM (Raven, 1938; Bilker et al., 2012) 
was used to assess fluid intelligence. The task was composed of nine visual patterns 
which progressively increased in difficulty. For each matrix pattern, one piece was 
missing, and participants are asked to select the correct pattern piece from a set of 




All analyses were conducted in R (R Core Team, 2018) and SPSS (Version 25.0; 
IBM Corp., 2017), including the R packages visreg (Breheny & Burchett, 2017), jtools 
(Long, 2018), and pwr (Champely et al., 2015). First, we investigated whether the 
demographic variables of age, gender, and educational attainment, were related to the 
psychological variables of interest. Age was not significantly correlated with cognitive 
flexibility measured with the AUT (r=.06, p=.521), cognitive flexibility measured with 
the VF task (r=.011, p=.908), fluid intelligence measured with Raven’s SPM (r=.037, 
p=.703), or with the comprehensive intellectual humility score (r=.056, p=.567). 
Furthermore, there were no gender differences in AUT cognitive flexibility, 
t(106)=0.68, p=.501, VF cognitive flexibility, t(106)=-0.60, p=.552, or in intellectual 
humility, t(106)=-1.03, p=.306. There was a gender difference in Raven’s SPM scores in 
the current sample, t(106)=2.14, p=.035, in which males scored higher than females. 
Educational attainment was significantly correlated with AUT Flexibility (r=.23, 
p=.002) and Raven’s SPM (r=.31, p=.001), nearly significantly correlated with VF 
Flexibility (r=.18, p=.060), and not correlated with intellectual humility (r=.06, p=.552). 
In all subsequent statistical analyses, age, gender, and educational attainment were 
included as covariates. 
5.3.1 H1: Is intellectual humility positively correlated with cognitive 
flexibility? 
Correlational analysis revealed that cognitive flexibility measured with the 
AUT was significantly positively correlated with general intellectual humility (Figure 
5.1A). Furthermore, as evident in Figure 5.2, decomposing the Comprehensive 
Intellectual Humility scale into its constituent factors revealed that this association 
was primarily driven by the correlations of cognitive flexibility with openness to 
revising one’s viewpoint (Factor 2) and respect for others’ viewpoints (Factor 3). Given 
Gignac and Szodorai’s (2016) effect size guidelines for individual differences research, 
these effect sizes can be considered moderate to large. 
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This pattern was corroborated by the correlations of intellectual humility and 
cognitive flexibility measured with the Verbal Fluency (VF) task. VF Flexibility was 
positively correlated with the comprehensive intellectual humility scale (r=.26, 
p=.007), and specifically with openness to revising one’s viewpoint (Factor 2; r=.29, 
p=.002) and respect for others’ viewpoints (Factor 3; r=.24, p=.014). There were no 
significant correlations between VF cognitive flexibility and independence of 
intellectual ego (Factor 1; r=.12, p=.207) or lack of intellectual overconfidence (r=.09, 
p=.339), paralleling the findings for AUT cognitive flexibility. 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Correlation between Comprehensive Intellectual Humility and (A) 
cognitive flexibility (centred and measured with the AUT) and (B) intelligence 






5.3.2 H2: Is intellectual humility positively correlated with 
intelligence? 
 As depicted in Figure 5.1B and Figure 5.2 (bottom), intellectual humility was 
significantly positively correlated with fluid intelligence, such that more intellectually 
humble individuals tended to score more highly on Raven’s SPM. Similarly to the 
pattern of results revealed for cognitive flexibility, intelligence was specifically 
positively correlated to the factors of intellectual humility representing openness to 
revising one’s viewpoint (Factor 2) and respect for others’ viewpoints (Factor 3; Figure 
5.2). The correlation effect sizes were generally smaller for the relationship between 




Figure 5.2. Correlations between specific factors of intellectual humility (IH) and 
cognitive flexibility (top row) and intelligence (bottom row). Confidence intervals 




5.3.3 H3: What is the relationship between cognitive flexibility and 
intelligence in shaping intellectual humility? 
In order to investigate whether, and in what way, cognitive flexibility and 
intelligence interact to produce heightened intellectual humility, hierarchical linear 
regression analysis predicting general intellectual humility was conducted (Table 5.1). 
Note that all independent variables were centred prior to the hierarchical linear 
regression, as this helps reduce multicollinearity and facilitates testing of simple 
slopes (Dawson & Richter, 2006). In Step 1, the control variables, including age, 
gender, and educational attainment, were entered. As shown in Table 5.1, none of 
these control variables significantly predicted intellectual humility. In Step 2, the 
centred cognitive flexibility and centred fluid intelligence scores were entered. These 
independent variables explained a significant proportion of the variance in intellectual 
humility (R2=.17). As evident in Table 5.1, the coefficients of both cognitive flexibility 
and intelligence were positive and significant, suggesting that both positively 
predicted heightened intellectual humility and each was a unique predictor. Next, in 
Step 3, we entered the interaction term for cognitive flexibility and intelligence. As 
predicted, the interaction of flexibility and intelligence was significant and accounted 




Table 5.1. Hierarchical multiple linear regression predicting scores on the 
Comprehensive Intellectual Humility Scale. Intelligence measured via Raven’s scores 
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Simple slope analyses were conducted to examine the relationship between 
intellectual humility and flexibility at 1 SD above and below mean intelligence, while 
controlling for age, gender, and educational attainment as covariates (see Figure 5.3A). 
These analyses revealed that flexibility was positively related to intellectual humility 
in the context of low intelligence (at -1 SD, b = 6.24, SE = 1.51, p<.001) but not high 
intelligence (at +1 SD, b=-0.39, SE=1.87, p=.834). Reciprocally, simple slope analyses 
demonstrated that when flexibility is conceptualized as the moderator, intellectual 
humility was positively related to intelligence in the context of low flexibility (at -1 
SD, b = 2.43, SE = .72, p<.001), but not for high flexibility (at +1 SD, b=-0.51, SE=.78, 
p=.516). 
To validate this finding further, the sample was divided into three equal groups 
(terciles) rather than according to deviation from the mean. The simple slope analysis 
results were unchanged following this robustness check; cognitive flexibility was 
positively related to intellectual humility in the context of low intelligence (at -2.67 SD, 
b = 6.64, SE = 1.61, p<.001) but not average intelligence (at +0.5 SD, b =2.23, SE=1.25, 
p=.078) and high intelligence (at +2.71 SD, b=-0.85, SE=2.01, p=.674). Reciprocally, 
intelligence was positively related to intellectual humility in the context of low 
flexibility (at -0.87 SD, b = 2.16, SE = .66, p=.001), but not for average (at +0.28 SD, b 





Figure 5.3. (A) Interaction plot between comprehensive intellectual humility, 
cognitive flexibility, and intelligence (high: +1SD, low: -1SD), controlling for age, 
gender, and educational attainment. (B) Johnson–Neyman regions of significance and 
confidence bands for the conditional relation between intellectual humility and 
cognitive flexibility as a function of intelligence. Solid diagonal line represents the 
regression coefficient of cognitive flexibility for intellectual humility along the 
intelligence continuum. The dashed vertical line indicates that at +0.19 SD from the 
intelligence mean value, the regression coefficient of cognitive flexibility as a predictor 
of intellectual humility transitions from significance to non-significance. Confidence 
intervals reflect 95% CI. 
 
This interaction effect is visualized in the filled contour plot and the 
corresponding 3D perspective plot in Figure 5.4. This depicts that the relationship 
between intellectual humility and cognitive flexibility varies depending on 
intelligence, such that intelligence differentiates between low and high intellectual 
humility at low levels of cognitive flexibility, but not at high levels of cognitive 
flexibility. Similarly, cognitive flexibility differentiates between low and high 
intellectual humility at low intelligence scores, but not high intelligence scores. 
Moreover, Figure 5.4 illustrates that the highest intellectual humility was evident in 
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participants who scored highly on either intelligence or flexibility, and that scoring 
highly on both is not related to higher intellectual humility. Figure 5.4 also highlights 
a slight bias towards higher intellectual humility scores amongst those with high 
cognitive flexibility (but low intelligence) relative to those with high intelligence (but 
low flexibility), which is also reflected in the higher regression coefficients in Table 5.1 
for cognitive flexibility relative to intelligence. 
 
Figure 5.4. Representation of the regression surface predicting intellectual humility as 
a function of cognitive flexibility and intelligence, while controlling for age, gender, 
and educational attainment. (A) Filled contour plot. Colour gradient reflects 
comprehensive intellectual humility score. (B) Perspective plot. 
 
To probe the interaction further, we applied the Johnson-Neyman technique 
(Johnson & Neyman, 1936; Hayes & Matthes, 2009; Bauer & Curran, 2005), which 
calculates the range of z values of the moderator (in this case, intelligence) in which 
the predictor (i.e. cognitive flexibility) is a significant versus nonsignificant predictor 
of the outcome (i.e. intellectual humility). This helps to avoid limitations of traditional 
simple slopes analysis which require selection of potentially arbitrary values of the 
moderator at which the relationship between the predictor and outcome variable are 
assessed (e.g. ±1 SD from the mean). This technique is increasingly used in the 
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psychological and cognitive sciences (e.g. Salerno & Peter-Hagene, 2013; Beach et al., 
2012; Bushman et al., 2012).  
Furthermore, Esarey and Sumner (2017) pointed out that probing interactions 
in the traditional way can lead to a multiple comparison problem. To address this, we 
implemented the method proposed by Esarey and Sumner (2017) to control for 
multiple comparisons; this leads to a more conservative test in which the false 
discovery rate in the marginal effects plot is controlled. 
The findings from the Johnson-Neyman analysis demonstrated that the 
relationship between intellectual humility and cognitive flexibility was significant 
when intelligence was less than 0.19 SD above the mean, but not significant with 
higher values of intelligence (Figure 5.3B). This mirrors the finding from the simple 
slopes interaction analysis (Figure 5.3A), in which the relationship between 
intellectual humility and cognitive flexibility is significant at low intelligence (-1 SD). 
In accordance with the methodological suggestions of McClelland and colleagues 
(2017), Spiller and colleagues (2013), and Bauer and Curran (2005), this is revealed 
graphically in Figure 5.3B. In Figure 5.3B, the transition between significance and non-
significance of the conditional effect is indicated by the dashed vertical line, which 
represents the Johnson-Neyman point at which the 95% confidence band intersects 
the x-axis. In accordance with Esarey & Sumner’s (2017) recommendation, the 
Johnson-Neyman interval was calculated using the false discovery rate adjusted 
t=2.21; note that when not adjusted for multiple comparisons using Esarey & 
Sumner’s (2017) methodology, the Johnson-Neyman point is +0.35 SD. 
Although we conceptualized intelligence as the moderator of the relationship 
between intellectual humility and cognitive flexibility, it is important to note that the 
choice of moderator for analyses is arbitrary – cognitive flexibility could have equally 
been used as the moderator with paralleling results. We chose to use intelligence as 
the moderator here because it is largely considered a highly genetically heritable and 
stable construct, while there is more discussion over the stability and malleability of 
cognitive flexibility (e.g. Miyake & Friedman, 2012). Nonetheless, as evident in the 
filled contour plot of Figure 5.4A, there is a symmetry in the interaction effect, such 
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that the relationship between intellectual humility and intelligence is most 
pronounced at low levels of cognitive flexibility, and similarly the relationship 





Intellectual humility has been identified as a character virtue that enables 
individuals to recognize their own potential fallibility when forming and revising 
attitudes and beliefs. The present study examined the relationships between 
intellectual humility and objectively-assessed cognitive flexibility and fluid 
intelligence. With regards to our first hypothesis (H1), the results indicate that 
intellectual humility is positively related to heightened cognitive flexibility (Figure 
5.1A). Secondly, the findings reveal that intellectual humility is also positively 
correlated with intelligence (Figure 5.1B), corroborating our second hypothesis (H2) 
and Samuelson and Church’s (2015) suggestion that System 2 (i.e. analytical and 
deliberate) thinking styles are important for engaging in intellectually humble 
behaviour. These effects were driven by the facets of intellectual humility that 
correspond to openness to revising one’s viewpoints and respect for others’ 
viewpoints (Figure 5.2). Thirdly, the data revealed an interaction between cognitive 
flexibility and intelligence in predicting intellectual humility (Table 5.1). Specifically, 
there was evidence of a facilitation effect, such that high cognitive flexibility is 
particularly valuable for intellectual humility in the context of low intelligence, and 
reciprocally, high intelligence was beneficial for intellectual humility in the context of 
low flexibility (Figures 5.3 & 5.4). Interestingly, there was no evidence of an additive 
or multiplicative effect (contrary to hypothesis H3-A), as high flexibility and high 
intelligence did not produce superior intellectual humility relative to individuals who 
scored highly on only one of these cognitive traits (corroborating hypothesis H3-B; see 
Figure 5.4). This is suggestive of dual psychological pathways to intellectual humility; 
either cognitive flexibility or intelligence is sufficient for high intellectual humility, but 
neither is necessary. 
The results demonstrate that cognitive flexibility was more strongly implicated 
in intellectual humility than intelligence, as manifest by the larger effect sizes (in Table 
5.1, Figures 5.1, 5.2, & 5.4). This may signify that the two pathways may have 
differential efficacy in producing intellectually humble attitudes and behaviours. 
Furthermore, the study revealed that not all facets of intellectual humility are equally 
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shaped by cognitive flexibility and intelligence (Figure 5.2). While epistemically-
oriented features of intellectual humility, such as openness to alternative ideas 
(captured by Factor 2) and receptivity to attitude change (Factor 3), were positively 
correlated with both cognitive traits, the aspects of intellectual humility that are more 
closely associated with intellectual identity, such as the extent to which one feels 
threatened when contradicted (Factor 1) and one’s conviction that one’s own beliefs 
are superior and infallible (Factor 4), were unrelated to cognitive flexibility and 
intelligence. The specificity of these relationships suggests that future research will 
need to examine additional psychological and social factors that shape individuals’ 
tendency to be intellectually overconfident. 
These findings raise the question of the malleability of these cognitive traits. 
Interestingly, Porter and Schumann (2017) found that making salient the belief that 
people can develop their intelligence (i.e. a growth mindset of intelligence, Dweck, 2000), 
rather than the belief that intelligence is fixed, fosters greater intellectual humility. 
Porter and Schumann suggested that this may be because a growth mindset of 
intelligence promotes qualities such as a greater eagerness to learn (Blackwell et al., 
2007), diminished defensiveness (Nussbaum & Dweck, 2008), and a more accurate 
self-assessment of one’s knowledge (Ehrlinger et al., 2016). This suggests that 
intellectual humility may not only be shaped by intelligence, but also by beliefs about 
intelligence as a fixed or malleable trait. With respect to cognitive flexibility, a line of 
research has developed demonstrating ways in which creative or flexible thinking 
may in fact be malleable rather than fixed. Flexibility has been shown to be 
significantly amplified by training with divergent thinking activities such as the AUT 
in children (Scott et al., 2004, Fleith, Renzulli, & Westberg, 2002), adolescents 
(Stevenson et al., 2014; Kleibeuker et al., 2017), and adults (Kienitz et al., 2014; Sun et 
al., 2016), and schizophrenic patients (Nemoto et al., 2009). Even activities such as 
open-monitoring meditation, in which the individual is asked to freely attend to any 
incoming thoughts or sensations and be attentionally flexible, has been found to 
promote flexibility on the AUT (Colzato, Ozturk & Hommel, 2012; Colzato et al., 2017). 
While the long-term stability of this effect is yet to be fully examined, this implies that 
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promoting cognitive flexibility is possible and is a worthwhile focal point for future 
research into fostering intellectual humility. 
These findings extend research in three key disciplines: (1) cognitive 
psychology, (2) social psychology, and (3) interventionist and educational approaches. 
In the realm of cognitive psychology, recent research has provided corroborating 
evidence for a positive relationship between intelligence and intellectual humility 
across the lifespan. Danovitch and colleagues (2017) investigated biopsychological 
markers of intellectual humility in 6- to 8-year-old children. They found that greater 
intellectual humility was related to higher intelligence, and this relationship was 
specific to the epistemic aspect of intellectual humility (i.e. acknowledging the 
limitations of one’s own knowledge) rather than its social component (i.e. 
representing one’s knowledge to other people and being receptive to their ideas). This 
mirrors the specificity identified in the present study (Figure 5.2). Similarly, 
developmental work by Mills and Elashi (2014) found that intelligence predicted 6- to 
9-year-old children’s ability to recognize that a source of information may be worthy 
of doubt and scepticism. Intelligence may therefore also be linked to early forms of 
intellectual humility. Additionally, research with adults has illustrated that 
intellectual humility and receptivity to attitude-change are related to cognitive ability 
(De keersmaecker & Roets, 2017) and higher discriminability in an old/new 
recognition memory task (Deffler, Leary, & Hoyle, 2016). Furthermore, Lick, Alter, 
and Freeman (2017) found that cognitive ability (as measured with Raven’s Advanced 
Progressive Matrices) was related to enhanced updating of social stereotypes in light 
of new information, supporting the present finding that intelligence may be linked to 
a willingness to revise one’s attitudes based on novel evidence. 
These results are also congruent with research in social and political 
psychology on the psychological correlates of behaviours that may be conceptualized 
as the opposite of intellectual humility – dogmatism, prejudice, and rigid adherence 
to ideological doctrines. Intellectual humility has been linked to lower dogmatism and 
belief superiority (Leary et al., 2017), fewer negative attitudes toward religious 
outgroups (Van Tongeren et al., 2016), and a willingness to be exposed to opposing 
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political perspectives (Porter & Schumann, 2017). Frimer, Skitka, and Motyl (2017) 
have illustrated that liberals and conservatives are similarly motivated to avoid 
exposure to one another’s opinions – a key facet of intellectual humility – suggesting 
that strong adherence to ideologies is related to a tendency to avoid hearing opposing 
views. Furthermore, recent empirical work has shown that cognitive ability is 
negatively related to right-wing ideological attitudes, authoritarianism, and prejudice 
(e.g. Brandt & Crawford, 2016; De keersmaecker et al., 2017c; Ludeke, Rasmussen, & 
DeYoung, 2017; Choma & Hanoch, 2017; for meta-analysis: Onraet et al., 2015), and 
that a cognitive style characterized by rigidity and intolerance of ambiguity is 
positively related to right-wing attitudes (for meta-analyses: Van Hiel et al., 2016; Jost, 
2017). Moreover, a recent set of studies have demonstrated that behaviourally-
assessed cognitive inflexibility is related to the extent to which individuals adhere 
firmly and rigidly to ideologies, in the realm of nationalism (Zmigrod, Rentfrow, & 
Robbins, 2018; Chapter 2), politics (Zmigrod, Rentfrow, & Robbins, 2019b; Chapter 4), 
and religion (Zmigrod et al., 2018; Chapter 3). There is therefore converging evidence 
that intellectual humility and its opposing interpersonal correlate – rigid ideological 
thinking – are shaped by cognitive ability and cognitive flexibility. 
The finding that intellectual humility has multiple distinct psychological 
underpinnings – an analytical thinking route and a mental flexibility route – provides 
a fruitful basis on which to expand research into interventions that promote 
inoculation against misinformation and ideological polarization. Pre-emptively 
warning individuals about ideologically-motivated efforts to spread misinformation 
and about the argumentation techniques commonly used in misinformation 
campaigns has been shown to be effective in neutralizing the effect of misinformation 
on attitudes (van der Linden et al., 2017; Cook et al., 2017).  The present findings are 
complementary to this line of research on inoculating citizens against fake news for 
several reasons. Firstly, identifying individual differences in cognition that shape 
individuals’ willingness to revise their attitudes may suggest that individuals with 
certain psychological traits may be more receptive than others to inoculation 
interventions. Additionally, perhaps interventions that emphasize certain cognitive 
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skills (analytical thinking, flexible thinking, etc.) may be more beneficial for 
individuals with particular psychological dispositions. Future research that combines 
the interventionist and individual differences perspective will be fruitful in refining 
our understanding of these processes. Secondly, these studies have focused on 
examining the effects of conveying information about expert consensus and potential 
misinformation campaigns in shaping citizens’ attitudes (van der Linden et al., 2017) 
and trying to engage individuals’ System 2 analytical processing in evaluating 
evidence. The current findings suggest that fostering mental flexibility and an 
attentionally-open information processing style may also be a successful focal point 
for future interventions. 
Several potential limitations of the present study highlight future avenues for 
research. Firstly, it will be valuable to replicate these findings in lab settings and not 
just online samples, as well as in different cultural contexts, and with complementary 
measures of intelligence and cognitive flexibility. Since the a priori power analysis we 
conducted based on relevant effect sizes in the literature recommended a sample size 
of 92 participants, we computed the power achieved for the multiple regression 
models. This revealed that the power was 99.29% (f2=.290), suggesting that the 
analyses were well powered to detect the present effects. Larger samples in future 
studies will help to corroborate and generalize these findings.  
In outlining future directions for the field, Leary and colleagues (2017) 
identified that “of particular interest are ways in which people who are high versus low in 
intellectual humility may differ in how they process information” (p. 810). The present study 
addressed this question by illustrating that analytical as well as flexible cognitive 
processing styles predict heightened intellectual humility. Admitting intellectual 
fallibility helps facilitate more constructive reactions to disagreements and conflict 
resolution (Porter & Schumann, 2017). Consequently, identifying and cultivating the 
cognitive processes shaping intellectual humility may be a key endeavour in building 
more evidence-based, tolerant, and effective discussions about the contested issues 
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6 A Data-Driven Approach to the Psychological 
Correlates of Ideological Attitudes 
6.1 Introduction  
Scholars across the sciences and humanities have long theorized about the 
psychological origins of citizens’ political, nationalistic and religious attitudes 
(Adorno et al., 1950; Jost, 2017). A rich literature on the psychology of ideology has 
revealed that individuals’ ideological inclinations are related to various psychological 
traits, such as their personal needs for order and structure (e.g. Jost, 2017; 
Hannikainen, Miller, & Cushman, 2017), cognitive flexibility (Zmigrod et al., 2018a, 
2018b), metacognition and learning styles (Rollwage, Dolan, & Fleming, 2018), and 
even perceptual reactivity to negative information (Carraro, Castelli, & Macchiaella, 
2011; Hibbing et al., 2014; Oxley et al., 2008; Vigil, 2010). While researchers have 
demonstrated that individuals’ ideological orientations are related to their 
psychological dispositions, scientists are yet to answer the question: to what extent are 
psychological factors predictive of ideological attitudes? This is particularly pertinent 
given the long-held assumption that demographic characteristics and socialization 
processes are the most powerful predictors of how citizens vote and what they believe 
(e.g. Campbell et al., 1960; Jennings & Niemi, 1968). Consequently, it is of paramount 
importance to evaluate the explanatory power of demographic and psychological 
variables in predicting individuals’ ideological orientations. 
Here we adopt a data-driven approach to systematically quantify the 
explanatory power of an individual’s demographic background, self-reported 
personality traits, and behaviourally-assessed cognitive function, towards their 
ideological attitudes. We examine this in the context of political and nationalistic 
ideologies, religiosity, and dogmatism. The current investigation therefore espouses a 
domain-general outlook toward the definition of ideology – focusing on the factors 
associated with thinking ideologically in multiple ideological domains (politics, 
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nationalism, and religion). This includes dogmatism, which can be conceptualized as 
a content-free dimension of ideological thought reflecting the certainty with which 
ideological beliefs are held and the intolerance displayed towards alternative or 
opposing beliefs (Greenberg & Jonas, 2003; Rokeach, 1948, 1954). Evaluating the 
psychological similarities and differences between these diverse ideological 
orientations in concert facilitates a comprehensive overview of the nature of 
ideological cognition. Furthermore, we seek to map out the psychological landscape 
of these ideological orientations by investigating which psychological factors amongst 
those measured by a large battery of cognitive tasks and personality surveys are most 
predictive of an individual’s ideological inclinations. This work aims to bridge 
methodologies across the cognitive and political sciences, identify key foci for future 
research, and illustrate the utility of incorporating objective cognitive and personality 
assessments when predicting ideological convictions. 
Empirical research on the psychology of ideology has traditionally been highly 
theory-driven. This has increased the scope and applicability of political psychology 
and facilitated the falsifiability of scientific claims by encouraging the development of 
hypotheses and conceptual frameworks. Nonetheless, a growing concern has emerged 
amongst researchers that psychologists of politics, nationalism, and religion generate 
hypotheses and develop study designs that confirm their prior beliefs about the 
origins of social discord (Duarte et al., 2015; Malka et al., 2018; Washburn & Skitka, 
2018; Tetlock, 1994; Jussim et al., 2015). This is exacerbated by the fact that due to 
limited resources and siloed research disciplines, studies in social psychology 
frequently focus on one ideological domain (e.g. political conservatism) or one 
psychological domain (e.g. analytical thinking). While an in-depth focus on a specific 
domain is essential for theoretical development and replicability, the selection of 
hypotheses and methodologies can suffer from problems of bias and a lack of 
conceptual integration across different ideological and psychological domains. It is 
therefore essential to complement theory-driven research with data-driven approaches, 
which can help to overcome these methodological challenges, as well as offer a holistic 
view of these complex relationships. Perhaps most importantly, data-driven research 
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can help validate and challenge theory-driven findings and consequently offer 
directions for future research. 
The current study builds on recent work by Eisenberg and colleagues (2018, 
2019), in which a large sample of participants (N=522) completed an extensive set of 
37 well-established cognitive tasks and 22 self-report surveys focused on self-
regulation and personality characteristics. Through factor analysis, Eisenberg and 
colleagues (2019) constructed data-driven ontologies of cognition and personality, 
identifying a 5-factor structure for the cognitive task variables and a 12-factor 
structure for the personality survey variables. The power of these ontologies to predict 
real-world health outcomes was evaluated (Eisenberg et al., 2019). A study of test-
retest reliabilities demonstrated that the ontology factor scores possessed high 
stability over time (4-month mean test-retest reliability across factors of cognitive task 
ontology: M=.82; personality survey ontology: M=.86; Enkavi et al., 2019; Eisenberg et 
al., 2019); this reliability helps to address the challenges of obtaining robust individual 
differences from cognitive paradigms (Hedge, Powell, & Sumner, 2018; Saunders, 
Milyavskaya, Etz, Randles, & Inzlicht, 2018). In the present investigation, we recruited 
334 participants (49.4% female; age: M=37.07, SD=8.49, range=22-63) from Eisenberg 
and colleagues’ (2018) original sample and administered surveys pertaining to various 
political, nationalistic, and religious ideological beliefs, as well as dogmatism and its 
conceptual inverse, intellectual humility. This allowed us to address two key issues: 
(1) what are the relative contributions of demographics, personality, and cognition, to 
ideological attitudes? And (2) what psychological factors are most predictive of 
individuals’ ideological orientations? 
The 5-factor cognitive ontology was created by decomposing each of the 37 
cognitive tasks into multiple dependent measures that reflected psychologically-
meaningful variables, such as accuracy scores (e.g. in the case of the working memory 
Keep Track task), contrasts between different task conditions (e.g. in a task-switching 
task, including task-switch cost and cue-switch costs), and fitted model parameters 
used to capture speeded decision-making processes (for details see Eisenberg et al., 
2019). Wherever appropriate, performance on two-choice tasks was modelled using 
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the drift-diffusion model (DDM), which transforms accuracy and reaction time data 
into interpretable latent variables including drift rate (corresponding to average rate of 
evidence accumulation), threshold (corresponding to response caution in terms of 
speed-accuracy trade-off), and non-decision time (corresponding to perceptual stimulus 
processing and motor execution). This resulted in a total of 129 dependent cognitive 
measures, which exploratory factor analysis and model selection based on the 
Bayesian information criterion (BIC) reduced to 5 primary cognitive factors labelled 
according to their highly loading variables: (1) Caution (capturing the DDM threshold 
parameter), (2) Perceptual Processing Time (capturing the DDM non-decision time 
parameter and stop-signal reaction times associated with response inhibition 
processes), (3) Speed of Evidence Accumulation (capturing the DDM drift rate parameter 
and other related processes), (4) Temporal Discounting (reflecting variables associated 
with ability to delay immediate gratification for a larger future reward), and (5) 
Strategic Information Processing (reflecting variables associated with working memory 
capacity, planning, and other higher-order strategies occurring at a longer time-scale 
than the speeded decisions modelled by the DDM). Detailed information on the nature 
of the ontology and its constituent elements can be found in papers by Eisenberg and 
colleagues (2018, 2019) and Enkavi and colleagues (2019). 
The same methodology was applied to the 22 self-report personality surveys, 
resulting in 64 dependent measures that were reduced to 12 factors using oblique 
exploratory factor analysis. These personality factors were associated with specific 
measurement scales aimed at assessing various psychological constructs, for example 
Social Risk-Taking (measured via the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking scale (DOSPERT; 
Blais & Weber, 2006)) and Impulsivity (captured by the UPPS-P Impulsivity Survey 
(Lynam et al., 2006), Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11; Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 
1995), and I7 Impulsive-Venturesome Survey (Eysenck et al., 1985)). The original 
selection of surveys and tasks was guided by a focus on measures that capture self-
regulation and goal-directed behaviour (Eisenberg et al., 2018). Notably, personality 
was here broadly construed in terms of self-reported psychological traits measured 
with validated surveys that aim to tap into stable individual differences, and so 
personality was not defined in terms of the Big Five model of personality (though the 
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Big Five traits are included in the creation of the personality ontology). Consequently, 
while some of the personality and cognitive factors may be theoretically linked to 
ideological thinking, others should be unrelated (such as Eating Control or Financial 
Risk-Taking). This offers a check of discriminant validity to ensure that the identified 
relationships reflect appropriate and relevant psychological correlates of ideological 
attitudes. 
By fractionating individual differences in psychological traits into self-reported 
personality and behaviourally-assessed cognition, we address the diversity in 
assessment methods used by social and cognitive psychologists to measure “cognitive 
style” (Van Hiel et al., 2016). Indeed, recent studies have shown that self-report and 
behavioural measures of psychological traits may tap into different processes 
(Eisenberg et al., 2018, 2019; De Keersmaecker et al., 2017), and that the relationship 
between ideological leanings and cognitive style may be stronger when the latter is 
measured with self-report questionnaires rather than behavioural tasks (Van Hiel et 
al., 2016). A clear methodological distinction can therefore reveal patterns of 
convergence and divergence in the relationships between psychological dispositions 






6.2 Materials and Methods 
6.2.1 Participant Recruitment and Demographic Characteristics 
Participants were recruited from an existing pool of participants who 
completed a wide range of cognitive tasks and surveys for Eisenberg and colleagues 
(2018) on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). All 522 original participants were 
contacted via MTurk and invited to participate in an additional study for financial 
compensation ($7 for 30-45 minutes), and 334 participants completed the study. With 
respect to demographic characteristics, participants were asked to indicate age (year 
of birth), gender (male, female, and prefer not to say or other), educational attainment 
(less than high school degree, high school graduate, some college but no degree, 
Associate degree in college (2-year), Bachelor’s degree in college (4-year), Master’s 
degree, Doctoral degree or professional degree (JD, MD)), and income (<$10k, $10-
29k, $30-49k, $50-99k, $100-199k, $200-249k, >$250k, Prefer not to say). 
6.2.2. Measures of Ideological Orientations 
To comprehensively assess participants’ ideological orientations, each 
participant completed validated surveys of various ideological inclinations (Table 
6.1). A correlogram of these ideological orientations can be seen below in Figure 6.1. 
Table 6.1. Measures of ideological orientations 
Measure 
Scale Details 
(all measures were assessed on a 7-point Likert-scale 






7-item scale. Participants indicate their warmth towards a 
set of policies. 
Policies: abortion, traditional marriage, traditional values, 
family unit, religion, patriotism, military and national 





5-item scale. Participants indicate their warmth towards a 
set of policies. 
Policies: limited government, fiscal responsibility, welfare 
benefits, business, gun ownership. Scale of 0-100 with 





(Sidanius et al., 1997) 
9-item scale. Participants rate their agreement with 
statements such as "The United States is no more superior 
than any other country" (Reverse-coded) and "We should 
do anything necessary to increase the power of our 
country, even if it means war". 
.894 
Patriotism 
(Federico, Golec, & 
Dial, 2005) 
9-item scale. Participants rate their agreement with 
statements such as "I find the sight of the American flag 





4-item scale. Participants indicate whether they believe 
children ought to be “obedient”, “respectful”, and “well-




Orientation (Pratto et 
al., 2013) 
4-item scale. Participants rate their agreement with 
statements such as “we should not push for group 
equality” and “superior groups should dominate inferior 
groups”. Scale of 0-100 with intervals of 10.  
.891 
System Justification 
(Kay & Jost, 2003) 
8-item scale. Participants are presented with statements 
such as "In general, American society is fair" and 
"American society is set up so that people usually get 




(Swann et al., 2009) 
5-item scale. Participants are asked to rate their 
agreement with statements such as "I would fight 
someone insulting or making fun of America as a whole" 




(Shearman & Levine, 
2006) 






Comprehensive Intellectual Humility Scale measuring 4 
facets of intellectual humility: 
Factor 1: Independence of Intellect and Ego 
Factor 2: Openness to Revising One’s Viewpoint 
Factor 3: Respect for Others’ Viewpoints 
Factor 4: Lack of Intellectual Overconfidence 
Factor 1: .920 
Factor 2: .865 
Factor 3: .881 





Participants were asked: “How important is religion in 
your life?” Response options: not at all important, slightly 







Participants were asked: “People practice their religion in 
different ways. Outside of attending religious services, 
how often do you pray?” Response options: several times 
a day, once a day, a few times a week, once a week, a few 







Participants were asked: “Aside from weddings and 
funerals, how often do you attend religious services?” 
Response options: more than once a week, once a week, 





6.2.2 Exploratory Factor Analysis 
To reduce the dimensionality of the ideological orientations, exploratory factor 
analysis using oblimin rotation was conducted using the “fa” function from the R 
package psych (Revelle, 2017). Scree plots and parallel analysis both suggested a 3-
factor structure was the most appropriate reduction of the data (see Figure 6.2). The 
correlations between the three ideological factors suggested that they tapped into 
independent constructs (see Table 6.2). 
 
Figure 6.1. Correlogram and cluster analysis of ideological orientations based on 
Pearson’s correlations. IH = Intellectual Humility. IH1 = Independence of Intellect and 
Ego; IH2 = Openness to Revising One’s Viewpoint; IH3 = Respect for Others’ 
Viewpoints; IH4 = Lack of Intellectual Overconfidence. Note that the IH are not 
reverse-coded and so are in the opposite direction of the other ideological measures. 
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Table 2. Ideology factor correlations 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Factor 1: Political Conservatism -  .23 .34 
Factor 2: Dogmatism .23 - .08 
Factor 3: Religiosity .34 .08 - 
 
 
Figure 6.2. Exploratory factor analysis using oblimin rotation on all measured 
ideological orientations. Scree plots and parallel analysis suggested 3 factors. RMSR = 





6.3.1 Quantifying the Role of Psychological Variables in Predicting 
Ideological Attitudes 
We measured participants’ ideological inclinations across multiple domains by 
administering 16 validated surveys of ideological orientations (an average of 25 
months after the initial psychological assessment; the initial assessments did not 
contain measures directly related to ideological attitudes). These included 
nationalism, patriotism, social and economic conservatism, system justification, 
dogmatism, openness to revising one’s viewpoints, and engagement with religion 
(Figure 6.1, Table 6.1). Exploratory factor analysis was conducted to reduce the 
dimensionality of these ideological orientations, revealing a 3-factor structure 
corresponding to the following ideological factors: political conservatism, religiosity, 
and dogmatism. We utilized the factor scores of each participant from this exploratory 
factor analysis to validate and condense the findings obtained via the 16 ideological 
orientations (Figure 6.2, Table 6.2). To complement these broad ideological 
orientations, 16 socio-political policy-specific attitudes were measured in line with the 
methodology suggested by Everett (2013), in which participants rated their warmth 
towards issues such as abortion, welfare benefits, fiscal responsibility, same-sex 
marriage, particular political slogans, and the Paris climate change agreement. 
To quantify the role of demographic variables, self-reported personality, and 
behaviourally-assessed cognition to ideological attitudes, we computed a series of 
multiple regression analyses on each of the 16 measured ideological orientations, as 
well as the 3 summative ideological factors. Four linear multiple regression analyses 
were conducted for each ideological outcome variable, whereby each analysis 
consisted of regressors associated with one of the following feature matrices: (1) 
demographic variables (consisting of age, gender, educational attainment, and 
income), (2) the 5-factor cognitive ontology, (3) the 12-factor personality ontology, and 
(4) all 17 factor scores and the demographic variables. The R2 of these linear regression 
analyses is depicted in Figure 6.3. 
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As manifest in Figure 6.3, incorporating the psychological variables led to a 
substantial increase in the variance explained of the ideological orientations relative 
to regression analyses based on demographics alone. For example, the variance 
explained for social conservatism was 8.3% by demographic variables alone, and 
37.25% when demographic and psychological variables were simultaneously 
included in the multiple regression. This was consistent across the three summative 
ideological factors. For the political conservatism factor, demographic variables alone 
explained 7.43% of the variance, while demographics and the psychological variables 
together explained 32.5% of the variance (4.4-fold increase). For the religiosity factor 
and the dogmatism factor, demographics explained 2.90% and 1.53% of the variance 
respectively, while the combined model explained 23.35% and 23.60% of the variance 
respectively (corresponding to an 8-fold and 15-fold increase respectively). 
Consequently, including the cognitive and personality variables led to a considerable 
increase in the explanatory power of these models. 
Overall, the variance explained by demographic variables ranged from 1-
12.6%, and the variance explained by the cognitive task variables and personality 
survey variables ranged between 2-15% and 6-30% respectively. When the 
demographic and psychological variables were simultaneously included as 
regressors, the variance explained ranged between 11-37%. Additionally, the 
personality ontology was consistently more strongly associated with ideological 
measures than the cognitive ontology (Figure 6.3). This is in line with past research 
indicating that self-reported measures produce stronger relationships with ideological 
surveys than behavioural measures of psychological traits (e.g. Van Hiel et al., 2016). 
The results also reveal patterns of variability in the contributions of the 
demographic and psychological variables to different ideological orientations and 
policy attitudes. While some ideological orientations were well explained by the 
cognitive ontology, such as social conservatism and patriotism (15.27% and 13.89% of 
the variance explained by a cognition-only regression model, respectively), other 
ideological orientations were weakly explained by the cognitive ontology, such as 
social dominance orientation and system justification (3.04% and 3.10% of the variance 
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explained by a cognition-only regression model, respectively). Similarly, some 
ideological orientations were explained well by the personality-only regression 
models, for example intellectual humility (independence of ego and intellect; R2 = 
29.54%) and social conservatism (R2 = 23.67%), while other ideologies were explained 
only moderately better by the personality variables relative to the cognitive variables 
(e.g. R2 difference of 5.61% between cognition-only and personality-only models for 
patriotism). Variability was also evident with regards to policy attitudes: whereas 
support for abortion was explained very poorly by demographic variables (R2 = 
0.33%) and well by the combined model (R2 = 17.70%), support for traditional 
marriage and military and national security were explained equally well by the 
demographic variables (R2 = 8.28% and 8.03% respectively) and cognitive ontology (R2 
= 10.72% and 9.59% respectively) and very well by the combined model (R2 = 24.66% 
and 25.63% respectively) due to the strong predictive contributions of personality (R2 
= 13.75% and 14.62% respectively). This provides a window into the relative 
contributions of psychological factors towards different ideologies and attitudes. 
To validate the predictive power of these variables, we performed out-of-
sample prediction using 10-fold cross validation with L2-regularized linear regression 
to predict participants’ ideological orientations and ideological factor scores using the 
cognitive and personality ontologies. As evident in Figures 6.3 and 6.S79, the cross-
validated findings were consistent with the in-sample linear multiple regression 
findings (in Figure 6.3), albeit with smaller effect sizes. 
To examine the evidential strength for these different models, we computed 
Bayes Factors, which express the relative likelihood of two regression models given 
the data and prior expectations. To calculate Bayes factors using Bayesian regression, 
we relied on a default Bayesian approach promoted by Wetzels and colleagues (2011), 
Rouder and Morey (2012) and Liang and colleagues (2008), and computationally 
specified in the R package BayesFactor (Morey & Rouder, 2015). We computed Bayes 
Factors, relative to the null hypothesis (BF10), for the regression models consisting of 
                                                          
 
9 All figures with names starting with “6.S” can be found in the Appendix. 
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the different predictor types: (1) demographic variables, (2) cognitive ontology, (3) 
personality ontology, (4) the psychological variables (i.e. the cognitive and personality 
ontologies combined), and (5) the combined demographic and psychological 
variables. As evident in Figure 6.4, there was decisive evidence for all models 
consisting of both cognitive and personality variables. The demographics-only 
regression model was substantially more likely than a null model given the present 
data for the political conservatism factor (BF10=78.26) but there was moderate 
evidence in favour of the null model for the dogmatism factor (BF10=.01354) and the 
religiosity factor (BF10=.081655; Figure 6.4). This suggests that demographic variables 
play a key role in explaining ideological attitudes in the realm of politics, but do not 
explain religiosity or dogmatism in the current dataset. 
The Bayes factor analysis further illustrates that there is strong evidence in 
favour of the role of cognition in religiosity, and decisive evidence in favour of its role 
in political ideology. In contrast, there is decisive evidence in favour of the null 
hypothesis model relative to a cognition-only model in the case of dogmatism, 
suggesting that the cognitive ontology is less predictive of dogmatism than an 
intercept-only model. This is consistent with the R2 findings evident in Figure 6.3, in 
which the cognitive variables do not explain a large amount of the variance in the 
dogmatism factor or its subcomponents. Across all three ideological factors, there is 
decisive evidence in the current data in favour of the role of personality variables, as 
well as for models predicted by both personality and cognition, and for a combined 
model with all the psychological and demographic variables. 
Additionally, to evaluate the strength of the evidence for the psychological 
models (containing cognitive and personality regressors) relative to a model based 
solely on demographic variables, we also computed Bayes Factors for all the 
regression models relative to the demographic-only model (BFdem; see Figure 6.S1). 
This corroborated the findings obtained using the BF10, as the data was extremely 
more likely to occur under models containing only cognitive and personality variables 
than a demographics-only model (political conservatism factor: BFdem = 1.975×108; 








Figure 6.3. Association of ideological orientations and policies with demographic 
variables, cognitive task variables, personality survey variables, and all variables 
combined. Linear regression R2 are shown according to predictor type. The outcome 
variables are arranged according to the three ideological factors derived using 
exploratory factor analysis: political conservatism (top panel), dogmatism (middle 
panel), and religiosity (middle panel). Regression on policy-specific attitudes is 
depicted in the bottom panel. IH = Intellectual Humility. IH1 = Independence of 
Intellect and Ego; IH2 = Openness to Revising One’s Viewpoint; IH3 = Respect for 
Others’ Viewpoints; IH4 = Lack of Intellectual Overconfidence. 
 







Figure 6.4. Bayes factors for the three ideological factors for six regression models 
according to the model type, relative to intercept-only null hypothesis models. The 
“best” models in terms of Bayes factors are shown. Evidential strength guidelines 
follow the classification scheme offered by Jeffreys (1961) and advocated by Wetzels 









Figure 6.5. Cross-validated predictive accuracy for the three ideological factors using 
the psychological variables (cognitive and personality variables). All ideological 




6.3.2 Psychological Signature of Ideological Attitudes 
In order to understand the cognitive and personality bases of these ideological 
orientations, we used the standardized beta coefficients of the linear regression 
models to generate a “cognitive signature” and “personality signature” of each 
ideological orientation. Figure 6.7 depicts the standardized estimates of the combined 
cognitive and personality ontology scores for each of the three summative ideological 
factors, while controlling for demographic variables (see Figures 6.S3-S6 for the 
psychological signatures of all the ideological orientations). 
The results reveal both diversity and specificity in the psychological correlates 
of political conservatism, dogmatism, and religiosity. The political conservatism 
factor, which reflects tendencies towards political conservatism and nationalism, was 
significantly associated with greater caution and temporal discounting and reduced 
strategic information processing in the cognitive domain, and by greater goal-
directedness, impulsivity, and reward sensitivity, and reduced social risk-taking in 
the personality domain. As an illustration, Figure 6.8 demonstrates the cognitive 
correlates of all the ideological orientations captured by the political conservatism 
factor, revealing that the conservative-leaning political ideologies were consistently 
related to greater caution and reduced strategic information processing, with some 
variability in the role of temporal discounting, perceptual processing time, and speed 
of evidence accumulation. The dogmatism factor was significantly associated with 
reduced speed of evidence accumulation in the cognitive domain and by reduced 
social risk-taking and agreeableness as well as heightened impulsivity and ethical 
risk-taking in the personality domain. Similarly to political conservatism, the 
religiosity factor was also significantly associated with greater caution, and reduced 
strategic information processing and social risk-taking, but in contrast to dogmatism 
and political conservatism, religiosity was associated with greater agreeableness and 
risk perception. 
We further sought to identify the “best” model for each of the three ideological 
factors using a Bayesian Model Averaging approach (implemented in the bic.glm 
function in the bma R package (Raftery & Painter, 2005)) for all possible linear additive 
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models using the cognitive task variables, personality survey variables, and 
demographic variables as regressors. The bic.glm function fits generalized linear 
models with the “leaps and bounds” algorithm and the Bayesian information criterion 
(BIC) approximation to Bayes factors (Hoeting et al., 1999). In Bayesian Model 
Averaging, inference about each variable is based on the averaging of posterior 
distributions of all considered models – rather than a single selected model – given 
the present data (see Figure 6.S2 for all included models in the Bayesian Model 
Averaging). We used a Gaussian error distribution and defined selected variables as 
having a posterior probability above 75% in line with past guidelines (e.g. Viallefont, 
Raftery, & Richardson, 2001; Jeffreys, 1961). For each of the three ideological factors, 
we then obtained the Bayes factors for the regression model composed of these 
selected variables. This approach excludes unnecessary predictors and allows us to 
generate the Bayesian regression that exhibits the best combination of fit and 
parsimony.  As depicted in Figures 6.4 and 6.6, each ideological factor was best 
predicted by a different set of variables, all of which were consistent with the results 
of the standardized estimates from the multiple linear regression (see Figure 6.7). 
These “best” models all possessed the highest level of evidential strength relative to 
an intercept-only null model (BF10) and relative to a demographics-only (BFdem) model 
(Political Conservatism: BF10=1.428×1013, BFdem=1.825×1011; Dogmatism: 






Figure 6.6. Posterior probability that each variable (βi) is non-zero given the data, D, 
(in %) following Bayesian Model Averaging on each of the three ideological factors. 
Selected variables for the “best” Bayesian regression possessed a posterior probability 






Figure 6.7. Standardized estimates of cognitive and personality variables for each 




Figure 6.8. Standardized estimates of cognitive variables for ideological orientations 
that load on the Political Conservatism factor. Derived from multiple regression 













While the field of political psychology has expanded and flourished over the 
past two decades, to the best of our knowledge there has been no systematic and well-
powered quantification of the contribution of psychological traits to ideological 
beliefs. By administering an unprecedented number of cognitive tasks and personality 
surveys and employing a data-driven mental ontology (Eisenberg et al., 2018), we 
were able to evaluate the predictive power of cognition and personality to ideological 
inclinations. Multiple linear regression analyses (Figure 6.3), Bayesian model 
comparisons (Figure 6.4), and out-of-sample cross-validated prediction (Figure 6.5) 
converged to demonstrate that cognitive and personality assessments consistently 
outperform demographic predictors in accounting for individual differences in 
ideological preferences. This revealed that incorporating psychological factors into 
statistical models of ideological attitudes increases explanatory power by 4 to 15-fold 
relative to solely relying on demographic factors (Figure 6.3). Bayesian analysis 
highlighted that the most parsimonious and predictive models include both 
behaviourally-assessed cognitive variables and self-reported personality variables 
(Figures 6.4 and 6.6), suggesting that both measurement types are valuable for 
predicting ideological behaviour and should be treated as complementary sources of 
explained variance. 
Here we adopted a domain-general approach to ideology by examining a range 
of ideological attitudes pertaining to politics, nationalism, religion, and dogmatism. 
This exposed remarkable similarities and differences between the cognitive and 
personality correlates of diverse ideological orientations, demonstrating that there 
may be core psychological underpinnings of ideological thinking across domains 
(such as the roles of strategic information processing and social risk-taking; Figures 
6.4, 6.6, 6.7 and 6.S3-S6) as well as specificity that depends on the content of the 
ideological domain (such as the differing roles of caution, impulsivity, and 
agreeableness). Furthermore, the results suggest that the relative contributions of 
demographic, cognitive, and personality predictors vary across the three ideological 
domains. For instance, demographic variables significantly predicted individual 
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differences in political and nationalistic ideological orientations, but not dogmatism 
or religiosity (Figure 6.4). Within the political ideologies, the cognitive ontology 
predicted social conservatism, nationalism, and patriotism very well, but predicted 
social dominance orientation and system justification to a lesser degree (Figure 6.3), 
suggesting that cognitive traits may have differential effects depending on the nature 
of the ideology. Moreover, in line with past research (Van Hiel et al., 2016), the 
personality survey ontology was more predictive of ideological attitudes than the 
cognitive task ontology (Figures 6.3, 6.4, 6.S3-S6); an effect that was more pronounced 
for dogmatism and religiosity than political conservatism, highlighting the 
importance of both measurement types.  
In terms of political conservatism, the most predictive psychological correlates 
included reduced strategic information processing, heightened caution, and an 
aversion to social risk-taking (Figures 6.6, 6.7, 6.8). These three predictors were 
consistently implicated in the general political conservatism factor (Figure 6.7), as well 
as the specific political ideological orientations studied, such as nationalism, 
authoritarianism, and social conservatism (Figures 6.8 and 6.S3). These data-driven 
findings are remarkably congruent with existing theoretical and empirical accounts 
within political psychology and also add important insights. Firstly, the finding that 
political and nationalistic conservatism is associated with reduced strategic 
information processing is consistent with a large body of literature (for reviews see: 
Jost, 2017 and Van Hiel et al., 2016) indicating that right-wing ideologies are frequently 
associated with reduced analytical thinking (e.g. Hodson & Busseri, 2012; Onraet et 
al., 2015) and cognitive flexibility (Zmigrod et al., 2018, 2019b). Additionally, 
conservative political ideology was characterized by a diminished tendency to take 
social risks (Figures 6.7 and 6.S3) such as disagreeing with authority, starting a new 
career mid-life, and speaking publicly about a controversial topic. This corroborates 
research showing that political conservatives tend to emphasize values of conformity, 
ingroup loyalty, and traditionalism (Caprara, Schwartz, Capanna, Vecchione, & 
Barbaranelli, 2006; Cavazza & Mucchi-Faina, 2008; Feldman, 2003; Jost, Basevich, 
Dickson, & Noorbaloochi, 2016; Jost, Ledgerwood, Hardin, 2008; Piurko, Schwartz, & 
Davidov, 2011; Schwartz, Caprara, & Vecchione, 2010). These empirical consistencies 
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between the current data-driven findings and past theory-motivated research endow 
this line of work with further reliability. 
Furthermore, we found that a politically conservative – that is, careful and 
socially-vigilant – outlook was associated with greater caution in ideologically-neutral 
speeded decision-making tasks, as operationalized in terms of the drift-diffusion 
model parameter for the amount of evidence required before committing to a decision. 
Specifically, the caution with which individuals process and respond to politically-
neutral information was related to the conservatism with which they evaluate socio-
political information (Figures 6.7 and 6.8). It therefore appears that caution may be a 
time-scale independent decision strategy that is evident both in speeded two-forced 
choice paradigms as well as slower and cumulative higher-order decisions about 
political issues. This finding supports the idea of “elective affinities” between 
cognitive dispositions and ideological inclinations (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009) and 
is compatible with the perspective that political conservatism is associated with 
heightened motivations to satisfy dispositional needs for certainty and security (Jost 
et al., 2003a, 2008, 2017). This theory is based on a wealth of research implicating 
sensitivity to threat, negativity, and uncertainty in conservatism (e.g. Hibbing et al., 
2014). For example, under conditions of uncertainty, threat, or time pressure, 
individuals exhibit a conservative shift in their attitudes and choices (Landau et al., 
2004; Cohen, Ogilvie, Solomon, Greenberg, & Pysz, 2005; Jost et al., 2004; Hansson, 
Keating, & Terry, 1974; Hetherington & Suhay, 2011; Nail et al., 2009). Nonetheless, to 
the best of our knowledge, ideological attitudes have never before been investigated 
in relation to caution as measured with cognitive tasks and drift-diffusion parameters. 
The present results therefore offer a novel addition to this literature by suggesting that 
political conservatism may be a manifestation of a cautious strategy in processing and 
responding to information that is both time-invariant and ideologically neutral, and 
can be manifest even in rapid perceptual decision-making processes. 
The findings reveal further novel insights by highlighting that ideological 
orientations that have been widely studied and debated in political psychology exhibit 
both uniformity and variability in their cognitive and personality predictors. For 
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example, while social and economic conservatism possessed many overlapping 
correlates (such as heightened goal-directedness and caution; Figure 6.8 and 6.S5), 
economic conservatism was associated with enhanced sensation-seeking whereas 
social conservatism was not, and in turn social conservatism was related to heightened 
agreeableness and risk perception, while economic conservatism was not (Figure 
6.S5). This bears on recent debates regarding the need to fractionate conservatism into 
its social and economic components in order to effectively and comprehensively 
understand its psychological underpinnings (e.g. Crawford et al., 2017; Malka, Lelkes, 
& Soto, 2017; Azevedo, Jost, Rothmund, & Sterling, 2019; Zmigrod et al., 2019b), and 
highlights sensation-seeking and risk perception as potential candidates for future 
study. The results can also help to disambiguate past debates about the conceptual 
overlaps between ideological orientations such as social dominance orientation, 
system justification, and authoritarianism (for review see: Sibley & Duckitt, 2008) and 
their differential predictive power in relation to real-world outcomes such as prejudice 
(e.g. McFarland, 2010; Brandt & Crawford, 2016; Cohrs & Asbrock, 2008) and policy 
attitudes (e.g. Jylha & Akrami, 2015). Here, we found that each of these ideologies 
exhibited a different cognitive and personality signature, with several notable 
patterns. For instance, system justification was the only political ideological 
orientation to be associated with elevated levels of emotional control (Figure 6.S5) – a 
pattern that system justification theory (for review see: Jost, 2018) may benefit from 
exploring further. Moreover, in the cognitive domain, while authoritarianism was 
related to faster accumulation of evidence and a tendency towards greater discounting 
of delayed rewards, social dominance orientation was associated with slower evidence 
accumulation and greater caution (Figure 6.8). Theoretical work and empirical 
replication by political psychologists and social dominance orientation researchers 
(for review see: Sidanius, Pratto, Van Laar, & Levin, 2004; Sidanius, Cotterill, Sheehy-
Skeffington, Kteily, & Carvacho, 2016) will be necessary in order to elucidate how 
these data-driven findings fit in with existing conceptualizations of authoritarianism 
and social dominance orientation. 
The dogmatism factor was best and most parsimoniously predicted by a 
different set of psychological variables to those that underpin political conservatism. 
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Dogmatic participants were slower to accumulate evidence in speeded decision-
making tasks but were also more impulsive and willing to take ethical risks (Figure 
6.7 and 6.S6). This combination of traits – impulsivity in conjunction with slow and 
impaired accumulation of evidence from the decision environment – may result in the 
dogmatic tendency to discard evidence prematurely and to resist belief updating in 
light of new information. This psychological signature is novel and should inspire 
further research on the effect of dogmatism on perceptual and decision-making 
processes. It is noteworthy that impulsivity differs here from caution (implicated in 
political conservatism and religiosity) in terms of measurement method (self-report 
survey versus behavioural task) and its relationship to self-control: caution here is 
operationalized as a trade-off between speed and accuracy under conditions where 
both are rewarded and so is under the influence of some strategic control, whereas 
impulsivity is typically conceptualized as a deficit in inhibitory control rather than a 
strategic trade-off (Dalley, Everitt, & Robbins, 2011). Consequently, dogmatic 
individuals may possess reduced inhibition that could be compounded by slower 
information uptake, leading to impulsive decisions based on imperfectly processed 
evidence. There has been remarkably little contemporary research on the cognitive 
basis of dogmatism, with a few exceptions (Brown, 2007; Deffler, Leary & Hoyle, 2016; 
Leary et al., 2016; Rollwage et al., 2018; Zmigrod et al., 2019a), and so we hope these 
findings will stimulate further in-depth research on the nature of dogmatic thinking 
styles. 
The psychological signature of religiosity consisted of heightened caution and 
reduced strategic information processing in the cognitive domain, and enhanced 
agreeableness, risk perception, and aversion to social risk-taking, in the personality 
domain (Figures 6.7, 6.S5, 6.S6). Religiousness has been previously linked to factors 
associated with lower strategic information processing (e.g. Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, 
Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2012; Zuckerman, Silberman, & Hall, 2013; Lynn, Harvey, & 
Neyborg, 2009; Willard & Norenzayan, 2013; Zmigrod et al., 2018), heightened 
agreeableness (for meta-analysis see Saroglou, 2010), and avoidance of social risk-
taking through conformity (e.g. Saroglou, Delpierre, & Dernelle, 2004). The finding 
that religious participants exhibited elevated caution and risk perception is 
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particularly informative to researchers investigating the theory that threat, risk, and 
disgust sensitivity are linked to moral and religious convictions (e.g. Fincher & 
Thornhill, 2008, 2012; Murray, Kerry, & Gervais, 2019), and that these cognitive and 
emotional biases may have played a role in the cultural origins of large-scale 
organized religions (Norenzayan, 2013; Purzycki et al., 2016). The results support the 
notion that experiencing risks as more salient and probable may facilitate devotion to 
religious ideologies that offer explanations of these risks (by supernatural accounts) 
and ways to mitigate them (via religious devotion and communities).  
The present data-driven analysis produced results that are largely consistent 
with prevailing conceptualizations of the psychology of ideological beliefs, but also 
revealed cognitive signatures of ideological thinking that have not yet been 
investigated. The findings demonstrated large effect sizes and strong evidence for 
predictive models of ideological orientations that incorporate demographic, cognitive 
and personality factors (Figures 6.3, 6.4). By adopting research practices such as 
relying on large samples, integrating assessment methods from cognitive and social 
psychology, utilizing both frequentist and Bayesian statistical techniques, and 
temporally separating the collection of psychological and ideological data, the current 
investigation was able to overcome many methodological concerns in social and 
political psychology regarding biased hypothesis generation and reproducibility (e.g. 
Duarte et al., 2015). The convergence between the present data-driven results and past 
theory-driven research helps to validate existing findings and to highlight the degree 
to which human ideological inclinations are rooted in cognitive dispositions. 
Moreover, this data-driven approach generated notable novel insights that will help 
guide future research, such as the role of evidence accumulation rates and impulsivity 
in dogmatism, or the manifest relationship between cognitive caution and political 
conservatism (Figures 6.7 and 6.8). These findings underscore the fruitfulness of 
examining the relationships between high-level ideological attitudes and low-level 
perceptual processes, and suggest that ideological beliefs are amenable to careful 
cognitive and computational analysis. Future cumulative research will need to 
elucidate the question of causality. Recent accounts suggest that not only do 
psychological processes underlie ideological attitudes, attitudes also guide behaviour 
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and decision-making across domains in ways that can shape perception, cognition, 
and personality (Hatemi & McDermott, 2016). A holistic, domain-general approach to 
the relationship between ideology and cognition can therefore offer a valuable 
foundation for research on the psychological roots of intergroup attitudes, 


















7 General Discussion 
7.1 Summary and Synthesis 
7.1.1 Overview of Aims 
The research program detailed and developed in this doctoral dissertation was 
guided by the question: what traits make some individuals more susceptible to ideological 
thinking than others? By invoking “traits”, the research was concerned with stable 
individual differences in cognitive information processing and personality 
characteristics. By referring to “ideological thinking”, the research explored the notion 
that ideologies – regardless of their content or ambition – attract and inculcate a 
common type of thinking in their adherents. Ideological thinking is characterized by 
strong adherence to an ideological cause and resistance to belief-updating, as well as 
a parochial relational orientation that is strongly favourable to ingroups and 
antagonistic to outgroups. It was therefore reasoned that ideological thinking could 
become manifest across a range of ideological commitments, including nationalism 
(Chapters 2 and 6; Zmigrod, Rentfrow, & Robbins, 2018), religious fundamentalism 
(Chapters 3 and 6; Zmigrod et al., 2018), extreme political partisanship (Chapters 4 
and 6; Zmigrod et al, 2019b), attitudinal dogmatism (Chapters 5 and 6; Zmigrod et al., 
2019), and a selective favouritism towards ingroups over outgroups10 (Chapter 6; 
Zmigrod, Rentfrow, & Robbins, 2019a, 2019b). Within this definition of “ideological 
thinking” lies an assumption as well as a hypothesis that was tested throughout the 
series of studies that constitute this doctoral research: there is remarkable uniformity in 
the psychological underpinnings of diverse ideological convictions.  
The epistemological motivation for this premise resides in questions regarding 
the form and structure of ideological thinking, rather than the content of ideological 
beliefs. In this regard, this line of inquiry departs from a majority of existing 
psychological research on politics, morality, religion, or intergroup relations. The 
                                                          
 
10 Operationalized specifically in Chapter 6 in terms of extreme pro-group attitudes. 
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focus of past research has often been on how specific beliefs about social institutions 
or groups relate to psychological processes (for reviews: Jost, 2017; Norenzayan, 2013, 
2016). Research on these questions is currently divided into the disciplines of “political 
psychology”, “psychology of religion”, “moral psychology”, and “intergroup 
psychology”, and so researchers are typically interested in single ideological domains 
and their associated beliefs (e.g. conservatism, religiosity, moral values, and prejudice) 
rather than the overarching psychological similarities (and differences) across 
ideological domains. 
Consequently, one important way in which the studies outlined here differ 
from past research exists in the impulse to identify psychological factors that are 
implicated in ideological thinking generally. A second point of departure from 
previous approaches is the emphasis on studying ideological cognition by merging 
the tools of cognitive science and social psychology rather than using self-report 
measures to infer cognitive traits. Lastly, the current research sought to integrate 
theory-driven and data-driven methodologies in order to generate research that 
overcomes past methodological weaknesses in the field and facilitates reproducible 
research practices. This combination of approaches allowed for the development of a 
more precise understanding of the similarities and differences in the cognitive 
underpinnings of diverse ideological convictions. In the following, the main 
conclusions from each chapter will be summarized, followed by a synthesis of three 
overarching conclusions that can be drawn from this doctoral research. 
7.1.2 Summary of Findings 
 While there is convergence in the general approach and objectives of the 
chapters outlined here, each study examined a distinct manifestation of ideological 
thinking and identity, and studied it in relation to a different combination of 
psychological variables. Each chapter employed a range of statistical techniques to 
explore the data and each resulted in nuanced empirical observations. A brief 
summary of the main findings of each chapter will be delineated here. 
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Chapter 2, “Rigidity of Thought and Inflexible Borders: A Cognitive Analysis 
of British Nationalism”, began with the premise that nationalistic ideologies tend to 
have firm categories and rules for what belongs to and represents the national culture. 
This led to the hypothesis that nationalistic individuals would tend to think in more 
inflexible and categorical terms about non-ideological stimuli. Using voting behaviour 
and attitudes from the UK’s 2016 EU Referendum, we found that a flexible 
representation of national identity and culture was linked to cognitive flexibility in 
the ideologically-neutral WCST and the RAT, and to self-reported flexibility under 
uncertainty. Structural equation modelling revealed that subjective and objective 
cognitive inflexibility predicted heightened authoritarianism, nationalism, 
conservatism, and system-justification, and these in turn were predictive of support 
for Brexit and opposition to immigration, the EU, and free movement of labour. This 
model accounted for 47.6% of the variance in support for Brexit. Path analysis models 
were also predictive of participants’ sense of personal attachment to the UK, 
signifying that individual differences in cognitive flexibility may contribute towards 
ideological thinking styles that shape both nationalistic attitudes and personal sense 
of nationalistic identity. This is particularly notable given the scarcity of empirical 
studies conducted on the topic of nationalism, and given that nationalism is often an 
ideological orientation that is evident across both the political left and the political 
right. The findings suggested that information processing styles in relation to 
perceptual and linguistic stimuli may be drawn upon in the evaluation of political 
information and in the formation of ideological identities, such that the rigidity of 
one’s perception and cognition is manifest in the rigidity of their ideological 
sentiments. 
Chapter 3, “Cognitive Flexibility and Religious Disbelief: The Roles of 
Ideological Rituals, Identity, and Upbringing”, similarly considered the role of 
flexibility of thought in ideological thinking, but focused on religiosity. It drew on the 
literature of the cognitive science of religion, which has highlighted that religious 
belief systems consist of strict rules and rituals that offer adherents certainty, 
consistency, and stability. It was therefore hypothesized that religious adherence and 
practice of repetitive religious rituals may be related to the persistence versus 
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flexibility of one’s cognition. The study investigated the extent to which tendencies 
towards cognitive flexibility versus persistence are related to three facets of religious 
life: religious affiliation, religious practice, and religious upbringing. In a large sample 
(N=744), we found that religious disbelief was related to cognitive flexibility across 
the WCST, RAT, and AUT. Furthermore, lower frequency of religious service 
attendance was related to cognitive flexibility. When analysing participants’ religious 
upbringing in relation to their current religious affiliation, it was manifest that current 
affiliation was more influential than religious upbringing in all the measured facets of 
cognitive flexibility. The findings indicate that participation in religious ideologies 
may shape and be shaped by cognitive control styles towards flexibility versus 
rigidity, highlighting that ideological affiliation, engagement, and upbringing may 
have different psychological antecedents and consequences. 
Building on these findings, Chapter 4, “Ideological Symmetries: Testing the 
Ideological Extremity Hypothesis in American Political Partisanship”, sought to 
dissect the various components of ideological identity and participation in the context 
of US politics. It challenged the reliance of past research on single-item measures of 
political conservatism, and their unwarranted use in assessing political extremity11. It 
also questioned the tendency of research in political psychology to discard political 
independents from primary analyses. Notably, contemporary political psychology 
has dealt with the cognitive rigidity account since the publication of The Authoritarian 
Personality (Adorno et al., 1950), and this has led to two competing hypotheses. The 
prominent rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis argues that mental rigidity is related to a 
conservative political orientation, while the ideological extremity hypothesis suggests 
that rigidity is associated with partisan extremity across the political spectrum. The 
study detailed in Chapter 4 revealed that partisan extremity predicted reduced 
cognitive flexibility, regardless of political orientation, across three independent 
cognitive assessments of flexibility. This was evident across multiple statistical 
analyses, including quadratic regressions, Bayes factor analysis, and interrupted 
                                                          
 




regressions. These findings signify that the rigidity with which individuals process 
and respond to non-political information may be related to the extremity of their 
partisan identities. This constituted the first direct testing of the two hypotheses using 
behavioural measures of cognitive inflexibility, revealing that sensitive measures of 
ideology and cognition can help resolve disputed theoretical debates. 
Chapter 5, “Deconstructing Dogmatism: The Interaction of Cognitive 
Flexibility and Intelligence”, adopted a complementary approach to that of Chapters 
2-4 and instead of focusing on a coherent ideological identity or set of convictions it 
examined intellectual humility – the recognition of one’s own potential fallibility when 
forming and revising attitudes. The results indicated that intellectual humility was 
positively associated with cognitive flexibility on the AUT and with intelligence 
(measured with the Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices). These relationships 
were pronounced for the facets of intellectual humility associated with respect for 
opposing opinions and openness to revising one’s attitudes in light of new evidence. 
The data revealed an interaction: high cognitive flexibility is particularly valuable for 
intellectual humility in the context of low intelligence, and reciprocally, high 
intelligence is beneficial for intellectual humility in the context of low flexibility. 
Notably, there was evidence of a compensatory effect, as participants who scored 
highly on both flexibility and intelligence did not exhibit superior intellectual humility 
relative to individuals who scored highly on only one of these cognitive traits. These 
findings are suggestive of dual psychological pathways to intellectual humility; either 
cognitive flexibility or intelligence is sufficient for high intellectual humility, but 
neither is necessary. The interactionist perspective adopted in Chapter 5 highlights 
the importance of considering moderation effects when studying such complex 
phenomena and compilation of traits – this will be discussed further as a fruitful 
avenue for future research in section 7.2. 
Lastly, Chapter 6, “A Data-Driven Approach to the Psychological Correlates of 
Ideological Attitudes”, built on the convergent finding from Chapters 2-5 that it is 
fruitful and productive to embrace an individual differences perspective to study the 
cognitive underpinnings of various ideological orientations. However, it departed 
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from the theory-driven approach of Chapters 2-5 and instead relied on a unique 
dataset compiled in collaboration with researchers at Stanford University to apply a 
data-driven approach to these questions. Using an unprecedented number of 
cognitive tasks and personality surveys, and data-driven derivation of mental 
structure, we conducted the first rigorous, systematic quantification of the relative 
contributions of demographics, personality, and cognition to individuals’ ideological 
inclinations. The findings illustrate that psychological variables consistently 
outperform demographic variables in accounting for political conservatism, 
religiosity, and dogmatism. A combination of novel data-analytic strategies including 
in-sample linear regression, out-of-sample cross-validation, and Bayesian Model 
Averaging, revealed that including psychological traits increased explanatory power 
by 4- to 15-fold. Furthermore, we uncovered the psychological dispositions that were 
most strongly linked to individuals’ ideological orientations, revealing the cognitive 
and personality signatures of a large set of ideologies in the domains of nationalism, 
religion, politics, and dogmatism. Consequently, the findings of Chapter 6 are directly 
informed by and informative for the conclusions of Chapters 2-5.  
7.1.3 Three Insights 
These findings yield three overarching conclusions. Firstly, the results of 
Chapters 2-6 shed light on cognitive traits that are implicated in domain-general 
ideological thinking as well as those that play a role only in specific ideological 
orientations (Section 7.1.3.1 below). Secondly, the findings challenge past assumptions 
that socioeconomic context and emotional processes are the most powerful predictors 
of how people will vote and what they will believe – illustrating that “cold” non-
emotional processes matter too (Section 7.1.3.2 below). Lastly, this body of work 
provides support to the notion that ideological cognition should be studied as a 
separate, integrative phenomenon in the psychological and behavioural sciences, and 
that such an approach could help illuminate complex societal challenges and address 
gaps in our theoretical and applied knowledge (Section 7.1.3.3 below). 
189 
 
7.1.3.1 Ideological Similarities and Differences: (When) Does Ideological Content Matter? 
Across this set of studies, it has become manifest that there are several cognitive 
and personality traits that are consistently implicated in strong possession of 
ideological beliefs. Heightened cognitive rigidity (Chapters 2-5), response caution 
(Chapter 6), and aversion to social risk-taking (Chapter 6) reliably emerged as individual 
difference factors that characterize people with tendencies towards ideological 
thinking in relation to nationalism, religion, political partisanship, and dogmatism. 
Chapters 2-6 jointly illustrate that the intensity and strictness of one’s adherence to an 
ideology therefore appears to be as relevant to – and revealing of – one’s mental 
flexibility and psychological makeup as the content of one’s favoured ideology. The 
results of these studies suggest that the cognitively inflexible mind may be especially 
susceptible to the clarity, certainty, and safety frequently offered by strong loyalty to 
collective ideologies and doctrines, regardless of their subject matter and motivation. 
Despite these similarities, there is also substantial diversity in the psychological 
correlates of ideological convictions. Chapter 6 revealed that political conservatism, 
nationalism, and religiosity generally implicate reduced strategic information 
processing and heightened response caution, while general dogmatism did not. 
Dogmatism was uniquely associated with impaired accumulation of evidence in 
conjunction with impulsivity – a profile that was distinct from content-based 
ideologies. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 6, even within the political ideologies, 
there was considerable variability. For instance, social and economic conservatism, 
which are measured as part of the same Social and Economic Conservatism Scale 
(SECS; Everett, 2013), were characterized by several discrepant personality correlates; 
economic conservatism was associated with enhanced sensation-seeking whereas 
social conservatism was not, and in turn social conservatism was related to heightened 
agreeableness and risk perception, while economic conservatism was not (Figure 
6.S5). Similarly, while authoritarianism and social dominance orientation have often 
been investigated in tandem (e.g. Asbrock, Sibley, & Duckitt, 2010; Duckitt & Sibley, 
2007, 2009; Duriez & Van Hiel, 2002), we found that in spite of considerable 
psychological overlap, there were also notable differences. For example, while 
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authoritarianism was associated with faster accumulation of evidence and a tendency 
towards greater discounting of delayed rewards, social dominance orientation was 
associated with slower evidence accumulation and greater response caution (Figure 
6.8). Theoretically-similar ideological orientations therefore exhibit both overlaps and 
differences in their psychological underpinnings. Consequently, studying the 
psychological similarities across domains can inform our understanding of the 
cognitive consequences and antecedents of ideological thinking generally, and 
identifying the discrepancies in cognitive underpinnings helps clarify the nature of 
diverse ideological convictions, and what it is that makes them different in the first 
place. 
 
7.1.3.2 Beyond Pure Circumstance and Emotion 
 There has been a long-held assumption in political science that socioeconomic 
circumstance and family upbringing are the most powerful predictors of individuals’ 
beliefs, attitudes, and identities (e.g. Campbell et al., 1960). Adorno and colleagues 
(1950) already noted in The Authoritarian Personality that this is likely to be an 
oversimplification, but at the time lacked the empirical evidence to demonstrate this 
convincingly. Nonetheless, they wrote eloquently: 
“Even when individuals are exposed during their formative years almost exclusively to 
a single, closely knit pattern of political, economic, social, and religious ideas, it is found 
that some conform while others rebel, and it seems proper to inquire whether personality 
factors do not make the difference. The soundest approach, it would seem, is to consider 
that in the determination of ideology, as in the determination of any behaviour, there is 
a situational factor and a personality factor, and that a careful weighting of the role of 
each will yield the most accurate prediction.” (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 9) 
 Chapter 6 exemplifies that we are able to carefully quantify the relative 
contributions of demographic and psychological factors in a data-driven fashion in 
order to illuminate that cognitive dispositions and personality traits play a substantial 
role in determining individuals’ ideologies. This was also clearly evident in Chapter 
2, in which nationalistic attitudes were predicted to a considerable degree by cognitive 
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traits. Interestingly, Chapter 3 adds nuance to this finding by illustrating that while 
ideological upbringing is less influential in predicting one’s psychological tendencies 
than current ideological affiliation, one’s upbringing – and the extent to which the 
individual departed from that upbringing in adulthood – does give a context to the 
expression of cognitive traits. In particular, nonreligious participants with a religious 
upbringing (i.e. those that chose to “leave” religion in favour of atheism) exhibited 
heightened cognitive flexibility on the RAT relative to all other groups. This raises a 
multitude of valuable questions about the nuanced interactions between 
environmental influences and cognitive traits, which deserve careful attention in 
future research. 
 Another strongly-held assumption by political scientists and social 
psychologists is that ideological beliefs are largely determined by our receptivity to 
emotional rhetoric, contagion, and intimidation (e.g. Goldenberg et al., 2016). To our 
knowledge, the current studies are amongst the first to suggest that ideological 
processes are not purely underpinned by ‘hot’ emotional processing, attitude-
confirming biases, or moral foundations and values. Here it is shown that people’s 
evaluation of ideological arguments and willingness to harm others for their group 
may also be rooted in ‘cold’ emotionally-neutral cognitive information processing 
tendencies. Thus, it is not only emotional processing or “psychological needs” that 
underlie individuals’ adoption of ideologies; “cold” cognitive information processing 
styles also play a key role in ideological behaviour and identity. Cognitive dispositions 
may therefore need to be incorporated into prominent theories about the factors 
shaping extremism and self-sacrifice, such as significance quest theory (Kruglanski et 
al., 2014, 207) and identity fusion theory (Swann et al., 2010, 2012). This will facilitate 
research into the neural mechanisms that underlie these psycho-social processes, and 
offer insight into the extent to which political campaigns appeal not only to our 




7.1.3.3 Studying Ideological Cognition as a Phenomenon 
An emergent conclusion from this set of studies is that it is possible, valuable, 
and perhaps socially-important to study ideological thinking and related processes 
under one umbrella, rather than in siloed subdisciplines of psychology. It is possible to 
consider ideological cognition as a separable phenomenon because the findings 
indicate that there are core commonalities in the substrates of adherence to ideological 
doctrines regardless of their content. There are therefore psychological dispositions, 
situational factors, and neurobiological characteristics that can predispose an 
individual to process and respond to the world in an ideological fashion. 
Consequently, it is valuable to cluster these behaviours and susceptibilities in common 
terms and under unified theoretical frameworks if scientific endeavours to 
deconstruct these phenomena are to be meaningful and applicable. Lastly, there is 
considerable societal utility in comprehending the susceptibility factors – and antidotes 
– to attitudes that are dogmatic and hostile to dissimilar others. Given the 
kaleidoscopic diversity of mass movements, doctrines, and regimes that characterize 
human history and culture, isolating and defining the core processes of ideological 
adherence, immersion, and extremism is a pressing academic and applied task. 
One of the most profound results from the current studies is that ideologically-
neutral cognitive processes that manifest in simple trial-by-trial decision-making are 
related to higher-level ideological convictions and beliefs. This is suggestive of domain-
general and time-invariant processes and strategies that operate on multiple time scales 
and across a variety of contexts. That is, the rigidity, caution, and accumulation of 
sensory and reinforcement evidence on a neutral two-forced choice paradigm was 
related to the rigidity, caution, and insensitivity to evidence manifest in the individual 
at higher-order goals and temporally-longer strategies. This suggests a 
correspondence between the cognitive mechanisms governing stimulus-response 
relationships in simple perceptual tasks and the cognitive processes that underlie 
evaluation of ideological arguments. This raises a number of key questions regarding 
the neural and behavioural instantiation of these shared mechanisms as well as the 
causal structure of these processes. Do the relationships identified in this research 
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indeed emerge from low-level rigidity at the stimulus-response level that becomes 
manifest in higher-order information contexts? Does engagement with ideological 
doctrines lead to rigidity through alterations of the individual’s low-level perceptual 
systems? If so, what environmental and neural mechanisms mediate this set of 
changes? 
The Identity-Based Model of Political Belief sketched out by Van Bavel and 
Periera (2018) generally posits that partisan identities influence the value attached to 
different beliefs, and so shape attentional control, memory, implicit evaluation, and 
executive functioning. To support this, Van Bavel and Periera (2018) cite research 
illustrating how knowledge of others’ political affiliations and social identities 
changes visual perception of and attention to identity-relevant videos and events 
(Caruso, Mead, & Balcetis, 2009; Granot et al., 2014; Kahan et al., 2012; Molenberghs 
et al., 2013). Nonetheless, this model concerns what happens to cognitive systems 
when the brain processes politically-valenced or identity-relevant information, rather 
than how the brain processes and responds to the world in general when it is under 
the overarching influence of ideologies, or how ideological thinking can infiltrate 
processing of non-political information. 
The task of characterizing the mediating mechanisms between general 
cognition and ideological cognition will require interdisciplinary efforts, including the 
incorporation of computational methods, neuroscientific paradigms, and a systematic 
study of other fields which have drawn parallels and identified shared mechanisms 
between perceptual representations and higher-order psychological processes. Novel 
lines of inquiry in the realm of political neuroscience have already begun to unpack 
these questions. There is now some evidence that amygdala structure and function 
relate to individual variability in ideological positions and attitudes (Kanai, Feilden, 
Firth, & Rees, 2011; Nam, Jost, Kaggen, Campbell-Meiklejohn, & Van Bavel, 2018), and 
that the disgust evoked by non-political images and stimuli can predict political 
ideology in US participants (Ahn et al., 2014; Liuzza et al., 2018). There is even 
evidence that prefrontal cortex activity during intergroup fairness games tracks 
participants’ identity fusion to the group (Apps, McKay, Azevedo, Whitehouse, & 
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Tsakiris, 2018), suggesting that the impact of identity processes on social behaviour is 
related to prefrontal cortex processing. However, there is still substantial work that 
needs to be done in order to elucidate the underlying mechanisms. Do we observe 
these findings simply because these regions are implicated in high-level 
cognitive/emotional processing as well as processing information about social 
groups? Or is there a deeper process at play, in which low-level perceptual tendencies 
and neural architecture directly support the emergence of ideological attitudes and 
dogmatic or parochial processing of information? Scientists of ideological and 
intergroup thinking will need to tackle difficult questions about why we observe 
correspondences between social attitudes and cognitive structure, and what 
behavioural and neural mechanisms underpin these correspondences. While this may 
sound like a reductionist enterprise, understanding ideological cognition in terms of 
the mechanistic principles of perception and neuroscience will only enrich our 
understanding of these high-level behaviours. We need to be as rigorous and 
mathematical in our investigation of ideological cognition as psychologists and 
neuroscientists are about temporal cognition, modal cognition, and sensory 
perception – echoing Spinoza’s words that we can “analyse the actions and appetites 
of men as if it were a question of lines, of planes, and of solids” (Spinoza, 1677/2017). 
7.2 Future Research 
The research outlined here has sparked numerous valuable research questions 
for future inquiry. Firstly, the findings call for further investigation into the precise 
mechanisms that underlie how cognitive traits give rise to individuals’ ideological 
orientations and identities. An assumption underlying the present studies is that 
domain-general cognitive rigidity translates into ideological rigidity because general 
mental inflexibility will lend itself towards inflexible processing and evaluation of 
ideological arguments and a greater reliance on rigid social categories. Nonetheless, 
to corroborate this idea, future studies will need to develop methods that can directly 
quantify the rigidity with which arguments are evaluated and incorporated into 
individuals’ mental schemas of these concepts. This will allow us to more directly test 
whether the underlying mediational hypothesis is indeed at play. Methods will also 
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need to be designed that tap into the way in which rigid social categories shape 
cognition and decision-making. This will involve assessing contexts when these 
ingroup-outgroup social categories are either task-relevant or task-irrelevant in order 
to evaluate the global psychological effects of adhering to sharp categorical “us-vs-
them” distinctions. There is therefore room for empirical research and design that will 
carefully interrogate the mechanistic explanations hypothesized here. 
Secondly, one major area of future investigation will be to examine how these 
“cold” non-emotional cognitive processes interact with “hot” emotional traits and 
contexts. There is a growing research on the role of emotional processes (DeSteno, 
Dasgupta, Bartlett, & Cajdric, 2004; Goldenberg, Halperin, van Zomeren, & Gross, 
2016; Zaki & Cikara, 2015) and of emotionally-implicated neural substrates (Nam et 
al., 2018) in shaping intergroup attitudes. Nonetheless, there is little to no research 
about the interaction between (non-emotional) cognitive and emotional traits in 
influencing susceptibility to engaging with collective ideologies. For instance, do 
specific patterns of reactivity to threatening stimuli combined with cognitive rigidity 
elevate susceptibility in an additive or multiplicative fashion? Or does a heightened 
capacity to regulate one’s emotions buffer against the effects of cognitive rigidity on 
ideological rigidity? These “cold” and “hot” cognition effects are all interactions that 
need to be empirically specified and examined in order to develop a more 
comprehensive picture of the factors that can predispose an individual to ideological 
thinking.  
Along these lines, a future direction for research involves examining how 
situationally-activated motivations (as extrapolated in the motivational accounts of 
social identity and political conservatism outlined in Chapter 1) interact with these 
dispositions. Future research on the psychological roots of radicalization and 
extremist attitudes will need to address how non-emotional cognitive styles interact 
with other individual-level motivational risk factors such as the quest for personal 
significance (Kruglanski et al., 2014), identity fusion (Swann et al., 2010; Whitehouse, 
2018), the need to belong (Lyons-Padilla et al., 2015; Littman & Paluck, 2015), and 
sacred values (Atran, 2010; Ginges, 2019; Sheikh, Ginges, Coman, & Atran, 2012). Are 
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individuals with certain cognitive dispositions more resistant or susceptible to 
situations that might motivate individuals to seek existential answers or social 
connectedness? And crucially, are these traits that we can cultivate in order help 
confer resistance to radicalization in vulnerable populations?12 As outlined 
throughout the dissertation, there is growing evidence that cognitive flexibility is 
malleable and trainable with simple interventions (e.g. Colzato, Ozturk & Hommel, 
2012; Colzato et al., 2017; Fleith, Renzulli, & Westberg, 2002; Kleibeuker et al., 2017; 
Scott et al., 2004, Stevenson et al., 2014) and so early educational programs in schools 
that emphasize cognitive flexibility may facilitate intergroup perspective-taking and 
reduced prejudice (e.g. Diamond & Lee, 2011). Consequently, the study of interactions 
amongst situations, motivations, and traits could hold important promise for both our 
academic and applied understanding of ideological phenomena and the emergence of 
mass movements. 
In addition to considering the broader high-level factors that may shape 
individuals’ susceptibility to collective ideologies, it will also be instrumental for 
future research to consider the underlying low-level neurobiological factors that can 
amplify or buffer against risk. The present research suggests that biologically-
grounded cognitive traits are implicated in formation and maintenance of ideological 
identities, and so it may be promising to examine how neurobiological factors such as 
genetic traits and neuro-physiological characteristics shape cognition – and in turn 
ideological thinking. Building biologically-informed models of ideological cognition 
may therefore be a fruitful direction for this field to take as it continues to grow and 
mature.  
Furthermore, the results have highlighted the need for novel assessment tools 
in order to facilitate a new “psychology of ideology”. There are three main avenues 
for this methodologically-oriented research that will have a particularly fruitful 
impact on future studies. Firstly, it is necessary to create a tool that assesses ideological 
                                                          
 
12 While making sure that any intervention program does not inadvertently result in unfavourable by-product 
outcomes such as social antipathy. 
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commitment, conviction, and attachment without invoking the particular content of 
that ideology. This is important in order to be able to truly compare the psychological 
correlates of diverse ideological orientations. One proxy to measuring the strength of 
ideological identity is the Identity Fusion index (used in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4), in 
which the participant is asked to move a small circle labelled “Me” in relation to a 
large static circle labelled with the name of the ideological group (e.g. a personally-
relevant religious group, political party, nation). The amount of overlap between the 
two circles and the distance between the circles13 can be used as a metric of personal 
feelings of immersion with the ideological group. The power of this measure lies in its 
applicability to any ideological or social group, such that the amount of identity fusion 
is quantifiable and translatable between ideologies. 
Another attempt to do this is the Open-Minded Cognition Scale, in which the 
scale items can be easily adjusted to target general, political, or religious open-minded 
cognition (Price, Ottati, Wilson, & Kim, 2015). For instance, the 6-item scale contains 
items such as “I am open to considering other (political/religious) viewpoints” and “I 
have no patience for (political/religious) arguments I disagree with”. Nonetheless, 
recent work by Crawford, Brandt, and Germano (2018) challenges the predictive 
validity of the Open-Minded Cognition Scale and suggests that it may be best 
conceptualized as a measurement of self-perceived open-minded cognition rather than 
open-minded cognition itself (Crawford, Brandt, & Germano, 2018, p. 24). 
Consequently, there is still substantial room for methodological work that seeks to 
develop appropriate, reliable, and predictive measures that avoid social-desirability 
biases14.  
 The second methodological direction for future research is the need to clearly 
separate correlates of (1) the doctrinal aspects of ideological thinking (dogmatic 
reasoning that follows a ready-made doctrine and is resistant to belief updating in 
                                                          
 
13 Distance can be a useful measure when participants are explicitly told that they can also drag the “Me” circle 
away from “Group” circle to indicate distance or aversion. 
14 Indeed, a pictorial measure like the Identity Fusion index helps ameliorate these kinds of biases because there 




light of new evidence) and (2) the relational components (ingroup favouritism, 
outgroup antagonism, and enforcement of rigid social norms). Ideological thinking as 
defined here possesses both components, and so it will be important to develop clear 
guidelines and frameworks for measuring each facet as well as their interactions. How 
do the doctrinal and relational aspects of ideological thinking emerge in tandem 
within an individual? How are the doctrinal and relational elements structurally 
related? That is, does one temporally precede the other and how do they reinforce and 
amplify each other? What personal and social experiences or motivations affect the 
emergence of each? Do they possess separable or similar cognitive correlates? What 
are the real-world manifestations of the relational component without a doctrinal 
component (e.g. avid sports fans15) or the reverse (e.g. lone suicide terrorists16)? 
Unpacking the structure of ideological thinking is therefore a key next step for this 
line of research. 
Lastly, in order to advance a psychology of ideology, we must clearly delineate 
and study the whole process of ideological immersion, from exposure to adherence to 
extremism. Each stage between exposure to radical adherence and self-sacrifice is 
likely to have overlapping and unique susceptibility factors, and so we need 
appropriate assessment tools to evaluate individuals’ position at each stage. This will 
require measurement tools that are both content-free and contextually-specific, since 
there are likely to be both similarities and differences in the trajectories and 
manifestations of ideological immersion for different doctrines. Indeed, 
developmental and longitudinal studies will be necessary in order to elucidate causal 
links and self-reinforcing loops between cognitive dispositions and ideological 
identity and behaviour. 
 
 
                                                          
 
15 However, arguably some fans are also resistant to information of poor performance by their team, and so the 
doctrinal aspect can exist in sports group memberships as well. 
16 Nonetheless, even when an individual is supposedly purely motivated by ideology, there is often the hope of 




 All the studies presented here consisted of samples of participants recruited 
online. This constitutes a primary limitation of the current research, as online samples 
are often not perfect representations of the general population, and so inferences about 
psycho-political processes require that these studies are replicated in samples that are 
selected for their representativeness. Lab experiments will also help verify the 
reliability of these findings. The challenge with lab-based studies of this nature is that 
this may constrain the representativeness to even more extreme degrees – university 
students and populations around universities are often WEIRD (Henrich, Heine, & 
Norenzayan, 2010; Hruschka, Medin, Rogoff, & Henrich, 2018). Hence, there is 
considerable scope for replication work in nationally representative samples. 
Moreover, it is paramount to conduct cross-cultural work in order to make stronger 
claims about the psychology of ideology, especially given the diversity of political 
systems and levels of totalitarianism across the world today. 
 From the cognitive methodology perspective, the studies here are also limited 
to particular subsets of cognitive tests, and so it will be valuable for future research to 
examine a broader range of cognitive flexibility tests such as task-switching 
paradigms and probabilistic reversal learning tests in order to generate a 
comprehensive picture of the relevant facets of mental flexibility. Additionally, while 
the studies have sought to show the specificity of flexibility – rather than general 
cognition – in shaping ideological worldviews, it will be important to clearly and 
directly delineate the role of intelligence and cognitive ability as risk or resilience 
factors (as in Chapter 5). Indeed, the strength of Chapter 6 is its expansive cognitive 
dataset. However, in order to deal with such a large dataset we used factor analysis to 
reduce the dimensionality of the psychological data, but also lost some granularity as 
a result; the “strategic information processing” factor that is implicated consistently 
in political conservatism, nationalism, and religiosity, is a conglomerate of many high-
level cognitive traits and so is difficult to fully interpret. This limitation is in part a 
weakness of available analytic methodologies – there are few tools that can robustly 
evaluate relationships in such a large data matrix without falling prey to questionable 
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research practices. Our use of Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) helped alleviate this, 
but due to limitations in the software used to run these analyses, we could only run 
BMA on the 17 psychological factors and 4 demographic variables but not on the 
larger set of raw dependent variables (consisting of 129 cognitive dependent variables 
and 64 personality dependent variables). Advances in these analytic methods and the 
improvement of computational social science will hopefully allow us to revisit this 
analysis in the future to achieve an even more fine-grained understanding of exactly 
which cognitive tasks and personality survey items are most predictive of ideological 
attitudes. 
 Furthermore, there are limitations on the extent to which inferences about 
causality can be made here. Are the manifest relationships between cognitive traits 
and ideological orientations a result of engaging with ideologies or a reflection of the 
traits that confer susceptibility to ideological thinking in the first place? Moreover, 
what happens to these relationships in response to societal events such as when one’s 
ideological position is either socially marginalized or accepted. There are three 
primary ways to disentangle this: (1) longitudinal research that tracks individuals 
over time, (2) experimental paradigms that manipulate the salience of ideological 
doctrines, and (3) retrospective questions that tap into past ideological upbringing and 
levels of engagement with the ideology (as in Chapter 3). Future research will also 
need to consider the likely possibility that cognition both shapes and is shaped by 
ideological worldviews, and so we will need to develop means to characterize and 





At the end of her landmark paper, “Intolerance of Ambiguity as an Emotional 
and Perceptual Personality Variable” published 70 years ago in 1949, the pioneering 
psychologist Else Frenkel-Brunswik concludes that: 
“There is more than an empirical affinity between the strength of hostility, of power-
orientation, of externalization, and of rigid stereotyping, on the one hand, and the 
intolerance of ambiguity, on the other. There is a similar affinity between the orientation 
toward love and acceptance of drive-impulses, on the one hand, and a general flexibility 
on the other. The struggle between these two orientations is basic to our civilization, its 
individual members display these two patterns in varying proportions and changing 
configurations” (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949, p. 141). 
The research presented in this dissertation speak to Frenkel-Brunswik’s words 
in multiple ways. From an empirical perspective, indeed we have shown that mental 
rigidity and intolerance of ambiguity are linked to intergroup hostility, and at the 
same time that cognitive flexibility is associated with tolerance and acceptance of 
dissimilar others. From a philosophical and existentialist perspective, acknowledging 
the essential tension between the rigidity-ideology and flexibility-tolerance 
dimensions as well as the fact that these are constantly in struggle within the 
individual and across history should inspire hope. Why hope? Because it is exactly in 
the plasticity and malleability of these orientations – and the study of their nature – 
that we can imagine and implement positive change to build more tolerant, loving, 
and creative societies. 
The aim of this research and its subsequent future elaborations is therefore not 
only to characterize ideological cognition in scientifically-rigorous ways, but also to 
consider how this knowledge can have tangible consequences for how we understand 
the contemporary moment and our collective history, how we educate future 
generations, and how we help those who are most susceptible to the allure of collective 
ideologies. As new forms of ideologies continue to emerge – including ones with 
clearly sincere and positive intentions to improve the state of all humanity and the 
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natural environment – this line of research will need to grapple with the challenging 
task of investigating radical forms of social justice ideologies, unprecedented types of 
populism, and the difficulty of conducting political psychology and neuroscience 
research without political goals or prejudice17. Moreover, the findings of the present 
studies suggest that policymakers and intervention scientists may benefit from 
incorporating objective cognitive assessments into their toolkits for evaluating 
individuals’ susceptibility to radicalisation and extremism. Hence, an 
interdisciplinary approach that is biologically-informed and socially-sensitive, and 
guided by both theoretical considerations and data-driven analytics, will be 
instrumental in deconstructing the complex cocktail of traits, states, situations, and 
ecologies that shape an individual’s vulnerability to ideological worldviews.  
By delving into the remarkable parallels between an individual’s idiosyncratic 
tendencies in processing and responding to information and how they evaluate and 
internalize ideological arguments, we can illuminate the subtle workings of ideologies 
as well as of general human perception and cognition. It is in these insights that we 
can discover antidotes to the effects of ideologies on the human mind and to begin to 
wonder what a life untinged by ideological doctrines and harsh social categorizations 
might look like – and whether it is even possible. 
  
                                                          
 
17 Objectivity and rigour in political psychology are naturally fundamental goals if we are to study ideological 
cognition in a scientific way. However, it is valuable to keep in mind the observations of the philosopher of science 
Paul Feyerabend who noted in Against Method: “Is it not possible that science as we know it today, or a “search for 
the truth” in the style of traditional philosophy, will create a monster?... “Is it not possible,” asks Kierkegaard, “that 
my activity as an objective observer of nature will weaken my strength as a human being?” I suspect the answer 
to many of these questions is affirmative and I believe that a reform of the sciences that makes them more anarchic 
and more subjective (in Kierkegaard’s sense) is urgently needed.” (Feyerabend, 1975/1993, p. 154). The study of 











Figure 6.S1. Bayes Factor for demographics-only regression 
models (BFdem) 
Figure 6.S2. Models used in Bayesian Model Averaging. 
Figure 6.S3. Personality correlates of political conservatism 
factor. 
Figure 6.S4. Personality correlates of dogmatism factor. 
Figure 6.S5. Personality correlates of religiosity factor. 
Figure 6.S6. Cognitive correlates of dogmatism and religiosity 
factors. 





Additional Figures for Chapter 6 
Figure 6.S1. Evidential strength (Bayes Factors) of psychological regression models 






Figure 6.S2. Models used in Bayesian Model Averaging of (A) political conservatism, 
(B) dogmatism, and (C) religiosity. The variables are ordered by probability of 
inclusion. If a variable is included in the model, red indicates positive estimate while 
blue indicates negative estimate (white indicates it was not included in the model). 
The models are ordered by posterior probability from left to right, and bar width 
reflects the posterior probability of the model. See Figure 6.6 for probability of 













Figure 6.S3. Standardized estimates of personality variables for ideological 
orientations that load on the Political Conservatism factor (divided across S3 A and 


















Figure 6.S4: Standardized estimates of personality variables for ideological 
orientations that load on the Dogmatism factor. Derived from multiple regression 
model predicted by personality survey variables only. IH = Intellectual Humility. IH1 
= Independence of Intellect and Ego; IH2 = Openness to Revising One’s Viewpoint; 







Figure 6.S5. Standardized estimates of personality variables for ideological 
orientations that load on the Religiosity factor. Derived from multiple regression 







Figure 6.S6. Standardized estimates of personality variables for ideological 
orientations that load on the Dogmatism and Religiosity factors. Derived from 
multiple regression model predicted by cognitive task variables only. IH = Intellectual 
Humility. IH1 = Independence of Intellect and Ego; IH2 = Openness to Revising 









Figure 6.S7. Cross-validated predictive accuracy for ideological orientations using the 
psychological variables (cognitive and personality variables). The cross-validated 
prediction significantly predicts all outcomes, except for the Intellectual Humility (IH) 
component Lack of Intellectual Overconfidence (IH4). IH1 = Independence of Intellect 
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